There’s always a worry in war that things will suddenly turn against you; that the enemy will advance and that you will lose. Ask Winston Churchill or George Washington.
Ukraine, like 20th-century Britain and 18th-century revolutionary America, is fighting for its existence against a more heavily armed power. The key battleground is Donbas, in the east around towns like Pokrovsk and Chasiv Yar, where its forces are losing ground against relentless Russian attacks. That’s not to say that all is lost; far from it.
Fortified defensive positions and grinding, attritional offensives have become a defining feature of the Russo-Ukrainian war. The mechanized Ukrainian counter-offensives — and faster Russian retreats — that liberated Kharkiv and Kherson in 2022 saw no echoes in 2023, as Ukraine’s summer offensive smashed into the walls of the Prigozhin line.
Since then, Ukraine has tended to be on the defensive (the Kursk incursion notwithstanding), and Russia on the offensive.
Unfortunately, this transition has favored Russian strategy in the last 12 months. With superiority in firepower and manpower and no qualms about expending both in vast quantities (Britain’s military intelligence says Russia is losing as many as 1,200 men a day, dead and wounded), it has inched further into Donetsk oblast, accomplishing at least some battlefield and political objectives. It has drained Kyiv of manpower, and at least in Bakhmut, forced Ukrainian forces into ill-advised and ill-prepared defensive battles. It lost almost 200 square miles of land in August alone.
These Russian gains have caused some in the West some to call for a ceasefire. Fighting on the back foot also hurts Ukraine’s international prestige and drains the morale of defenders.
Of course, Ukraine will not win the victory it wants in a defensive battle, but it must be victorious where it cannot seize the initiative.
Kyiv should consider reformulating its strategy in Donetsk to focus much more sharply on its own fortified defensive lines. Rather than fighting pitched defensive battles where Ukrainian forces try to blunt Russian offensives while shoving back as much as they can, it could consider turning population centers and military hubs into fortresses.
The shift would be subtle but meaningful. Rather than the positional fighting seen in Toretsk, Niu York, and previously in Bahkmut, Ukrainian forces should hunker down where they can find high ground and choke points.
Our reporting on the ground suggested there have been scattered efforts to reinforce positions in Pokrovsk, but less so in Chasiv Yar, likely due to the intensity of fighting there.
Instead of rushing units to fill the front line against Russian assaults, reserve forces should be digging into complex and well-constructed trench networks, backed up by artillery and a new influx of drones and air defenses.
As we spoke to soldiers on rotation from the Torestk sector, a common theme was the haste with which brigades had to deploy to blunt the Russian offenses south of Chasiv Yar. Undermanned and thrown rapidly into the fight, these units slowed but did not stop Russian advances.
The need for better fortifications was a constant theme throughout our trip to the front. One soldier in Kramatorsk said: “When we were rotated in [to Toretsk in July], the previous unit didn’t have good positions. They hadn’t dug in deep, the trench flooded. We didn’t have much time to improve the situation ourselves because we were attacked so much [by drones and artillery.]”
Another in the same town explained: “We were trained in how to set up defensive fighting positions in the United Kingdom and Germany. The training was good, okay. Not too detailed but it was simple. The greater problem is we need more time to set up. Now we prepare positions whenever we’re behind the line.”
The Ukrainian command is aware of the need and further behind the lines, there have been some efforts to better prepare a deeper defense.
We toured one such site on the hills outside Kramatorsk — a company-sized unit was spending a rotation from the front digging about two kilometers (1.25 miles) worth of trenches. The effort was encouraging — complex, deep trenches dug at a quick pace using just shovels, reinforced with wood planks. Fixed firing positions every 10 meters provided deadly fields of overlapping fire.
These positions were being prepared by well-trained sappers away from enemy direct fire. It’s a good start.
A commander outside Kramatorsk, near the trenches we photographed, said: “Whoever fights here will be much better prepared. We learned how to get really good positions from the Russians positions we’ve taken [especially earlier in the war, in fall 2022]. We’d kick them out, and see how they’d dug in deep, with strong walls, and good lines of sight.”
Later he explained: “We’ve trained in it, [the proper methodology for] how to set up. But a lot of it is just learning from experience. You get shelled a lot, you learn to dig in more. You learn to dig deep. Doing it fast becomes a matter of your muscles and how much you want it.” The optimum depth was 2.1m-2.4m (approximately 7–8 feet.)
Western allies can assist by providing combat engineering training, as well as heavy machinery to expedite the labor. The US Army Engineer Field Manual provides plenty of lessons on digging and reinforcing fortifications.
Earth-moving machinery could prove as important as armored fighting vehicles on the front and in reserve. Armored bulldozers such as the Caterpillar D9 have proven invaluable for the US military and Israeli Defense Forces. It would suit Ukraine to have tools like this near the front. Digging in now will give the certainty that solid defensive positions are ready for use when (as many fear) Ukrainian forces are pushed back from their current positions.
Concrete structures can replace wooden buttresses. Water pumps can be installed to drain trenches Alongside military necessities such as reinforced firing positions, sappers would have time to make room for more livable quarters.
We witnessed some creative means of improving trench life, such as aromatic herbs hung out to repel mosquitos and mask the dank earthy odors (as well as the smell of men fighting for days without showering.) These aren’t simple luxuries: dry trenches mean dry feet and the absence of so-called trench foot and other health problems. Comfortable sleep means rested fighters. The time devoted to making these fortifications more livable transforms them from hastily dug fighting positions to bastions.
The obvious question once the lines are built is where to find the troops to man them. This shortage helps explain Ukraine’s disadvantages in the Donbas, as well as the lack of adequate preparations. Recruitment to serve in dedicated combat engineering units might drive up the number of volunteers, as other targeted campaigns have. Ukraine has no shortage of civilians volunteering to help the war effort with fundraising and logistics; a civilian ditch-digging program might have similar results if well-planned and well-supplied.
Ukraine must restore maneuver when possible. This defense strategy is designed to hold ground in operational zones where maneuver is impossible. It is about maximizing the preservation of both Ukrainian lives and territory. This will contribute to a war-winning effort by dramatically increasing the ratio of Russian losses compared to Ukrainian.
This strategy also requires the West to supply more air defense systems; Ukraine can’t keep choosing between defending major cities and shooting down Russian combat sorties near the battlefield. This proposed strategy relies on cutting Russian airpower, achievable with more fighter planes and more Patriot batteries (as many as seven Patriot anti-air systems are expected to arrive in Ukraine from now.)
Even when the fighting ends, Ukrainian cities must continue to be fortresses. It will be a new experiment in civil-military relations, as the Ukrainians of future decades will live in cities surrounded by fortification networks, garrisoned by large military units. There will be strains when residential and commercial property located in strategic locations has to be confiscated by government ordinance.
After the bomb craters and bullet holes are patched up, there will still be trenches and bunkers. Ukraine’s strategic depth will provide a model of fortress cities not seen in Europe since the Renaissance, but that’s the scenery inflicted by modern military technology and by a truly awful neighbor.
Dyveke Undertun Aarhus is a freelance journalist reporting in Ukraine, where she has worked extensively for one year. She has also reported from Iraq and Lebanon.
Michael DiCianna is a visiting fellow at the Transatlantic Dialogue Center and a research assistant at the Yorktown Institute, he has been a research consultant in the US intelligence community for several years, focusing on military affairs in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and the Middle East. He is a Masters of Arts Candidate at the Institute for World Politics.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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