Anyone imagining that Georgia’s government might seek a better relationship with the West following its green light from the European Union (EU) on candidate status will need to re-think.
On April 3, the Georgian Dream ruling party declared it would reintroduce the foreign agent draft law that is reviled by its Western partners and by many Georgians, who say it is founded on the fundamentally repressive Russian model used by Putin to crush the opposition. Some 13 months ago, the bill was withdrawn following massive protests in Tbilisi and was widely thought to be dead. It very obviously is not.
In a further signal of confrontation, the statement noted that the bill’s content was wholly unchanged from last year, other than swapping the term “agent” in the title to “Organization Carrying Out the Interests of a Foreign Power.” Like last year, the law would require that organizations receiving foreign funds disclose their annual financial reports, with financial penalties in case of non-compliance.
The law will likely make it difficult for local organizations to operate as freely as they have. Foreign funding will diminish over time threatening many current projects and the jobs they sustain. It may ultimately also target independent researchers.
Unsurprisingly, the decision sparked a flurry of protests from Georgia’s Western partners and various international donor organizations. NATO, the EU, and US all issued statements. That acknowledges how high the stakes are for the West. Amid the growing uncertainties in the war in Ukraine, it would mark a significant victory for the Kremlin if Georgia veered off its pro-Western trajectory.
The EU needs Georgia because of the Middle Corridor which connects the bloc with Central Asia and China, bypassing Russia. Georgia also serves as land bridge to Armenia which is now rebalancing its foreign policy away from Russia and toward the EU. Georgia’s potential success on its EU path would resonate in Armenia.
So why has the Georgian government chosen this moment to provoke a fight? It follows two significant events. Firstly, the return of Bidzina Ivanishvili, the ruling party’s billionaire founder who made his fortune in Russia, to frontline politics three months ago; and secondly, US sanctions on Georgian judges accused of corruption. All those targeted have close ties to Georgian Dream. The party was enraged by the decision, which it partly blames on Western-funded non-government organizations (NGOs.)
The move seems odd given Georgians’ solid support for membership of the EU and NATO (79% and 67%), and their delight at the former’s decision to agree candidate status in December. The country is enjoying relatively good economic outlook, and its standing in the region has been improving. (Georgians also seem confused by the government’s approach — while 29% say it is actively pursuing EU membership, 52% say it’s not doing enough, or is doing nothing at all to advance the goal.)
It is overly simplistic to blame all this on Russia. Georgia’s government is not a puppet and makes its own decisions. Does it hope to play some game to pressure for membership talks late this year? The logic may be simpler. The ruling party is striving to win an unprecedented fourth consecutive election victory later this year when crucial parliamentary elections are held (scheduled for October 26.) Perhaps this is all about improving its chances.
But the election also seem a poor explanation. The party is once again poised to prevail comfortably over a splintered opposition; there was no need to resort to radical policy measures knowing they would antagonize parts of the population.
It’s true there are numerous questions about the efficacy of the nongovernmental (NGO) sector in Georgia. There are also genuine questions about how the political motivation of some. But none of them constitute a real threat to the government and its decision threatens the funding of Western-backed organizations providing an income to many Georgians.
The law’s re-introduction does demonstrate the limits of the Western influence on its eastern flank. Georgia will likely remain a pro-Western state with its population overwhelmingly pro-EU, and its economy and laws increasingly aligned with the bloc.
But there is clearly a well-organized element of the Georgian elite and population which seeks to set limits on its EU convergence. And which seems to have concluded that Brussels will not be willing to pull the plug on the entire process, however irritated it may be.
Protests are likely to follow, yet it is still unclear whether the public outcry will reach the peaks of last year. The coming weeks will be important in gauging the potential for anti-government resistance; so far, it has been quite muted.
Emil Avdaliani is a professor of international relations at European University in Tbilisi, Georgia, and a scholar of silk roads.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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