There was little drama over the decision on the European Union’s (EU’s) aid package of €50bn ($54bn) to Ukraine.
The decision was taken — unanimously — barely minutes after the beginning of February 1’s extraordinary EU summit, which was called specifically to solve the impasse caused by Hungary’s previous refusal to sign the check along with everyone else.
Viktor Orbán did not raise objections this time. Nor did he get exactly what he wanted; an annual veto on the aid package of grants and loans, which runs from this year to 2027. Yes, the EU agreed to an annual debate on implementation and a possible biannual review, which Orbán demanded in December. But this was thin gruel for a man who had seen himself turning the EU tide.
Between the December summit and February 1, Europe’s policy community was left guessing whether the aid deal would be struck. There were, to be clear, alternative ways to provide the cash for Kyiv’s pressing recovery and wartime governance needs, and those did not require unanimity.
Nevertheless, if the decision regarding the €50bn fell through at this summit, this would signify that Europe was no longer united on helping Ukraine win – and that Ukraine could no longer be certain that more EU aid would be forthcoming in the future.
Coupled with the stalled passage of around $60bn in Ukraine aid by members of the Republican party in Congress, the message to President Zelenskyy and his people would have been extremely bleak.
The EU faced a decision; whether to allow a Hungarian leader representing fewer than 10 million of the bloc’s near-450 million population to decide Europe’s strategic direction. It decided not to allow this and showed its considerable irritation in the process (including the leaking of a Commission document essentially threatening to trash the Hungarian economy if Orbán’s campaign continued.) Poland’s Prime Minister Donald Tusk openly referred to “Orbán fatigue.”
As Tusk was doorstepped by reporters on his way in, he also remarked that Orbán’s “egoistic behavior” was incomprehensible and was jeopardizing European security. He noted, in passing, that there can be no compromise on the rule of law, and that Hungary will have to decide, whether it was part of the community or not.
Such a tough stance from another head of government, let alone from Poland, is almost unprecedented. The spirit of increasing dissatisfaction with Hungary holding the rest of the EU hostage on Ukraine can be read in many diplomats’ private assessments of the summit, and the way Orbán’s presentation of the result as his victory — “We’ve stood our ground” — was described by experts as disingenuous.
In fact, Orbán now finds himself in a very tricky spot. He is desperate to receive $21.5bn of EU aid which is still being withheld; the sum equates to more than 10% of the country’s 2022 GDP. Yet there is no reason to believe that EU money previously earmarked for Hungary is about to be released and there was no suggestion that it would be offered as a quid pro quo for the Ukraine decision.
And for the medium term, the dispute has focused minds in Brussels and in national capitals on reforming the system to avoid future use of the system by recalcitrant members. The liberal Renew Europe group in the European Parliament tweeted in the wake of the summit that it is time to end vetoes. It was accompanied by a picture of Orbán with the words “Victory for Europe, Victory for Ukraine. No Veto for Viktor!” superimposed on top.
The key to possible reform of this type will likely lie in the hands of the European People’s Party (to which Tusk belongs) after June’s European Parliament elections.
This could in theory lead to moves toward qualified majority voting for foreign policy and defense decisions.
Unless, that is, the more worrying scenario of a populist-right coalition of Christian democrats, conservatives, and radical MEPs predicted by the European Council on Foreign Relations emerges.
In that case, Orbán ’s grip on the veto may be preserved for years to come.
Marija Golubeva is a Distinguished Fellow with the Democratic Resilience Program at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA). She was a Member of the Latvian Parliament (2018-2022) and was Minister of the Interior from 2021-2022. A public policy expert, she has worked for ICF, a consultancy company in Brussels, and as an independent consultant for European institutions in the Western Balkans and Central Asia.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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