After the return of Donald Trump to the White House, US tough love has prompted Europe not only to spend more on defense but also to revitalize its own defense industry. But, despite the push to “Buy European,” the Future Combat Air System (FCAS) saga displays fundamental weaknesses of the European defense renaissance.
Born in 2017 as a flagship project of European strategic autonomy, the FCAS promised to overcome the three main issues marring European defense: procurement nationalism, reliance on the United States, and a fragmented defense industry. Contrary to expectations, the FCAS did not solve these issues; it highlighted them.
Workshare and intellectual property disagreements between France’s Dassault and Germany’s Airbus have shown how national interests still plague European defense. In the current setup, Germany, France, and Spain — which joined in 2019 — would each take a third of the project. But, France’s Dassault has pushed for sole leadership, proposing to take over 80% of the workshare. Germany would have been asked to pay an equal share of the estimated €100bn ($116bn) program, with limited input on the design and an unequal share of the manufacturing. It said no.
Recent Franco-German political tensions have added more fuel to the FCAS fire. After arguments over the Mercosur trade deal with South America and the use of Russia’s frozen assets, French President Macron’s proposal for joint European borrowing was rejected by Berlin within hours.
Despite reaffirming Germany’s commitment to FCAS last summer, Merz is now ready to pull the plug on the ill-fated fighter jet. On February 18, the German Chancellor made clear that Germany does not need the same fighter jet as France — Merz stated that, while France needs a nuclear- and carrier-capable fighter jet, Germany has other requirements.
With a smaller navy and no aircraft carrier, Germany seeks to modernize the Luftwaffe as a key enabler of the Bundeswehr. In 2025, the Bundestag approved funds for 20 Eurofighters to be delivered between 2031 and 2034. Germany is now considering acquiring more F-35s from the US to buy time as it considers an alternative to FCAS.
Defense-wise, this makes sense, but the FCAS failure is a vivid illustration of the problems Europe faces in its efforts to end reliance on the US. This is troublesome. Europe has not built any fifth-generation jets, instead relying on the US F-35s to fulfill its airpower needs. But, with FCAS close to the end, the European ability to completely wean away from the US defense industry is in doubt.
For now, two solutions seem likely. On the one hand, Airbus has proposed two separate jets in an attempt to save Europe’s fighter jet dreams. While this solution offers Europe more solutions for different mission profiles, this eleventh-hour pitch shows how the European defense industry still bases its solutions around national preference.
Germany has shown interest in joining the more successful Anglo-Italian-Japanese GCAP, which is due to enter service in 2035. But the grass is not necessarily greener in the GCAP yard. In January, Italian Minister of Defense Guido Crosetto blasted the UK for its secrecy on key elements of GCAP. More recently, the United Kingdom has suggested Saudi Arabia might invest in the GCAP as costs for the sixth-generation fighter jet program balloon.
Meanwhile, Japan has expressed concerns about the GCAP’s ability to meet its operational deadline. These doubts have not only pushed Japan towards US F-35s as a valuable stopgap but have also encouraged US attempts to lure Japan away from the Europe-led project by promising F-47s, the US’s own sixth-generation fighter jet program.
As competition for the skies heats up between the United States and Europe, some have looked at the FCAS and GCAP as useless duplicates that jeopardize Europe’s security. Yet, the fragmented politics behind both programs make any merger unlikely.
Others have pointed out that the demise of the FCAS is proof that Europeans are not sufficiently serious about their collective defense. That’s unfair — EU efforts to fund the €150bn ($174bn) SAFE program prove that this explanation is equally unlikely.
Rather, the demise of the FCAS offers a critical lesson that Europe cannot ignore. European defense procurement is still a national affair, not out of mere national jealousy, but because that is where security decisions are made — at the national level.
Should strategic decision-making move to the EU level? That’s the suggestion of former Italian Prime Minister Mario Draghi and others, but as shown by the recent showdowns over funding to Ukraine (first blocked by supposedly federalist-minded Belgium and then by nationalist-minded Hungary), this is another European pipe dream.
Rather, Europe needs to develop clear-cut strategic priorities and match these with broadly agreed and funded projects. Only then will defense procurement accord with strategic ends and become a true European affair.
Anna Matilde Bassoli is an independent researcher and analyst. She earned a Master of Arts in Security Studies from Georgetown University and a Master of Letters in Strategic Studies from the University of St Andrews. Anna Matilde also served as the 2025 YPFP Rising Expert for Defense. Her contributions have appeared in several outlets, including The Diplomat, Real Clear Defense, CIMSEC, and the Center for Maritime Strategy, among others.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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