Georgia is not in a good place. And given the certainty of imminent, serious disruption with the West, stability is likely to be in short supply at least until October’s elections.
So where are we? On May 28, parliament overcame the veto imposed by the country’s President Salome Zurabishvili on the “foreign agents” bill despite huge popular demonstrations. The only remaining procedural step is for the bill to be forwarded to the head of state for signature within five days.
When, as expected, she refuses to do so, the legislation will be forwarded to the parliamentary speaker, Shalva Papuashvili, who will sign in her place. On the 15th day following its publication in the official press, the law takes force.
The West has made clear its revulsion at legislation which it sees as overtly repressive and wholly antipathetic to Georgia’s stated aspirations to join the community of democratic states, especially the European Union (EU) and NATO. Membership of both organizations is backed by a large majority of voters.
The US and the EU have issued a range of statements criticizing Tbilisi’s decision and arguing that the law’s passage will torpedo the country’s EU membership bid. Both are also considering a broad range of measures to pressure the ruling party, Georgian Dream, to make concessions. So far, it shows no signs of making any changes.
One of the most obvious options is an asset freeze and visa bans on leading Georgians and their families. The EU may also cut financial aid. For instance, Georgia receives approximately €85m ($92m) annually in grants for both the government and non-governmental (NGO) sectors. A more radical option involves reversing Georgia’s candidate status, only granted in December, although the EU has never before taken such a step. Yet another option is suspending Georgia’s visa liberalization.
Some of these measures require unanimity among EU member states, such as suspension of the visa-free regime, only a majority. But the latter measure is seen as unfair as it would target the entire population, which remains pro-Western in its outlook, perhaps even more than before. Moreover, there has been only one case when the EU suspended visa liberalization.
The bloc therefore faces a major dilemma. The pursuit of heavy-duty sanctions would jeopardize its prestige among the majority of Georgians. Cancelling visa liberalization would arguably be the biggest hit but it might serve as an argument for Euroskeptics inside the country who want to derail Tbilisi’s Western path.
But whatever measures are eventually selected, the geopolitical fallout from the adoption of the law is evident: Georgia’s progress toward EU membership path will be effectively stalled (as the German ambassador stated on May 29.)
If Tbilisi wanted — as it says — to build a so-called multi-vector foreign policy (read something between the West, Russia, and other powers), that would require the joint efforts of several major actors. It would require goodwill, and goodwill is now in short supply. Georgia could therefore find itself tumbling into a completely different geopolitical club. That in essence is a Eurasian grouping where illiberalism is on the rise and where the present world order is ardently contested. That helps to explain the Kremlin’s enthusiasm for the country’s current trajectory.
It is true that Georgia remains pro-Western and that the population may now be more animated than ever with the idea of the country moving Westward. October’s elections will show just how deep the resentment runs against the ruling party.
Yet Georgia’s example is an interesting case study of the difficulties faced by Western multilateral initiatives. First, it is about geography. Georgia might have always been a part of the European project through its close links to the Roman and then Byzantine world, but as in previous centuries, it has been on the periphery of Europe and therefore more vulnerable to other powers.
There has also been a growing fatigue in Georgia with the slow pace of EU expansion both for the country and in the wider Black Sea region, and the ruling party has skillfully tapped into this. In short, the trouble in Georgia could be an indicator of a wider weariness, where ruling elites conclude that the costs of opposition to Russian domination (see Ukraine) are too high and that they should fold into an authoritarian Russo-Chinese alternative world system based on spheres of influence. The protests and the opinion polls show this is not a majority view, but it is a significant strand of thought.
The opposition now has a huge opportunity, though it’s another matter of whether it can capitalize given its fissiparous past.
The law has already damaged the ruling party’s prospects of remaining in power. The parliamentary elections in October will now be much tougher than had been expected. There are clear signals that a nationwide movement is emerging with Georgian EU membership a rallying cry. This creates momentum for the opposition, which has been in disarray in past years, to join forces to create a powerful, unified front.
Indeed, the work toward this end has already begun with the incumbent Georgian president suggesting a new platform for all pro-Western forces. Given the growing frustration with the law, the political coalition might emerge as a powerful rival to the ruling party.
There is still some time till the elections and much could change but a bigger picture is emerging: for the first time since 2012 when Georgian Dream came to power, the party will face major competition.
Emil Avdaliani is a professor of international relations at European University in Tbilisi, Georgia, and a scholar of Silk Roads.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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