The stampede for critical minerals is reshaping global power, just as oil did in the 20th century. From revived ambitions to acquire Greenland to mineral deals in Ukraine, access has become a growing focus of geopolitical tension.
Through their use in combat aircraft, missiles and advanced communications systems, a handful of raw materials are central for modern military power. And Europe remains heavily dependent on foreign suppliers for many of them.
The European Union (EU) has identified 34 critical raw materials vital to its economy and security, flagging 17 as “strategic” because of their supply risk and central role in key industries. While the focus is often on their importance for green and digital transitions, several are fundamental to Europe’s defense.
Graphite, cobalt, titanium, gallium, and germanium are particularly critical for the continent’s armed forces, according to Benedetta Girardi, an analyst at The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies.
Graphite, the most used in defense applications, strengthens aircraft frames, naval vessels and armored vehicles, while cobalt is used in high-performance alloys for jet engines and naval turbines. Titanium, prized for its strength and corrosion resistance, is indispensable in fighter jets, submarines, tanks, and ammunition. Gallium and germanium, though lesser known, are widely used to produce semiconductors and chips embedded across modern defense platforms.
Europe lacks sufficient domestic extraction and processing capacity for these resources, and its supply chains are heavily concentrated in the hands of its geopolitical competitors. China, for example, controls 69% of the world’s graphite production, owns 15 of the 19 major cobalt mines in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and accounts for more than 90% of global gallium and germanium output. It also dominates processing of the raw materials.
In 2023, following increased US curbs on advanced semiconductor exports to China, Beijing retaliated with export controls on gallium, germanium, and antimony. By early 2024, Europe was feeling the ripple effects: Chinese germanium and antimony exports dropped by 39% and 57% respectively, while gallium shipments fell to historic lows.
The continent relied heavily on Russian titanium before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and sanctions and wartime disruptions sent prices soaring. Ukraine, once a secondary supplier of gallium, also saw its industrial capacity collapse under attack from Moscow.
Recognizing its vulnerabilities, the EU adopted a Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA) in 2024 with a goal of at least 10% of strategic materials being extracted in Europe by 2030, 40% processed domestically, and 25% sourced from recycling. To reduce overreliance, strategic raw materials should come from several non-EU countries, with no more than 65% from a single source.
“It’s a very good start to have policies that try to define what is critical in terms of raw materials, and give some policy guidelines that both the industry and the general public can look at,” The Hague Centre’s Girardi said.
But building mines, processing facilities, new partnerships, and recycling operations will take levels of political will and coordination that have been hard for Europe to achieve. (Serbia, for example, has seen huge protests over a proposed lithium mine.) Mining faces environmental opposition across the continent, as well as legal battles, and governance challenges, slowing the expansion policymakers want.
“Mining is complex — regulatorily, financially, and socially,” said Thea Riofrancos, a professor specializing in resource governance and the geopolitics of extraction at Providence College, Rhode Island. “Pushing it through doesn’t actually deal with that complexity, it can create chokepoints or issues elsewhere in the process.”
The Savannah Resources Barroso lithium project in Portugal offers a cautionary tale. Fast-tracked to secure supply for the green transition, it faced protests, court challenges, and a corruption probe that led to the prime minister’s resignation. Now, legal appeals have delayed production until at least 2027.
As part of the CRMA rollout, the EU Commission selected 47 Strategic Projects across 13 member states to fast-track extraction, processing, recycling, and substitution of key raw materials. And several focus on defense-relevant materials.
While they benefit from an accelerated permit process, their success will depend on whether Europe can avoid the same political, environmental, and legitimacy hurdles that have stalled past initiatives.
Europe’s defense industry remains fragmented, with national interests, overlapping weapons programs, and a lack of transparency across supply chains complicating any unified critical materials strategy. “If you speak to assembler companies like Thales, Leonardo, Damen, they don’t know where the raw materials in their systems come from,” Girardi said.
Without full visibility into supply origins, Europe risks leaving vulnerabilities undiscovered until it’s too late. “It’s a big problem, particularly with Chinese involvement in Africa, Latin America, lithium mining, and all the processing that takes place there,” said Daniel Hill, a military acquisition and procurement expert at RAND Europe.
Duplication of capabilities between member states further strains planning and stockpiling. “Aligning defense priorities necessitates doing so in raw materials as well,” Hill added.
Securing autonomy will require stronger coordination across European governments and trusted external partnerships, including the UK, Norway, and Turkey, with defense procurement and critical raw materials policy moving in lockstep.
And as Europe turns to partners in Africa, Latin America, and elsewhere, it will be under pressure to avoid repeating extractive models that have historically prioritized European needs over local development, human rights, and environmental protection.
The EU’s strategic partnership with Rwanda was suspended after reports revealed many exported minerals came from the conflict-ridden eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, where the Rwandan-backed M23 group controls key mining areas.
Europe’s critical raw materials strategy is still taking shape, but the direction is clear: greater resilience, stronger and diverse partnerships, and a more deliberate link between defense needs and global responsibility. The challenge won’t just be securing materials, it’ll be aligning defense, climate, and industrial priorities under a coherent European strategy.
Mila Tanghe holds a master’s degree from Columbia University’s Graduate School of Journalism and is currently an Intern with the Editorial team at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA).
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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