In an astonishing era, it would be easy to miss something that historians may one day see as very significant. Germany is quietly becoming the leader of European security. 

It’s true that this is not the result of traditional European shoulder barging or raised voices. It has happened very quietly, and there have been few ripples, but it’s unmistakable. 

The most obvious signal has been the growing involvement of Chancellor Friedrich Merz in the Ukraine peace talks. The latest discussions took place in Berlin on December 14-15 at Merz’s request. His aim? To ensure that Ukraine was protected from US-Russian pressure and that the negotiations did not take place “above Europe’s head.” 

Merz not only appeared at the opening of the talks but also ensured his diplomatic advisor, Guenter Sautter, was present throughout. No other European leader was there, although Emmanuel Macron, Keir Starmer, and others attended a post-talks dinner. 

This isn’t the only example of a more activist Germany. On December 5, Merz flew at short notice to Brussels to discuss the Belgian premier’s objections about plans to pass frozen Russian assets to Ukraine. Also, there was the German President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen. 

A more energetic German foreign policy does not necessarily lead to success. German plans to send as much as $200bn in Russian assets to Kyiv have not been agreed, and Belgium, now joined by a few other EU countries, continues to oppose them. A crunch EU meeting on the issue is scheduled for December 18-19. And the US, with Russia, is continuing to push for the Ukrainian evacuation of the Donbas in the east of the country and its key belt of fortified cities

Germany is also in the EU’s driver’s seat, mobilizing to meet the danger from Russia. Under Merz’s leadership, my long-frugal country has abandoned its debt restrictions and unleashed a dramatic increase of up to €378bn ($444bn) in defense spending by 2029. Merz is also moving forward with military conscription — and, as his Belgian jawboning illustrates, is willing to use Germany’s diplomatic clout.  

The spark motivating this German resurgence is not only danger from Moscow, but also hostility from Washington. A center-right stalwart, Merz is the most pro-American chancellor Germany has had in years. Yet the American pullback from Europe has forced him into declaring German “independence from the USA”.  

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As strong as Merz appears in foreign policy, he struggles domestically. His Christian Democrat Union is neck and neck with the far-right, anti-immigrant AfD in the polls. A strong foreign policy has only limited domestic cut-through when issues like the rising cost of living, immigration, and a crippling deadlock on efforts to reform the country are fueling discontent. Proposed reforms to pensions and other welfare programs divide his party. His personal rating remains low.  

But the German chancellor looks far stronger than his European counterparts. Britain and France have traditionally been Europe’s defense heavyweights, but both are plagued by financial and political difficulties. A paralyzed parliament and rising debt have hamstrung France’s Emmanuel Macron. A lack of charisma, difficulty tackling key issues like migrant crossings, and tight budgets weaken the UK’s Keir Starmer. Both countries are making slow and murky promises on defense spending. Their debt-to-GDP ratios are 100% or more. Germany’s is just 63%.  

So, Germany has money to spend, and Merz has opened the spigot. Just before taking office, he won bipartisan support to overcome Germany’s debt-averse culture and loosen the country’s constitutional restrictions on borrowing, enabling €1 trillion or more in spending on defense and infrastructure. 

Upon taking office, the new Chancellor announced plans to more than double the current military spending to hit NATO’s spending target of 3.5 % of GDP on core defense and transform the Bundeswehr into Europe’s strongest military.  

The extra money now is being bolstered with additional manpower. In December, Germany passed legislation to increase its forces by nearly 50%, approving a new system starting in 2026 that requires all 18-year-old men to register and undergo medical checks for potential service, alongside increased incentives for voluntary enlistment. The new law also left the door open for parliament to reintroduce compulsory service if needed to build up its armed forces, aiming for a stronger, “war-ready” military by 2035.  

Merz understands that Germany faces an existential threat: it must confront both a revisionist and imperial Russia waging war against its neighbor — and against Europe’s security order — and an increasingly disinterested United States, on which Germany has based its security for the past seven decades.  

This means bolstering Ukraine at all costs — the country announced another €11bn in aid for Ukraine on December 15 for a total of €86bn since 2022 — and by using the €210bn in frozen Russian assets in Europe. Most are held in a Belgian company, and American officials have encouraged Belgium to resist because Washington sees the return of Russia’s assets as part of its proposed Ukrainian settlement. Right-wing leaders in Hungary and Italy are also showing doubts.  

The test of newfound German resolve looms. When Europe’s leaders meet this week, will Chancellor Merz be able to convince them?  

Arndt Freytag von Loringhoven is a German diplomat. He was deputy director of Germany’s Federal Intelligence Service between 2007 and 2010. He served as NATO’s first Assistant Secretary-General for Intelligence and Security and Germany’s ambassador to Poland. He is the author of ‘Putins Angriff auf Deutschland: Disinformation, Propaganda, Cyberattacken [Putin’s attack on Germany: disinformation, propaganda, cyberattacks’], published September 2024. 

CEPA Editor Bill Echikson also contributed to this article. 

Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.

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CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America.
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