Russia has targeted many European countries in its new shadow war offensive this summer. But Enemy No. 1 is Germany, the nation that has done more than any other to fund Ukraine and rebuild Europe’s crumbling defenses.
Infrastructure sabotage, assassination plots, drone incursions and the menacing of undersea cables have become commonplace. There are signals that this may be as serious as that of last fall. Or worse.
It’s not hard to see why the Kremlin targets Germany. The country increasingly acts as the linchpin of a hawkish but fledgling North European alliance determined to confront Russian aggression. Other countries in this grouping (the Nordic-Baltic eight, plus Poland) are also targeted, along with Romania, while most NATO members in Southern Europe are less affected.
Germany has faced several hybrid attacks in recent months. The key event was the discovery on August 4 of explosive-laden drones at Leipzig/Halle airport in eastern Germany, causing the shutdown of all its runways. Leipzig/Halle hosts Antonov Airlines, a Ukrainian cargo carrier that has four planes at the airport.
The attack was not a simple warning message; it was designed to do serious damage. Of the at least three drones involved, two were armed with military-grade explosives and two aircraft were struck, though there were no detonations. Chancellor Frederick Merz said it was “pure chance” that no one was hurt. Germany’s government and US intelligence said Russia was behind the attack. Russia denied this, claiming that the evidence of its involvement was planted by Germany’s leading parties in order to divert attention from impending elections. It also (confusingly) said Germany deserved to be attacked and described the Merz government’s decision to publicize attribution as a declaration of war. Moreover, on September 3, explosives were thrown in the vicinity of the headquarters of Rohde & Schwarz, an electronics manufacturing company whose products are used by military enterprises. Two Bulgarian nationals were taken into police custody following the propulsion, and Russian intelligence involvement is suspected.
Behind such notable events is a steady drumbeat of Russian intelligence activity in the cyber sphere and continual drone incursions above German military bases and power infrastructure.
In neighboring Poland, Russian artist and political dissident Robert Kuzovkov, also known as Semyon Skrepetsky, was murdered close to his home on June 16. He was granted political asylum in 2021. Additionally, on August 7, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk disclosed that a joint Polish-American effort had foiled the assassination of a dual US-Ukrainian citizen in Warsaw. The identity of the target has not been revealed, although the individual was identified by Tusk as adverse to Russian interests. And on September 1, an attack on the EU’s largest Polish drone producer in Skarżysko-Kamienna was also attributed to Russia.
The Baltic countries, too, have experienced their eastern neighbor’s disruption techniques. On the night of August 15, a fire broke out in a building used by Estonian defense company Milrem Robotics in Tallinn.
The incident is being investigated as an act of sabotage, and three suspects have been identified in neighboring Latvia. In 2022, the Russian Armed Forces offered a financial reward for the procurement and delivery of the Milrem Robotics’ THeMIS unmanned ground vehicle, which is used by the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Moreover, Latvian intelligence warned about Russia’s increasing hybrid warfare in late June, and those concerns were reiterated by Lithuanian President Gitanas Nausėda in July, who disclosed infrastructure damage attributable to Russia.
The Nordic countries are also targets. In August, the Swedish Security Service (Säpo) revealed the detection of a long-running Russian intelligence operation. Two employees of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) recruited an agent working for another foreign embassy and gathered important information. The alleged Russian spy escaped prosecution due to their diplomatic immunity.
Moreover, on September 3, the Danish Security and Intelligence Service (PET) said Russia was preparing acts of sabotage, reporting that its spies were recruiting Danes to commit acts damaging to the defense sector. Four days later, Finland inaugurated a 200 km (124 miles) surveillance fence along its southeastern Russian border. Officials pointed to the hybrid war threat posed by Russia as a core reason for the fence, explaining that control of the border hinders Russia from using migrants to their advantage in grey-zone war tactics.
What to do? Jan Kallberg, the CEPA Fellow and security strategy researcher, said a response is critical because the Russians were reaping gains without paying a price.
He pointed out that the costs linked to the campaign were huge and rising. Rather than simply responding to the assaults, Kallberg argued European leaders should agree on measures, including aid to Ukraine, that target the urban middle and upper class in Moscow and Saint Petersburg, whom he argues are vital constituencies for Putin.
“We have to strike where it hurts,” he said. “As long as Putin’s power base remains stable, this war [in Ukraine] and the provocations against Europe will not end. But if we shake the power base, there is reason to think that there might be change.”
European allies must aim to inflict “deep scars on [upper-class Russians]. Their sense of superiority is the weak spot of the Russian mentality,” he said.
Ester Ljunggren is CEPA Editorial Intern and a final-year undergraduate student at Gustavus Adolphus College, where she studies political science, economics, and Russian. Originally from Sweden, her research interests include European and Eurasian affairs, political economy, and authoritarianism and democratic resilience in the post-Soviet region.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
