The US Senate passed the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act by 86 votes to 11 on August 7. A House version was introduced three days later, and it includes a provision that deserves particular attention in Europe.
Section 113 would require the President to impose duties of up to 100% on US imports from countries that make new purchases of Russian crude oil or natural gas, rank among the five largest importers by volume, or are in the top five facilitators of sanctions evasion. An amendment to remove the tariff authority, which has a national-interest waiver, was rejected.
Russian energy revenues help finance the war against Ukraine, and Europe has spent years — and much political capital — reducing its imports. Under binding EU legislation, remaining imports under qualifying long-term Russian LNG contracts end on January 1, 2027, with qualifying long-term pipeline contracts ending nine months later, subject to a storage safeguard that could delay the latter for a further month.
But the continent has been buying Russian LNG at record levels, especially since the US/Israeli war on Iran disrupted alternative supplies, and the bloc has carved out a temporary exemption allowing certain transfers of Russian LNG to third countries under contracts concluded before February 2022.
What will happen if this results in US pressure on Moscow being applied through measures against its European allies?
For natural-gas purchases, Section 113(d) makes the mechanism unusually explicit. A country would not be affected if its imports account for less than 15% of Russia’s total annual gas exports and if it has taken “significant steps” to reduce them.
In other words, Washington would not only assess what one of its allies buys, but whether it is doing enough to change.
The problem is that the EU already has a legal framework in place to respond to other countries passing judgment on its members and trying to force them to change course.
The bloc’s Anti-Coercion Instrument defines economic coercion as a third country applying, or threatening to apply, a measure affecting trade or investment to make the EU or a member state adopt, change, or abandon a particular act.
And the European Commission is explicit that this applies to all third countries, regardless of whether they are a friend or foe. If the legal conditions are met and efforts to end the coercion fail, EU response measures can include tariffs or import restrictions, as well as curbs on public procurement, services, foreign direct investment, intellectual property rights, banking, insurance, and access to the bloc’s capital markets.
For years, European debate on economic coercion has focused on authoritarian competitors, and the EU’s instrument for dealing with it emerged from concerns that trade dependence could be converted into political leverage.
But the test written into EU law is neutral about the source of the threat. It asks what a measure does, not whether Brussels likes the government applying it, so it could be used against Washington.
While the Graham legislation does not automatically constitute economic coercion under EU law, the bloc’s rules require a case-by-case assessment. What is the severity and duration of the pressure? Does it intrude into an area of European sovereignty? Is it part of a pattern of interference? Does the country applying it have an internationally recognized legitimate concern?
The need to cut Russia’s capacity to finance its war clearly answers the last of those questions, but that cannot be the end of the analysis. The other central questions do not disappear when allies agree on the objective but disagree on the means.
What if the mechanism moves beyond Russian oil? Access to the US market could become conditional on European choices over long-term energy contracts, infrastructure suppliers, industrial subsidies, technology standards, or investment relationships.
In all of those cases, the policy objective might be defensible, but the choice would no longer be entirely Europe’s.
And that is where alliances need rules. And why they must work together to manage the potential for damage and disruption to relationships and trade.
Brussels should not threaten Washington with the Anti-Coercion Instrument every time Congress considers extraterritorial economic measures, as it would turn a defensive mechanism into a source of permanent transatlantic friction. Nor should it pretend pressure from an ally does not qualify as pressure.
Instead, the European Commission should publish a clear doctrine for allied economic pressure. When a third-country trade measure is designed to alter an EU or member-state policy, the Commission should assess it against the same criteria regardless of the country concerned.
Where the pressure comes from an ally pursuing a legitimate security objective, consultation should come before any formal response. But that consultation should operate within a defined legal framework, not as a substitute for one.
And the point should be deterrence, not retaliation. Predictable thresholds would give both sides an incentive to solve disputes before they become tests of economic strength.
The US has good reasons to attack the revenue streams that sustain Russia’s war. And Europe has equally good reasons to preserve the principle that coordination is not the same as one ally policing another’s sovereign choices.
The proposed legislation may still change, but the underlying issue will stay the same.
Europe built an instrument to defend sovereign economic choice against coercion. It must now decide if that principle depends on who applies the pressure.
Ivo Hlaváček is a former Slovak ambassador and former director-general at the Slovak Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs. He holds a doctorate in international law and writes on European energy security, sanctions policy, economic statecraft, and EU-Ukraine cooperation.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
