After 80 years of military restraint, Germany marked a watershed moment in May with the first permanent foreign deployment of a German unit since World War II. In the coming years, there are likely to be many more historic milestones as the country rearms to deter and possibly to fight Russia.
The new chancellor, Friedrich Merz, attended a military parade in Lithuania’s capital Vilnius — which was occupied by the Soviet Union, the Nazis and finally again by the Soviets during and after World War II — on the creation of the new, 5,000-strong 45 Armored Brigade.
“We are taking the defense of NATO’s eastern flank into our own hands,” Merz said in a May 24 speech. “Anyone who threatens any ally must know that the entire alliance will jointly defend every inch of NATO territory.”
Former Chancellor Olaf Scholz may have launched Germany’s military Zeitenwende, or historic turning point, in 2022, after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. But Merz has added muscle to the skeleton by ending Germany’s debt brake to allow unlimited military spending. Merz vows to transform the Bundeswehr into Europe’s most powerful conventional armed forces.
The starting point for this is President Donald Trump, who has shown that Europe can no longer rely on the US. This point will likely be underlined at the NATO summit in The Hague on June 24-25, where alliance leaders will commit to higher spending even as European members prepare for discussions later this year on a pullback of US forces from the continent.
From a German perspective, there is a need for focus and swift action. The Bundeswehr’s needs have been much-discussed and include more of almost everything from soldiers to tanks to drones/anti-drone systems, air defenses, and aircraft.
Less noticed is Germany’s “to-do” list beyond conventional military spending to make the country kriegstüchtig or war-ready. This list is daunting but it is possible for Berlin because — as illustrated by the scrapping of the once sacrosanct debt brake — Germans are at their best in a crisis when they tear up the rule book. The country is far better than its current Sick Man of Europe image. There’s a reason that Germany, despite the present gloom, is the third biggest economy in the world.
There are, however, many issues to be considered:
- What if Berlin spends oodles of new money but can’t change its old mentality and refuses to see the Bundeswehr as a political tool? This isn’t a call for saber-rattling, but Berlin must develop an approach to hard power akin to that of Paris and London.
- Germany has been glacially slow about military change and security innovation in the past decades. So far, for example, only about 400 of the 5,000 soldiers have been deployed to Lithuania. And Berlin only approved the arming of drones in 2022, after years of debate and is still in the process of doing so. Meanwhile, countries like Israel are light years ahead and Jerusalem is already deploying its Lite Beam laser system to shoot down drones.
- Some 57% of Germans, far more than before Russia’s 2022 full-scale war against Ukraine, support raising defense spending. But a large minority still oppose rearmament. The far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) is the second biggest party after Merz’s Christian Democrats. The AfD is pro-Russia, anti-US, anti-EU, anti-euro and anti-NATO. The Left party, formerly East Germany’s communist (SED) party, is polling at around 10%, and its breakaway BSW is at 4%. Together, these three parties would currently win almost 40%, polls show. Parts of Merz’s SPD coalition partner are also wobbly. A group of party leftists are calling for dialogue with Russia and reject a big rise in defense spending. This was swiftly nixed by Merz and SPD Defense Minister Boris Pistorius.
- Rearmament is one thing; readiness to fight is quite another. A majority of Germans (52%), declare they are not wehrbereit, i.e., not ready to take up a weapon in case of a military attack.
- Germans see Russia far more critically since 2022. Almost 70% view Putin as a threat to German security, double the 2021 figure. But there are key exceptions: Russia’s hybrid warfare is dangerously underestimated and large numbers of German businesses and eastern Germans dream of appeasement, cooperation and a return to cheap energy from Russia.
- The key issue now is how far and how fast the US withdraws its forces from Europe. And let’s be honest: Europe still has no answer to this. There’s been an ominous silence from Trump on NATO, although some detect greater warmth from the administration recently.
Regardless, Germany can no longer rely on things remaining the same, and must now put its defenses in order.
Here are some of the measures that Germany needs to take:
Spying: The temporary US halt to intelligence sharing with Ukraine gave a brutal demonstration of why Germany needs an expanded spy service. Berlin can start by reactivating large-scale spying inside Russia. Counter-terrorism desperately needs beefing up: Over the past 25 years more than a dozen major terrorist attacks in Germany were prevented only due to initial intelligence being passed on by Washington; as the head of Britain’s MI5 said, Russian intelligence is now reckless in the extreme and has “gone a bit feral.” Berlin must produce this intelligence itself even if it means dirtying its hands.
Hybrid warfare and disinformation: Vladimir Putin’s attack on Germany is already in “pre-war” amid the severing of undersea data cables and pipelines, cyber-attacks, drone flights at sensitive security sites, and disinformation campaigns. Berlin needs far more robust responses and must boost public awareness.
Civil defense: The deficit is shocking. Most of Germany’s civil defense bunkers and shelters date back to the Cold War, and hundreds have been dismantled. There is currently space for less than 1% of the 83 million population. In contrast, Switzerland has space for 100% and Finland 80%.
Infrastructure and logistics: There’s an urgent need for bridges and roads to support tanks; transport systems to move forces from west to east; and roads and railway tunnels big enough for military equipment. The loss of Cold War military airfields in eastern Germany has been vast: many have been converted to solar or industrial parks or planted with trees. A strategic reserve of truck drivers is necessary given that many truck drivers in Germany are from Central and Eastern Europe: In a crisis, they are likely to go home.
Countering demographics: Germany had 495,000 soldiers prior to 1990, with about 800,000 reserves. Today, the Bundeswehr has some 182,000 soldiers with 40,000 to 60,000 reserves. The defense minister says as many as 60,000 additional troops are needed. Restoring conscription was blocked in Merz’s government by his Social Democratic partners. This must change.
Nuclear deterrence: Germany is banned under the 1990 2+4 Treaty from having nuclear weapons. Here, the answer is “Pay-to-Play” (see here). France and the United Kingdom get German money, and Germany and Europe get some form of Franco-British nuclear shield, with Berlin hosting nuclear weapons and supplying delivery systems, as it does now with US nuclear weapons.
Europe’s coalition of the willing: The EU, with its 27 members and awkward squad of Hungary and Slovakia, isn’t the forum to swiftly bolster Europe’s defenses. A Big Five Coalition of the Willing is the better model: Germany, France, the UK, Poland and the Nordic-Baltic Eight. Yet coalition of the willing talking-shops aren’t enough. They need concrete projects like building a drone/anti-drone wall protecting NATO’s eastern border; ensuring a massive naval presence in the Baltic Sea; creating a task force for a post-peace treaty Ukraine; or guarding the Suwałki Gap.
The United Kingdom: Improved security is mutually beneficial for Europe and the UK, so that the sour legacy of Brexit can be overcome. Upgrade the UK’s role in European security with its nuclear weapons, battle-tested armed forces as well as its intelligence services and diplomacy. The EU-UK defense and security deal in May marked a good start.
Like-minded nations and laggards: Forge closer security and economic ties with non-EU members, including Norway, Canada, Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, and India. Oh, and try to shame Ireland, Austria, and Switzerland into not being such blatant free riders.
United States: Do everything possible to preserve the transatlantic relationship, but realize that Europe can never again depend on the US. Europeans need to “rebalance” NATO by investing in strategic enablers (intelligence, air transport) to overcome dependence on Washington and assume more alliance leadership positions.
Change the German domestic narrative: Germans need to focus on national interests and stop pretending their country should just be a benign moral, environmental, and economic example for the world. They must grasp that Germany’s holiday from history, what Thomas Enders and Hans-Peter Bartels dub “that luxury of geopolitical escapism,” is long over.
And this last point may be the most difficult.
In 2011, Polish Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski famously said: “I fear German power less than German inaction.” Today, the growing fear among at least some allied countries is there is something even worse than inaction. It’s the fear that Germans still don’t “get it.” That Germany is an unreliable partner where too many people cling to naïve ideas about being a virtuous, exemplary world citizen even as the global rules-based order crumbles; Russia wages war in Europe; China threatens Taiwan and Asia; and President Trump allows the Western alliance to wither.
“Military defense capability remains central — or rather: it must again be perceived as central,” says Bartels, the former chairman of the Bundestag’s defense committee and parliamentary commissioner for the armed forces, who is now president of the German Society for Security Policy (GSP).
Chancellor Merz’s biggest challenge may be to change this narrative. To speak truth and force Germans out of their comfort zone. To warn them that the best way to prevent blood, sweat, and tears is to ensure that Berlin becomes Europe’s geopolitical leader. If it does, Germany’s allies will applaud, because a serious European defense without Berlin is an impossibility.
Arndt Freytag von Loringhoven is a German diplomat. He was deputy director of Germany’s Federal Intelligence Service between 2007 and 2010. He served as NATO’s first Assistant Secretary-General for Intelligence and Security and Germany’s ambassador to Poland. He is the author of‘Putins Angriff auf Deutschland: Disinformation, Propaganda, Cyberattacken’ [Putin’s attack on Germany: disinformation, propaganda, cyberattacks], published September 2024.
Leon Mangasarian worked as a news agency reporter and editor in Germany from 1989 with Bloomberg News, Deutsche-Presse Agentur, and United Press International. He has a PhD in International Relations from the London School of Economics and is now a freelance writer in Brandenburg, eastern Germany. Leon Mangasarian worked as a news agency reporter and editor in Germany from 1989 with Bloomberg News, Deutsche-Presse Agentur, and United Press International.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
War Without End
Russia’s Shadow Warfare
CEPA Forum 2025
Explore CEPA’s flagship event.
