Russia’s all-out aggression against Ukraine has highlighted the need for robust defense. The European Union (EU), traditionally a bloc committed to peace and prosperity, has recognized that the continent is at a turning point and has launched strategic initiatives to strengthen its capabilities.
Key among these is the European Defense Industrial Strategy (EDIS) and the European Defense Industrial Program (EDIP), which build on previous efforts to improve production and procurement.
EDIS encourages EU member states to invest in defense products branded “Made in the EU,” in a bid to reverse the trend of sourcing arms from outside the bloc (especially the US.) In the year to June 2023, such external spending accounted for 78% of total defense procurement by EU nations. The new strategy aims to incentivize collaboration, coordination, and joint purchasing.
The two programs also address broader concerns, including the efficiency of Europe’s defense industry, financing, the security of supply chains, support for small and medium-sized enterprises, and innovation. They emphasize the need for closer NATO collaboration and explore ways to integrate the Ukrainian defense industry into European efforts.
The EDIS plan suggests this should include a new policy proposal by the High Representative and member states to support joint drone production, opening an EU Innovation Office in Kyiv to ensure matchmaking between the Union’s start-ups and innovators and Ukraine’s industry and armed forces, opening a possibility for Ukraine to participate in joint procurement and to Ukrainian defense companies to be supported in their industrial expansion. The EU will also host an EU-Ukraine Defense Industry Forum in 2024, to bolster cooperation.
The success of the European Commission’s vision inevitably depends on the commitment and commitment of member states, including the need for swift implementation and overcoming national barriers to joint procurement.
With Russia’s shift toward a war economy and dwindling US military assistance, European nations are urgently sourcing defense equipment from non-European suppliers, which often offer shorter delivery times. Poland has made significant acquisitions from South Korea, for example. Warsaw decided to purchase FA-50 light attack aircraft, K9 howitzers, K2 Black Panther tanks, and K239 Chunmoo multi-barreled missile launchers worth $5.8bn in 2022.
Balancing the immediate need for rearmament with the goal of developing indigenous defense industries is critical to the success of Europe’s strategies.
Procurement involves two main aspects: military-technical and political. The former is driven by planning processes that outline the capabilities and technologies needed for national defense and is often shrouded in secrecy, even among allies.
The latter often doubles as a tool for diplomatic engagement and involves long-term partnerships with supplier countries encompassing maintenance, upgrades, and personnel training. Europe’s preference for US-made equipment, despite political uncertainties on the other side of the Atlantic, exemplifies this.
It also underlines another key point. US defense producers generally only have to consider one market and negotiate with one customer. The procurement process is faster and driven by a huge market that supplies the world’s most capable military. That means products are available and tested — take the F-35 combat aircraft ordered by multiple EU countries in recent years, the HIMARS precision artillery system, or the Patriot surface-to-air missile system.
Meanwhile, France and Germany have only just agreed to produce a new main battle tank unlikely to be available until 2040, the same date as their planned $100bn future combat aircraft. Its British-Japanese-Italian competitor program aims to have aircraft flying by 2035. All these projects will come too late for European states looking to meet the Russian threat now.
European defense procurement is also hampered by rigid legislation and peacetime processes, which prioritize transparency and value for money but result in lengthy and inflexible acquisition timelines. The extreme case is Germany’s achingly slow process to replace GS36 assault rifles since 2017.
These challenges, along with varying national specifications like amphibious capability for armored personnel vehicles, varying canon calibers, information and communication systems connectivity, and other issues, along with the pressure to support domestic industries, hinder the EU’s goal of increased joint procurement. In 2022, only 18% of the EU’s defense spending was through joint purchases, a long way from the ambitious targets of 50% and 60% set for 2030 and 2035 by the EDIS.
The June, European Parliament elections will mark a critical juncture for the EU’s defense initiatives, as the formation of a new Commission and budget negotiations will significantly impact its plans. These may include a new Commissioner for Defense, as is currently being proposed by Commission President Ursula von der Leyen.
Current funding, including €1.5bn ($1.6bn) reallocated from the European Defense Fund to the European Defense Industrial Program for 2025-2027, falls far short of more ambitious visions, such as a €100bn plan to rejuvenate the sector proposed by Commissioner for the Internal Market Thierry Breton. The French government has compared the need to re-arm as comparable to the pandemic and has proposed EU defense bonds as a means of funding, although Germany says it is opposed.
As the EU introduces more mechanisms to strengthen its defense capabilities, careful management will be required to ensure a speedier process, to ensure that redundancy is avoided, and to prevent excessive administrative burdens, especially for smaller enterprises navigating the bloc’s complex bureaucracy.
Coordination with NATO is also crucial, given that most EU member states are part of the alliance. Collaborative efforts in standardization, certification, and interoperability are essential for cohesive capabilities.
The role of non-EU defense producers, such as the UK, US, Turkey, and South Korea, remains a contentious topic. While there’s a logical and strong argument for the UK’s involvement due to its close ties with the EU market, broader participation risks diluting the EU’s focus on developing its own capabilities.
Balancing the openness of European defense subsidy programs without compromising the EU’s strategic autonomy is a delicate task, and yet it may be the most urgent issue currently facing the bloc. This is not a time to dither.
Matej Kandrík is Chief Executive Director and co-founder of the Bratislava-based Adapt Institute and a Ph.D. candidate in Political Science with a specialization in Security and Strategic Studies at Masaryk University in the Czech Republic. He has also researched at the National Defense University of Poland.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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