During the cold war decades, Finland lived in Russia’s shadow, with enforced neutrality, self-censorship and constrained economic options. But the core institutions of the Finnish state maintained their integrity and the country’s sovereignty. The pejorative term “Finlandization” was coined to describe this life in the gray zone. The worry was that it would spread.
Now Finland is not just a member of Nato, but a leading force in Western decision-making. It leads by example, not just in aid to Ukraine, but in showing mastery of defense and deterrence in the unconventional warfare Russia is now waging against the West. The Finlandization of Nato could hardly be more welcome.
A sharp example of this came on Christmas Day when a tanker carrying Russian oil, the Eagle S, destroyed the Estlink 2 power cable between Finland and Estonia. This was the latest in a string of sabotage attacks against Baltic seabed infrastructure. Previous episodes have prompted dithering and timidity, fueled by fears of an escalation in Washington, DC, and Germany.
This was different. The Finnish Border Guard’s flagship, the Turva, had shadowed the Eagle S and caught it red-handed. Its dragging anchor had already severed several cables and was approaching the remaining Estlink 1 power cable and the Balticconnector gas pipeline, which was sabotaged last year. The Turva ordered Eagle S to head towards Finnish territorial waters, with permission from the Finnish government to seize it in international waters if necessary. It then launched a helicopter carrying police and a border-guard special intervention units to board the vessel, which has now under guard in a Finnish harbour
The military blogger Robin Häggblom notes that the operation exemplifies Finland’s approach. “Everything goes according to the book and it takes place within a clear legal framework, but it is also clear that it is signalling, and perhaps [with] just a bit more of a show of force than would have been needed, just to make sure the message is drilled home.”
One question is how Russia will respond. It has decried Finnish “piracy” and suggested that it may give naval escorts to merchant ships to protect them from Western interference. That turns an irritant into a potential geopolitical standoff, and highlights an important point: as Dovilė Šakalienė, Lithuania’s new defence minister, notes, this kind of “hybrid” or “unconventional” attack is no longer an aberration. It is mainstream.
Another question is whether the West will draw the right conclusions. The seabed sabotage is just the latest instalment in an intensifying series of destabilizing stunts and provocations, ranging from arson and assassinations to cyber-attacks and weaponized migration. All of them, Šakalienė notes, “test the ground”. The aim is to erode capabilities and trust, to intimidate and to dismay.
The wrong reaction would be that Western countries need to avoid escalation. This is the instinctive reaction of decision-makers reared on the platitudes and complacency of the post-1991 era. It is dangerously out of date now. The truth is that Russia has been systematically escalating its attacks for years. Projecting an image of weakness is the best way to encourage more of the same.
Nato is belatedly beefing up its efforts in the Baltic Sea. That may improve defense. But the best answer to aggression is deterrence. Seizing Russia’s “shadow fleet” of sanctions-busting tankers, or applying secondary sanctions to those who insure, finance, fuel and supply them, would be a good response. So too would be seizing the frozen funds from Russia’s central bank – around $300 billion in total. And supplying Ukraine with the weapons and money that it so badly needs would be the best response of all.
Edward Lucas is a Non-resident Senior Fellow and Senior Advisor at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA).
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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