An ever-louder drumbeat of menace has been emerging from Western intelligence agencies, culminating in a warning this month that Russia may be preparing an attack on NATO.
The clock starts running next month, according to US intelligence sources cited in the Wall Street Journal, which said Kremlin action could take the form of anything from a cyberattack to a limited ground incursion designed to break NATO by demonstrating a failure of allied resolve.
As the US scholar Andrew Michta said: “I’ve been warning about this. The three months I just spent in Europe confirmed my concern. Time to wake up and act. If appeasement of Russia continues, Europe will find out the price the hard way.”
That’s partly an issue of political willpower. Europe must assume that it will have to fight alone. That means achieving unity among its 30 continental members. The risks have been underlined by the US struggle to impose itself on Iran since its February 28 attack. This may no longer be a matter of American choice; it may simply be unable to help given its commitments elsewhere.
But Europe must find more than willpower; it must also summon up a military strategy to beat a Russian armed attack. Senior European military staff have been considering this possibility and planning to fight the new conflict that has been seen in Ukraine.
Gen. Roly Walker, the British Army’s chief of staff, said in June that the UK-commanded, 21-nation Allied Rapid Reaction Corps must be able to do what a Ukrainian corps “can do today. That is persistent mid- and deep-range strikes . . . That is what stretches [Russian] front lines, what starves [them] . . . of the materiel and the people to sustain that defense. And then be able to, at their weakest points, strike deep to turn a flank. All the while dismantling any attempt they have, to mobilize for attack and to get close.”
New British acquisitions including autonomous and remote systems will be deployed by the army to the alliance’s eastern flank over the next year, “in much greater numbers . . . ready to strike and act within 30 minutes.”
Across Europe, Ukraine’s experience is beginning to reshape not simply what armies buy, but how they expect to fight. The emerging model relies on dispersing forces, generating affordable mass through autonomous systems, and shortening the time that separates battlefield experience and technological adaptation.
This is most visible at the unit level. The Netherlands is assigning around 600 personnel to drone operations, and mobile teams are able to modify systems near the front. France has ordered 5,000 low-cost soldier drones after testing the first 1,000 during Exercise Orion. Like Britain’s new 20:40:40 approach to combat power, which is heavy on autonomous and reusable equipment, these initiatives recognize that small numbers of expensive, sophisticated platforms cannot provide the mass or adaptability required for sustained high-intensity warfare.
Mass, however, is useful only when connected to surveillance, targeting, and survivable strike. NATO’s choice of Sweden’s GlobalEye for airborne early warning (AEW) and Swedish investment in satellites, electronic-warfare drones, and loitering munitions could strengthen Europe’s ability to detect and track threats.
Significant European cooperation is underway, most notably with the signing of the European Long-Range Strike Approach (ELSA) by Europe’s biggest military powers to oversee seven missile and long-range attack systems, plus AEW.
New acquisition programs are already funded. Norway has selected South Korea’s Hanwha Chunmoo for long-range precision fire, while Estonia is adding the same system to its HIMARS, artillery and layered air defenses. Germany’s training to disperse aircraft across civilian airports addresses the other side of the equation: strike capabilities cannot deter if they can be destroyed on their permanent bases.
Europe is also moving from protecting individual assets towards layered territorial denial. Poland’s SAN “drone wall”, integrated with its German-supported Eastern Shield, will combine sensors, electronic warfare, interceptor drones, guns and missiles. Lithuania’s fortifications and restored wetlands apply the same principle on land: slowing an attack and directing it towards areas where it can be detected and struck. Romania’s Eastern Phoenix exercises extend this layered approach into live testing, linking NATO forces and defense companies with the NATO-Ukraine Joint Analysis, Training and Education Centre to trial counter-drone tactics under realistic conditions.
These changes will endure only if the industry can replenish losses. Denmark is combining urgent drone procurement with deeper cooperation with Ukraine, while Ukrainian systems are moving towards production in the Netherlands and Finland. EU programs are attempting to translate such battlefield innovation into European-scale manufacturing.
So, Europe is preparing to fight. Recent assessments suggest that European NATO already possesses sufficient personnel and platforms to contest a Russian offensive, while current investments should improve its resilience over the next several years.
But without the US, it would fight differently. Rather than relying on rapid maneuver, persistent air superiority, and deep strikes at American scale, Europe would probably pursue a more defensive and deliberate strategy: denying Russia an early breakthrough, absorbing the initial attack, and exploiting its greater economic and industrial weight over time. In other words, it would seek first to avoid losing quickly and then to outlast Russia.
Autonomous systems, dispersed operations, and layered defenses are now being introduced to fit this model, but acquisitions alone will not create a sustainable European way of war. To achieve that, the strategy still needs sufficient ammunition and spare parts, protected logistics, trained personnel, and an industrial base able to replenish losses faster than Russia can exploit them.
Above all, it requires integration. Swedish surveillance must be able to cue Polish or Norwegian fires; national drone defenses must exchange data; dispersed aircraft must operate from allied bases; and commanders must be authorized to act before Russia creates a fait accompli.
Common communications, joint targeting, compatible logistics, and pre-agreed political procedures are as important as additional weapons. Without coordination, Europe will end up with promising but disconnected national projects whose combined value is smaller than the sum of their parts.
With it, these capabilities could become a genuinely European force able to detect, absorb, and retaliate against an attack and sustain that effort even when American assistance is unavailable.
Margaryta Khvostova is a PhD Candidate in Politics in the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Surrey, a PhD Fellow at the Centre for Britain and Europe (CBE), and Programmes Manager at the Centre for the Study of Global Power Competition (CGPC).
Professor Amelia Hadfield is Head of the Department of Politics, Founding Director of the Centre for Britain and Europe (CBE), and Associate Vice President of External Engagement at the University of Surrey.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
