The real Zeitenwende, Germany’s historical turning point, is now underway following the February 23 election, says Jan Techau, Senior Fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA) and Director of Europe at the Eurasia Group.
Speaking in a February 25 interview, Techau laid out the pitfalls and opportunities that lie ahead for the new chancellor, the Christian Democrat Friedrich Merz.
“It’s finally Zeitenwende,” Techau said, although much needs to happen before the resultant policies, for example, increased defense spending, actually come to pass.
Merz’s predecessor, Olaf Scholz fundamentally reimagined Germany’s security with his February 2022 Zeitenwende speech following Russia’s all-out invasion of Ukraine. Critics argue there has been some additional defense spending since, then but nothing to fundamentally shift the country’s security and geopolitical trajectory.
But the new chancellor faces a race to change Germany’s constitution through the old Bundestag, which remains sitting until its successor moves in on March 24. The new Bundestag with increased numbers of far-left and far-right members would probably block such a change.
“There’s now a frantic, short-term attempt to do this before the new parliament can constitute itself to ram through a constitutional amendment that would allow for more defense spending,” Techau said. If successful, that might allow for €200bn ($210bn) in extra defense funds or reform of the so-called debt brake, which limits budget deficits to 0.35% of GDP.
“This is a crucial moment,” Techau said. “If they don’t get it done within the next four weeks, the next government’s fiscal space on defense will be extremely limited, and that would be catastrophic.”
The brake is seen by many, though not all, in German politics as an unnecessary restraint on government spending. They argue it has hindered critical investments in infrastructure, education, tech, and defense. With Germany facing its worst economic crisis in decades, the issue has become a fault line in national politics, and disagreement on lifting it was blamed for the collapse of the last government.
Having secured over 20% of the votes, the AfD opposes debt brake reform to aid Ukraine and seeks a rapprochement with Russia. The Left Party, meanwhile, strongly resists increasing defense spending and is similarly Kremlin-friendly.
Germany’s military has suffered from decades of underinvestment and deterioration, resulting in equipment shortages and recruitment shortfalls that undermine its readiness. Chancellor Scholz’s 2022 Zeitenwende pledge promised a shift, with a €100bn special fund aimed at modernizing the Bundeswehr. Three years later, progress has been slow, and Berlin meets NATO’s annual defense spending target of 2% of GDP only thanks to the special fund. That money will run dry by 2027, at which point Germany risks falling below NATO’s benchmark. At a time when the Trump administration and many European allies are talking of 3%-plus defense expenditure, that would mark an embarrassing failure.
The real question isn’t just whether the CDU and SPD will reach a deal, but what kind of deal it will be.
“The fear is that they will neutralize each other, and we get some sort of unambitious, lukewarm reform agenda, on defense, on the economy, on migration,” said Techau. That would create a government of drift and might open the way for a more extreme administration in a few years.
Merz aims to steer Germany out of its economic crisis by prioritizing deregulation and lower taxes, while the SPD emphasizes social justice and investment in education and infrastructure.
“My hope is that, because of the sense of urgency and this clearly historic turning point in European history, they will be able rise above that lowest common denominator logic that usually applies to coalitions,” Techau added.
Recent changes in SPD leadership could facilitate this: Lars Klingbeil has replaced Rolf Mützenich as the head of the parliamentary party and represents a more centrist faction. But this does not mean the party’s left-wing has lost influence. “They will stay powerful,” explained Techau, and will likely push for concessions on migration, welfare spending, or social programs.
While Merz remains an untested executive leader, Techau credits him with “fearlessness” and a “level of ambition” that are well-suited for the moment, despite contradictions in some policy areas.
Known for his conservative views, Merz, a 69-year-old former financier, has positioned himself as a departure from Angela Merkel’s centrist approach. He has recently faced criticism for breaking a long-standing political taboo against cooperating with the AfD. His parliamentary proposal for stricter immigration laws was approved with support from the far-right party, prompting nationwide protests where hundreds of thousands took to the streets.
However, the biggest obstacle to a successful Merz chancellorship will most likely be his ability to strike an ambitious deal with the Social Democrats.
“Much depends on the Social Democrats now,” said Techau. “Can they come around, or will this be lowest common denominator politics? That’s the decisive question.”
Merz has acknowledged this is a decisive moment, saying the continent’s security situation means “it’s five minutes to midnight”. Germany won’t be alone in hoping a successful and outward-looking government emerges from the election.
Jan Techau is a Senior Fellow with the Transatlantic Defense and Security program at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA) and is the Director of Europe at the Eurasia Group, covering Germany and European Defense from Berlin. He was head of speechwriting for three German defense ministers from 2020-2023. From 2011-2016, he was Director of Carnegie Europe and ran the Europe Programs at both the German Marshall Fund of the United States (2018-2020) and at the German Council on Foreign Relations (2006-2010).
Interview by CEPA editorial staff. Written by Mila Tanghe. Mila attended Columbia University and is currently an Intern with the Editorial team at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA).
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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