Political turmoil has reached new levels in Bosnia and Herzegovina with the second consecutive court verdict against Milorad Dodik. The Bosnian Serb leader, known for his secessionist tendencies and affection for Vladimir Putin, was convicted on appeal for defying decisions by the High Representative, Bosnia’s international overseer.
Dodik faces a year’s imprisonment, a six-year ban from holding political positions, and has been stripped of his current position as president of the country’s Republika Srpska entity.
Dodik is unhappy, calling the verdict a farce (and worse) and blaming foreigners in Bosnia, including EU officials and the High Representative, and Bosniaks from Sarajevo.
Losing his political position is more worrisome for Dodik than going to jail. According to national law, the convicted politician can — and will — exchange his prison sentence for a fine of approximately $22,000. No matter, he can still be replaced on the political scene; there are challengers from his own opposition, and Western countries may not mind seeing the more moderate Željka Cvijanović, the current Serbian member of the state-level Presidency, step out of Dodik’s shadow.
The coming weeks will center on Dodik’s fight to maintain his political legitimacy in the Serbian entity. He is unlikely to go quietly — possibly calling a referendum to demand his restoration to the position, or activating his international allies to pull strings on his behalf.
A friend in need is a friend indeed. His circle of allies is quite small (or exclusive) and includes Russia, Serbia, and Hungary. Dodik may also hope for assistance from the White House, having reached out to Trump. But who can Dodik really count on?
While Russia can do little to intervene in the legal-political processes in Bosnia, causing havoc in the country remains one of its top priorities. The more instability Bosnia (and the entire Balkans) endures, the better it is for Putin, since this diverts Western attention from Ukraine. The Kremlin, as always, can support Dodik by using the same narrative about the alleged injustices he faces, but it cannot provide him with any substantial assistance. The only symbolic gesture, which has been previously deployed, is calling for a UN Security Council meeting over Dodik.
President Trump’s involvement would mix things up. Dodik has wasted no time reaching out to the American president and even compared his own political struggles to what Trump experienced during the previous administration.
Dodik sees Trump as someone who, by using the same narrative about political injustice, might be able to influence internal dynamics in Bosnia. That would include US advocacy for the removal of the High Representative and pressure on Bosnia’s legal institutions in his favor.
The White House has so far been silent about Dodik’s sentencing, and this silence may indicate a future change in position. Since January, the US has stopped openly signaling an unwavering commitment to the High Representative, although it still backs the country’s territorial integrity and opposes forces actively seeking to undermine the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords.
In March, in an attempt to grab Trump’s attention, Dodik even offered the lithium reserves under Republika Srpska soil to companies chosen directly by the US president.
Dodik’s most valuable international allies are more traditional and much closer. Serbia’s Aleksandar Vučić and Hungary’s Viktor Orbán were the first to call the verdict a political witch-hunt. Like Dodik, they blamed “unelected political representatives” for it.
Vučić has closer ties to the White House than Dodik, and Serbian diplomacy has already launched a quest to influence the US administration, such as Secretary of State Marco Rubio, on Dodik’s situation. This diplomatic offensive is the maximum the Serbian president can do for his Bosnian ally. Vučić is preoccupied with internal issues, including mass protests that have challenged his hold on power since last year. He cannot ignore Dodik, but his support now has serious limitations.
Backing for Dodik’s cause seems almost unlimited when it comes to Orbán. The Hungarian prime minister, who in recent years has become the Bosnian Serb’s main European ally, vehemently protects his ideologically aligned Bosnian friend, to the extent of sending at least 70 members of a Hungarian anti-terrorist police squad commanded by his former bodyguard to extract him in February in case Dodik faced arrest. VSquare reported that this provoked a rebuke from the US.
Over the past few years, Hungary has become a haven for politicians fleeing their national justice systems and prison sentences, including North Macedonian Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski and Polish Deputy Minister of Justice Marcin Romanowski, while fiercely supporting Marine Le Pen and Jair Bolsonaro alike. Dodik still has room, some freedom of maneuver, but if all hell breaks loose, it is always good to know there is a nearby country where he could find asylum.
Dodik’s friendship circle is limited, and his allies are either occupied or powerless to intervene. A major shift in US policy might alter this calculation, but for now, at least, they can do little more than offer him words and — in extremis — a way out of Bosnia, and perhaps a nice apartment overlooking the Danube.
Ferenc Németh is a Ph.D. candidate at Corvinus University of Budapest. He has previously conducted research on the Western Balkans in Toronto and Skopje, worked as a research fellow at the Hungarian Institute of International Affairs, and interned at EULEX Kosovo. His areas of expertise include the Western Balkans, EU enlargement, and regional security. Ferenc was a Denton Fellow at CEPA in 2024.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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