Photo: Volodymyr Zelensky, on the right, and Ursula von der Leyen. Credit: European Union AV Service

Europe Needs a Military Operations Center in Ukraine

A proposal: The continent’s militaries should build a command center in Ukraine to help fight Russia and form the nucleus of a post-US operational command.

By Alexander Crowther and Jahara ‘Franky’ Matisek

February 3, 2026

Russia is fighting two wars at once: a brutal war in Ukraine and a persistent hybrid war across the European continent. That gray-zone conflict increasingly uses the air, space, and cyber domains — along with criminals and biker gangs — to probe, destabilize, and undermine European resolve. If and when a peace deal is finalized, this pressure will not cease; it will intensify.

Western capitals must therefore prepare for the war after the war, especially since any post-ceasefire force is likely to have to fight. The central lesson of the past two decades is that Russia regards the end of hostilities as no such thing.

The challenge ahead is more than just rebuilding Ukraine; it is about fundamentally re-engineering European defense. Europe must develop the capability to plan, command, and control multidomain operations (MDO) at scale and speed.

The possible core of this proposal already exists. Last year, France and the UK established a joint three-star HQ in Paris to command the future Ukraine reassurance force. This will form the kernel for any future military deployment. It includes plans for a command and control (C2) capability on the ground under a two-star British officer whose remit includes securing Ukraine’s skies.

But while the Deployable Air Control Centre at Poggio Renatico, Italy, was sufficient to provide C2 for the Libyan air operation in 2011, operations in Ukraine will, due to the nature of modern warfare, be multidimensional.

The seed for a vital, all-domain C2 capability must therefore be planted in Ukraine. We propose a Multidomain Operations Center in Ukraine (MDOC-U) as a necessary security mechanism. This center must be the first pillar in a continent-wide air, cyber, drone, missile, and space defense architecture: a shield stretching from the High North to the Mediterranean. Crucially, this is a project that Europeans must lead. The United States will no longer be around to anchor European defense (at least in the way it has), and a non-NATO framework denies Russia the propaganda victory of casting this as “further” alliance aggression.

A peace deal will not end Russia’s campaign; it will merely shift its focus. Moscow’s proven toolbox of coercion (e.g., mass drone attacks, airspace violations, sabotage, GPS jamming, and cyberattacks) is calibrated to fall just below NATO’s tripwires. This is not speculation; evidence of this shadow war is already visible across the continent.

Russian warplanes and drones routinely violate the airspace of the Baltic states, Finland, Norway, Poland, and Romania. Pervasive GPS jamming over the Arctic Circle and the Baltic Sea now regularly endangers civilian aviation and maritime traffic. Cyber and electronic warfare campaigns targeting European governments and critical infrastructure have intensified. Major European airports, including Brussels, Copenhagen, Dublin, and Munich, have been closed and aircraft have been menaced by drone incursions.

This is the deliberate execution of shaping operations as part of Russian political warfare. The entire Eastern flank is already experiencing Russia’s multi-domain pressure campaign. Ukraine is merely the testing ground where Russia refines its tactics.

Viewing post-ceasefire security in isolation is therefore a categorical error. Ukraine is, and will remain, the frontline of Europe’s security. Its defense cannot be decoupled from the defense of the entire continent. The Kremlin understands this; European capitals ignore it at their peril.

Currently, Europe has no unified, operational structure to counter these hybrid threats in real time. NATO’s air policing missions are fundamentally reactive, scrambling aircraft after a violation and not providing for air defense. Security assistance to Ukraine, while substantial, remains fragmented across bilateral and multilateral channels, creating logistical seams and operational gaps that Russia exploits. European Union (EU) security policy, though evolving, remains too slow and politically constrained to operate at the speed of relevance.

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While NATO’s strategic commands in Brunssum and Naples are effective at planning, they lack an integrated tactical command-and-control architecture for multi-domain operations. Such a structure is essential to seamlessly fuse effects across all domains. Without it, Europe will remain vulnerable, especially if Moscow succeeds in forcing a post-war arrangement that limits the size of Ukraine’s military. A high-tech force multiplier like an MDOC thus becomes essential for Ukrainian security and would need to be integrated into the proposed EU drone wall.

This center would be more robust than a NATO Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC), which focuses primarily on airpower. An MDOC integrates data and commands effects across all domains, fusing intelligence from satellites, cyber networks, radar arrays, and ground sensors into a single, AI-driven operational picture. This allows commanders to detect, track, and neutralize a threat in minutes, not hours.

A phased, pragmatic approach is crucial:

Phase 1: Establish Airpower Allied Command-Ukraine (AAC-U)

A European mission would be needed to establish an Airpower Allied Command-Ukraine (AAC-U). This entity would mirror the capabilities of NATO’s existing CAOCs in Uedem in Germany, Torrejón in Spain, and Bodø in Norway to create a unified air and missile defense network. The AAC-U would need European military personnel alongside Ukrainians, and would integrate all available sensor data, from Ukraine’s air defense network to allied AWACS and satellite feeds, into a single common operating picture. This would dramatically increase the efficiency of Ukraine’s air defenses.

Phase 2: Evolve AAC-U into an MDOC

The AAC-U would serve as the nucleus for a full MDOC by taking in other domain-specific cells. A cyber and electronic warfare cell would conduct defensive cyber operations and coordinate jamming against Russian drones and command networks. A space cell would leverage commercial and military satellite assets for intelligence and protect friendly GPS and communication links from Russian interference. This MDOC system would link the sensor to the shooter with unprecedented speed. For example, a satellite spots a Russian logistics hub (space), a communications intercept confirms its importance (cyber), and the MDOC tasks a long-range precision strike to neutralize it (land) — all within a single, compressed kill chain.

This is designed to be scalable and transferable. Initially European-only, it would operate on a “train, advise, and assist” model, with the explicit goal of transitioning to a command staffed and operated primarily by Ukrainians. From protecting Ukraine, it would connect across frontline states, eventually forming an integrated command for the entire Eastern flank of the Baltics, Fennoscandia, Poland, Romania, and Ukraine. A united, multi-domain shield would force Russia to confront a single, seamless wall, not a series of exploitable gaps.

It is an open secret that NATO’s consensus-based structure struggles to operate at the pace of Russian aggression. Political unanimity is not operational speed. Simultaneously, the United States is undeniably shifting its strategic focus and resources elsewhere.

This is precisely why a European-led MDOC is so vital. It offers a politically viable mechanism for a coalition of the willing to build the defense infrastructure it needs. Such a framework could allow for the flexible participation of non-NATO members like Austria and Ireland while permitting hesitant NATO allies like Hungary to opt out, so bypassing political bottlenecks. The question confronting Europe is no longer should we support Ukraine, but who will defend Europe if America’s focus is elsewhere? The MDOC is not a competitor to NATO but a vital European pillar that demonstrates a credible commitment to its own defense.

At several moments in European history, a single strategic decision (or a single leader) altered the continent’s fate: from Aetius on the Catalunian Plains in 410 to Vytautas at Grunwald in 1410, and Jan Sobieski at Vienna in 1683. Today, Europe needs that clarity of purpose again, not from one person, but from a coalition.

Viewed narrowly, our proposed operations center is a tool to protect Ukraine. Viewed correctly, it is the embryo of a continental defense revolution. It would be the first, indispensable step toward building a unified, multi-domain shield capable of deterring and responding to Russian aggression. European leaders must drive this new era of defense integration.

G. Alexander Crowther, PhD, is a Senior Nonresident Fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis, a visiting professor at Florida International University, and was a Special Assistant to the SACEUR

Jahara “Franky” Matisek (PhD) is a U.S. Air Force Command Pilot that is a Research Fellow at the U.S. Naval War College, Fellow at the Payne Institute for Public Policy, and Visiting Scholar at Northwestern University.

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