Following Russia’s drone incursions into Polish and Romanian airspace, an event assessed by Western intelligence and the Warsaw government as deliberate, European Commission President Ursula Von der Leyen’s call for a European “drone wall” is a much-needed but perhaps late recognition that Europe’s eastern flank is far from secure. That risk is only deepened by evidence that US involvement is declining.
The intention of the European plan is clear: deter future Russian aggression and prepare a solid front line for any further attacks. What is not clear is what this drone wall will include and how the program will be executed.
The project cannot rely solely on swarms of small interceptor drones. Such drone clouds are a simple, quick, and cost-effective solution, but vulnerable to enemy electronic warfare.
If the entire drone wall relied on one channel, targeted jamming would paralyze defenses. With hundreds, if not thousands, of drones on the eastern flank, a sophisticated command-and-control system is necessary.
Developing a secure electromagnetic battle management system will be critical for the new system, providing drone operators with the flexibility to switch frequencies. Drones should be organized into a unit hierarchy, minimizing the effectiveness of enemy electronic warfare by having smaller groups of drones on different radio frequencies. This would also ensure proper identification of hostile and friendly drones in the heat of battle.
Technology alone is not enough; doctrine and experience matter too. Leveraging the experience of the Ukrainian armed forces will be essential. From using drones to disable up to a third of Russia’s strategic bomber fleet, to destroying oil refineries, and forcing a badly damaged Black Sea fleet into faraway ports, the Ukrainian military is well versed in using drones to amplify the country’s military might. Their battlefield experience is invaluable to NATO allies confronting similar threats.
These lessons matter not just tactically but economically. If Russia’s hybrid attacks continue, introducing a drone wall will be crucial for the cost per interception of enemy drones. Scrambling F-16s and F-35s against Shahed drones is economically unsustainable. In a larger conflict, as seen in the Israeli-Iranian confrontation this year, Europe would quickly exhaust expensive missile interceptors on cheap drones, and fighter jets would be diverted from more important missions.
Von der Leyen’s vagueness may be deliberate. With funding and cooperation at the EU level, it is not clear how the cost will be split across member states. Persistent defense, along with the upkeep of drones, training, and operations, will cost far more than anticipated.
EU Defense Commissioner Andrius Kubilius said on September 18 that the wall will include sensors, jamming systems, and weapons, and mentioned 12 months as a possible timeframe. The urgency of the EU’s work was underlined on the same day, when Ukraine said it would provide the program with drone surveillance systems. Kyiv will also offer training.
Even so, the EU’s 27 member states have varying priorities and political positions, and will not easily agree on how to construct the new system. Hungary and Slovakia, for example, are Kremlin-friendly and have chosen to rely on Russian energy supplies. This will complicate burden sharing, funding agreements, and cooperation.
Even more important, perhaps, Europe must avoid old patterns of behavior, like the Eurodrone program. The decision to proceed was announced in 2013, as a collaboration between France, Germany, and Italy to develop a joint medium altitude long endurance drone. After eight years of national government disputes, contracts were assigned with delivery expected in 2028, 15 years after the project’s announcement.
Collective EU defense projects can be painfully slow and suffer from political disagreements, damaging Europe’s deterrence and military credibility. The continent cannot afford another Eurodrone-style delay; deterrence for the current threat is measured in months, not decades.
The EU has acknowledged the risk. The EU’s Kubilius said in a September 18 interview that European governments’ current drone procurement projects, “can take two years… that would be totally unacceptable.”
The program can offer considerable opportunities. There are clear benefits for the Union and for other non-EU Europeans, like the UK and Norway.
European investment in the eastern flank could, for example, help consolidate Europe’s fractured defense market. The continent’s defense industry is underfunded and fragmented — only a fifth of the world’s 20 largest defense companies are European. A need for austerity and social spending has caused long-term under-investment in the defense industry, leaving assembly lines cold and less incentive to innovate.
Dalibor Rohac of the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) explains that, as the “example of Ukraine’s own drone and anti-drone industry shows, the success of the EU’s most recent initiative will require a high degree of flexibility, rapid innovation cycles, and a constant back and forth between military units and manufacturers.
“While EU-provided financial resources are welcome, it will be critical to design the scheme in a radically decentralized manner to allow for the iterative process between those using the technology and those supplying it to take place.”
There are now clear signals that at least some European countries are getting the message of both the threat and the need for swifter action. Denmark is expediting the construction of a missile fuel plant for Ukraine’s new Flamingo missile by setting aside more than 20 laws and regulations that would normally have delayed construction work.
That driving need for action is the key element of what’s needed for a viable drone wall, to make Europeans safe in their homes. The EU must treat Putin’s hybrid warfare as a test of its ability to deter, before they are caught off guard by the real deal. It requires “Action this day,” as Winston Churchill would write on his wartime commands.
Niccolò Comini works at the American Enterprise Institute. He writes about Italian politics and foreign policy, and has been published on CEPA’s Europe’s Edge, Foreign Policy, and The National Interest.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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