As US and Russian representatives fly to discuss Ukraine’s fate in Riyadh, the key concern in Europe’s capitals is to prevent a weakening of Kyiv’s position through premature concessions to the Kremlin.

While the outcome of the talks is beyond Europe’s direct control, it is essential to continue sending clear signals to the Trump administration that draw parallels with the 1938 Munich Agreement and the six years of global slaughter and destruction that followed that appeasement.

But the most pressing question for Europeans is what we will do, not what the US will do. Instead of reacting to every statement from Washington and lamenting decisions beyond our control, we must focus on what is actionable and necessary.

In the wake of the February 14-16 Munich Security Conference, key priorities and essential steps should include:

  • A European peace plan aligned with Ukraine.
    President Emmanuel Macron’s Paris summit on February 17, bringing together leaders from Germany, the UK, Italy, Poland, Spain, the Netherlands, and Denmark (representing the Baltic-Nordic eight), alongside the EU and NATO, should evolve into a structured diplomatic format, recognizing the unreliability of some Kremlin-friendly nations. A coalition of like-minded European states is the only viable path forward and should include the three Baltic states and Finland as the biggest providers of Ukraine aid per capita. Without decisive European action, the continent will find itself sidelined in future negotiations, leaving frontline states with a disproportionate burden of regional security and defense. If EU-wide solutions remain elusive, ad hoc informal security formats will become ever more critical.
  • Create real “peace through strength” leverage to pressure Moscow into negotiations.
    Europe has the means to expand sanctions against Russia and take control of its frozen assets. The majority of the approximately €300bn ($314bn) of frozen Russian funds are in Europe, and some countries have already provided a legal framework to seize and repurpose them for Ukraine’s needs. The next European Union (EU) sanctions package is also nearing completion and should be adopted soon. It’s also time to speed up the implementation of secondary sanctions on countries evading existing sanctions. Greater political will and courage are needed to make a key European contribution to shaping negotiations
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  • Maximize support for Ukraine without waiting for the US.
    Increasing defense budgets is critical because, without it, Americans will not take us seriously. But Europe must also take the lead in military and financial aid to Ukraine. The Nordic-Baltic countries have already outperformed larger EU states, both in terms of contributions relative to GDP and in absolute cash terms. Kyiv is expanding its defense industry, and military procurement from within Ukraine will increase significantly by the end of this year. Complaints about a lack of available equipment often serve as an excuse rather than representing real obstacles. Europe can even hope to partly offset the loss of US, aid but lacks the capacity to fully replace it. In theory, with political will and resources, it could supply Ukraine with short- and medium-range air defenses, electronic warfare support, basic military supplies, and drones. However, even if mobilized, Europe cannot provide critical advanced systems like Patriot or HIMARS, which remain essential for Ukraine’s defense — although it could acquire them from the US.
  • Prepare measures to deter future Russian aggression in Ukraine.
    Europe should present a clear plan for potential troop contributions to Ukraine after any agreement is signed. Lithuania and other nations remain convinced that Ukraine’s NATO membership is the most effective long-term deterrent against Russia. On the other hand, Ukraine already fields the largest conventional army in Europe and has more active forces than the rest of the continent. These combat-hardened units are a European asset and must be retained. Europe should commit to long-term military support, training, and supply for Ukraine’s armed forces and ensure sustained defensive capability for years to come.
  • Accelerating Ukraine’s EU membership.
    Traditionally, EU enlargement follows a performance-based model, requiring candidates to meet legal, political, and economic criteria. However, Ukraine’s unique geopolitical situation and strategic importance to European security necessitate a faster, more flexible approach. Ukraine is already deeply integrated with the EU through trade agreements, but full membership would unlock greater investment, infrastructure development,t and institutional reforms. Steps could include:
  1. Progressive economic integration: Granting Ukraine deeper access to the EU’s single market before full membership.
  2. Political inclusion: Providing Ukraine with observer status in key EU decision-making bodies.
  3. Defense and security association: Strengthening Ukraine’s ties with EU security mechanisms, including permanent defense cooperation.
  4. Access to EU funds: Expanding Ukraine’s eligibility for financial support to aid economic stability and post-war reconstruction.

Accelerating Ukraine’s integration would send a clear message to Russia that aggression will not block any country’s European aspirations. The EU must be willing to embrace non-traditional solutions, allowing Ukraine to benefit from membership advantages while the full accession process continues.

Europe must move on from reacting to the actions of others and take the initiative in shaping responses to Russia’s aggression, strengthening Ukraine, and preparing for future security challenges.

The EU must also increase military and financial support and use its leverage to proactively shape the peace process. Failure to do so would leave Europe marginalized in crucial decisions and overload frontline states with security responsibilities.

Dithering is not an option.

Eitvydas Bajarūnas is an ambassador in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Lithuania, and is currently a Center for Europe Policy Analysis (CEPA) Visiting Fellow.

Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.

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