Results from Georgia’s October 4 municipal elections indicated a landslide win for the ruling party of Georgian Dream. With all 3,061 precincts counted across the country, the party that has now held power for 13 years, won all the mayoral races and throughout all 64 municipalities. Georgian Dream won towns with over 70% of the vote, with its share in some cases surpassing 80%-90%.
It’s true not all parties joined the opposition boycott, and that turnout dropped from about 50% in 2021 to 41%, but the outcome simply hands more power to Georgian Dream. Unlike the 2024 general election, there were no widespread claims of vote-rigging because there was no need to engage in electoral skullduggery.
The municipal elections have traditionally carried limited national weight and were of low geopolitical importance when it comes to Georgia’s foreign policy. Yet this year’s vote was viewed as a major test for the ruling party’s popularity given it struggled to win the majority of votes in the parliamentary elections of October 2024 (and there was significant evidence it engaged in vote-rigging).
Condemned for “irregularities, deviations and anomalies”, last year’s parliamentary vote has enabled a systematic crackdown on opponents and an extension of ruling party control over state institutions from the judiciary and large parts of the media, to electoral institutions.
In the run-up to the municipal elections, Georgia’s opposition forces splintered. Persistent infighting and the absence of a charismatic leader have left it fragmented and ineffective.
Street protests continue, but they are smaller and less organized than in late 2024 when massive turnouts were recorded. There are signs that the opposition is exhausted. With its key leaders in prison and no unifying figure in sight, its decision to boycott the vote risks frittering away whatever popular trust remains.
As for those opposition parties that did participate, the Lelo/Strong Georgia alliance and former Prime Minister Giorgi Gakharia’s For Georgia, the results proved underwhelming.
Despite the disorganization of its opponents, Georgian Dream took the opportunity to show its disdain for demonstrably fair electoral behavior. The authorities obstructed independent monitoring. The invitation to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and its monitoring mission was deliberately delayed until September, effectively preventing comprehensive international oversight. The organization refused to participate, stating it didn’t have enough time to carry out systemic checks.
The government will have been further aided by attempts by a small group of protesters to break into the presidential palace on October 4. This behavior caused uproar even among those who were present at the massive demonstration on that day.
Yet, the municipal elections also showed that the ruling party has troubles ahead. For instance, in Tbilisi, its candidate, Kakha Kaladze, got more than 70% of the vote. But a closer look reveals a different picture. Out of nearly one million registered voters, the ruling party candidate received about 250,000. That’s hardly a popular mandate, something underlined by dismal turnout in the capital — only 31% bothered to vote.
Even so, the results are likely to further embolden the ruling party. It will grasp the momentum and push for an absolute ban of most opposition parties from the political scene. Some opposition parties will survive, including those that participated in the October 4 vote.
As for the others, there is likely to be an enforced transformation of the political landscape. The United National Movement (led by the imprisoned former President Mikheil Saakashvili) and its satellite parties will gradually fade from the political scene and be replaced by groups more amenable to Georgian Dream and its billionaire leader Bidzina Ivanishvili.
Georgian Dream’s chief objective now is to consolidate its hold on power, which will continue to be exercised in an authoritarian manner. This will further distance the country from the European Union (EU) and underline that any talk of future membership is doomed. This despite overwhelming popular support for joining both the bloc and NATO (A September poll showed 74% back joining the EU, with just 5% opposed.)
Attacks on the EU have become a defining characteristic of the regime and its outlets. It meanwhile continues its pivot to Russia, China, and others.
This does not mean that Tbilisi necessarily wants full alignment with Moscow, which still occupies 20% of Georgian territory, but the country now has few other friends.
Collaboration with Russia will be born out of necessity to deal with isolation from the West and the need to push for a solution to its territorial problem. The strongly pro-EU Georgian population, meanwhile, recognizes Russia as a geopolitical threat. It’s a difficult needle for the government to thread.
The name of this CEPA contributor has been withheld to shield him/her from retribution by dictatorial and authoritarian states.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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