A Russian land grab in Estonia in 2028 would destroy NATO, argues the newly published, best-selling, and widely reviewed“If Russia Wins” by Professor Carlo Masala.
I share his vividly depicted worries about NATO’s disunity. This (or indeed a future) US administration might hesitate to go to war with Russia over a small, messy territorial incursion in Europe. Under future far-right governments, France and Germany might decide against a military response to a Russian invasion of an allied country.
But the opening scenario is wrong. If Masala is looking for a pushover, he should not choose well-armed, battle-ready Estonia, whose citizens, more than most other Europeans, are willing to fight for their freedom. It is similarly lazy to assume that Russia and Belarus could easily close the land-bridge between Poland and Lithuania, the Suwałki-Alytus corridor, or simply annex the “Russian-speaking” eastern Latvian city of Daugavpils.
Instead, Masala should focus on complacent, dislocated countries farther west. I have just come back from Copenhagen, where mysterious drone sightings over airports and military installations in recent days prompted alarm and disruption. The authorities have now banned all drone flights for the coming week, when Denmark is holding an informal European Union summit and then a meeting of the European Political Community, a continent-wide grouping that includes non-EU Britain, Turkey, Ukraine, and Norway.
The visitors will have plenty to discuss, not least with their hosts. The Danish prime minister, Mette Frederiksen, made a sombre address to the nation on Friday, September 25th, saying that the country was under attack. She did not directly blame Russia, but said that it was the one country that “primarily” threatens European security.
Denmark has a stellar record in supporting Ukraine and is belatedly splurging money on rearmament. But its state institutions have a long way to go to rebuild the necessary security culture. The Prime Minister, in her speech, sounded not only angry with the attackers, but also exasperated at her own country’s response.
I can see why. The most recent news item on the main police website concerns two lost dogs. I visited an obvious source of potential clues, Copenhagen’s main plane-spotters’ hangout, the Flyvergrillen diner on the airport perimeter. Nobody there had yet been contacted by the authorities. I called the police to ask how the investigation was going: “It’s 1600 on a Friday. Everyone’s gone home,” I was told. Not quite what one would expect in a country that, according to the transport minister, has suffered its worst airspace violation since the Second World War.
Frederiksen warned of more such attacks, of different kinds, in future, in Denmark and elsewhere. As she rightly pointed out, their real aim is to create “insecurity and division”, to destabilise society and sow mistrust. Russia does not need to defeat NATO militarily if it can use “hybrid” (sub-threshold) attacks to create crippling inconvenience that confuses decision-making and corrodes confidence. The natural prudence of our societies turns into a vulnerability: once the public is sufficiently alarmed, just planting rumors can be enough to close an airport.
But Frederiksen’s speech had a big hole. She made no mention of deterrence. Just shooting down drones in the future will not work. Russia will simply switch tactics. As the security guru Julian Lindley-French tells me, our aim should be to create crippling inconvenience for Russia, planting uncertainty in the minds of Kremlin decision-makers. The more they worry about the duration, extent, scope, and frequency of our response, the more hesitant they will be.
Frederiksen is wisely asking Ukraine for support in countering drone warfare. She should remember that Denmark’s formidable, battle-hardened allies play offense, too.
Edward Lucas is a Senior Fellow and Senior Advisor at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA). He was formerly a senior editor at The Economist. Lucas has covered Central and Eastern European affairs since 1986, writing, broadcasting, and speaking on the politics, economics, and security of the region.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
War Without End: Deterring Russia’s Shadow War
Either Europe will continue allowing Russia’s shadow war to set the terms of escalation, or it will act now to prevent a larger war.
