Russia’s four-year-long war of aggression against Ukraine menaces Europe. With the US now stating that regional security is primarily an issue for the continent itself, there remains a still-unanswered question — who will take on this role?
There are three outline alternatives, and each offers its own problems and strengths.
- The European Union (EU) expands to take in defense and security;
- NATO adapts to become more European; or
- A group of European countries (and perhaps Canada) starts something new.
The EU Option
Russia’s war has reordered the EU’s priorities. Where the previous European Commission was defined by the 2019 Green Deal, defense and security are now top of the agenda.
The Commission’s early defense initiatives, focused largely on industrial policy and financing, have met with cautious approval. Instruments such as the €1.5bn ($1.8bn) European defense industry program (EDIP) and the €150bn security action for Europe (SAFE) loans to encourage joint procurement are widely seen as useful steps to support Europe’s fragmented defense industrial base.
But whenever Brussels seeks to move beyond industrial policy into a more strategic role of capability planning, it has encountered stiff resistance from member states. That was on display in October, when EU leaders merely “took note” of the Defense Readiness Roadmap 2030. While the roadmap identifies priority capabilities such as drone defense and long-range strike, leaders agreed that their development should be led by member states through the intergovernmental European Defence Agency, not the Commission.
Member states’ position is often paradoxical. They want the Commission to stay out of defense planning and strategy, and focus only on strengthening the defense industry, but deny it access to its most powerful instrument, the single market. By invoking the broad national security exemptions in EU law, governments continue to shield defense procurement from EU rules and protect national champions, and thus only replicate the fragmentation of European defense production.
The NATO Option
To deter Russia, NATO allies agreed last year to raise defense spending to 5% of GDP and rolled out new regional defense plans. Unlike the EU, NATO has not needed new powers or mechanisms, since territorial defense has been its core mission since 1949.
But the waning US commitment to the alliance, repeatedly articulated by Donald Trump and outlined in recent US national security and defense strategies, downgrades Europe to a tertiary theatre and assumes that Europeans can manage Russia largely with their own conventional forces. These, it is said, will be backed by US nuclear deterrence and strategic enablers. But the vibe shift is clear — US NATO ambassador Matthew Whitaker said in November he wanted the future Supreme Allied Commander (SACEUR) to be a German.
Although NATO’s Secretary General Mark Rutte, on January 27, told members of the European Parliament to “keep on dreaming” if they think that Europe could defend itself without the US, there have been calls from European Commissioners for a stronger European pillar witih the alliance. There is a clear tension here, and it’s far from obvious how it might be resolved.
European action cannot simply be limited to higher defense spending or acquiring capabilities, such as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) or long-range strike, that NATO currently relies on the US to provide.
It would also require a reshaping of NATO’s command structure to reflect European responsibility. Not only is SACEUR a US officer, as he has been since the start, but Americans currently lead half of NATO’s joint force commands and most of its domain commands. If Europe is serious about greater autonomy within the alliance, these roles will need to shift progressively into European hands.
That, in turn, would require Europeans to build the capabilities needed to assume command, and a cooperative US willing to agree a clear roadmap for the gradual Europeanisation of NATO. The July summit in Ankara presents an opportunity to start this process.
A Third Way
But neither of these approaches is suited to the challenge that Europe faces. The EU is constrained by limited defense competencies and divided by neutral states such as Ireland and Austria, as well as obstructive members such as Hungary and Slovakia. And lastly, the bloc is notorious for its notoriously slow pace of action that simply is not suited to security issues that by their very nature often rear up without warning.
With NATO facing similar internal frictions alongside an increasingly unpredictable US, attention has shifted to an alternative.
This has no good name as yet (a recent CEPA piece playfully suggested NEATO, for Northeast Atlantic Treaty Organization), but would involve that much-overused term, the coalition of the willing.
Initially formed to discuss security guarantees for Ukraine, an objective that remains distant as a ceasefire shows little sign of materializing. the grouping is increasingly emerging as a political forum for European defense coordination.
Its appeal lies precisely in its informality. Free from treaty constraints, it allows for faster decision-making and includes only those states prepared to contribute meaningfully to European security. The ability of the United Kingdom and France to put concrete commitments on the table for Ukraine has underscored the seriousness of the format, anchored by a core group of major powers and supported by a smaller but constructive set of partners.
Yet, as Jean Monnet famously observed: “Nothing is possible without men; nothing is lasting without institutions.” Over time, this points to the possible formalization of this coalition, perhaps along the lines of a European Security Council (ESC), as suggested in January by the European Defence Commissioner, Andrius Kubilius.
This would be something of a hybrid, because the UK would join the 27 EU members and help man its 100,000-strong army. Canada, Norway and perhaps even Turkey might also be interested, which again casts some doubt on the EU evolving into a defense organization.
That’s why reason why, in the near term, the coalition is likely to function as a political coordination hub, taking strategic decisions at the European level while relying on a flexible toolkit for implementation. This ranges from bilateral arrangements, such as the Northwood Declaration by France and the United Kingdom on nuclear cooperation, to minilateral formats, such as the recent Eastern Flank summit in Helsinki, with selected decosopms ultimately anchored in EU or NATO frameworks where necessary. The 10-nation, UK-led Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) could also be a model.
This may be enough to manage the current situation. However, it is unlikely to be enough to provide the continent with robust and autonomous defenses it needs to endure.
Juraj Majcin is a Policy Analyst with the European Policy Centre. He works mainly on European and transatlantic security and defense cooperation, as well as hybrid threats. He was also a 2024 James S. Denton Fellow with the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA.)
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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