The Trans-Balkan Pipeline (TBP), a vital piece of energy infrastructure in Southeastern Europe, is barely used because of over-inflated transit charges. Its dormancy inflates gas prices in Central and Eastern Europe, curtails the efficiency of Greek LNG terminals, and serves Russian energy interests, undermining core EU strategic goals.
Unlocking the pipeline is not merely an economic choice but a pressing matter of regional security and EU policy coherence.
Originally built to transport Russian gas south through Ukraine, Romania, and Bulgaria to Turkey and Greece, the TBP saw its primary purpose diminish with the advent of TurkStream. But the extensive network can be put to use again. With minor upgrades, it could provide northbound capacity of up to 20bn cubic meters a year, significantly diversifying gas flows and enabling liquefied natural gas (LNG) from southern ports to reach Moldova, Ukraine, and Central Europe efficiently.
The system, with its multiple high-diameter pipes, should offer one of the most cost-effective transit routes, translating into minimal tariffs if priced on the actual operational costs of the network. Its geography makes it an ideal conduit for Greek LNG to reach landlocked markets historically reliant on eastern supplies.
So what’s the problem? The TBP is commercially sidelined by a thicket of uncompetitive national tariffs. While new multi-billion-euro gas infrastructure projects have received EU support in Romania and Bulgaria, this capable asset is neglected.
The TBP’s underutilization for northbound flows stems from “tariff pancaking.” As gas moves north from Greece, each national transmission system operator (TSO) in Bulgaria, Romania, and Moldova levies separate tariffs. The cumulative effect is an exorbitant final cost for shippers, making the route uncompetitive.
Data from Ukraine’s Gas TSO clearly illustrates this distortion. Transporting LNG from Alexandroupolis via the pipeline incurs an indicative tariff of €13.61 ($15.43)/MWh, while it is €10.27/MWh from Revithoussa. These figures dwarf costs on other routes. Poland’s pipeline from Świnoujście to Ukraine, for example, is about €3.98/MWh, and Croatia’s Krk to Ukraine is €3.93/MWh. The discrepancy is irrational, especially as Alexandroupolis is closer to Ukraine than Świnoujście.
Adding to the frustration, certain sections of the Trans-Balkan Pipeline (such as in Romania) are reportedly not fully integrated into the national domestic gas networks. However, the costs of entire national grids are still being disproportionately allocated to these non-integrated sections, artificially inflating their tariff base beyond their actual operating costs.
Unblocking the TBP would offer widespread benefits. For the Central and Eastern European gas market, it would provide a much-needed alternative supply route, alleviating congestion on existing west-east and north-south corridors. With Ukraine and Moldova planning to import 5-6bn cubic meters of gas a year, reliance on existing northern/western routes could create bottlenecks and higher prices across the region.
The TBP could rebalance these flows, allowing significant imports from Southern Europe via Greece. Increased route diversity enhances energy security, fosters regional hub liquidity, and pushes down prices.
Revitalizing the TBP is also intrinsically linked to optimizing Greece’s LNG infrastructure. Terminals like Revithoussa and the Alexandroupolis Floating Storage and Regasification Unit (FSRU) are key strategic assets for diversification, and their underutilization stems from a lack of economic onward transit.
The TBP’s tariff blockade inadvertently aids Russia’s energy strategy. As Europe strives to decouple from Russian gas, the high cost of moving LNG north through the Balkans creates a gap, which is then filled by Russian gas from TurkStream and BulgarStream.
Allowing this directly contradicts the EU’s REPowerEU plan to eliminate Russian fossil fuel reliance by 2027. Continued Russian gas flows, facilitated by the TBP’s effective blockade, preserve Moscow’s influence and perpetuate dependencies the EU aims to dismantle. In the context of Russia’s war in Ukraine, these are direct security threats.
The situation starkly illustrates how national regulatory fragmentation undermines the EU’s single energy market principles of free, fair, and non-discriminatory energy flow. The solution is primarily regulatory and political. The European Commission, with the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators, European Network of Transmission System Operators for Gas, and the Energy Community Secretariat, should:
- Mandate a corridor-wide tariff methodology to establish a unified, transparent, cost-reflective tariff for the TBP, which would mirror EU network-code principles (e.g., the Balgzand-Bacton Line and Trans Adriatic Pipeline ), eliminate pancaking, and ensure tariffs reflect the actual costs plus a reasonable return.
- Condition new gas-infrastructure funding: EU funding for new gas projects in Bulgaria, Romania, and Moldova must be strictly conditional on the full utilization of existing assets like the TBP for northbound flows.
As a last resort, the Commission should investigate tariff-setting practices for compliance with EU law, initiating infringement procedures if necessary, to ensure national operators and regulators facilitate, rather than obstruct, vital cross-border flows.
The TBP is a significant missed opportunity for European energy security. Allowing this vital artery to remain clogged by tariff barriers is unsustainable. The European Commission, with member states and Energy Community parties, must act decisively. The challenge is to transform the TBP from a symbol of fragmented interests into a vibrant corridor of energy, solidarity, and resilience.
Sergiy Makogon is a Non-resident Senior Fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA). He is a seasoned executive and energy expert with over 20 years of expertise in the Ukrainian and Central and Eastern European (CEE) gas markets, as well as European security.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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