Since the end of World War II, the United States has excelled at building and maintaining stable security relationships, with NATO being the prime example.
In contrast, America’s adversaries have been largely unable to forge enduring and effective great power partnerships — the turbulent relationship between the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China during the Cold War (which sometimes descended into armed conflict) serves as a powerful reminder that a shared ideology can often divide more than unite.
Currently, a unity of purpose between the autocratic powers has created the closest relationship in decades. China and Russia are forging a partnership increasingly reminiscent of a great power alliance.
The war in Ukraine has brought out a core strategic realignment in the global power distribution that is fast redefining the world order: the Sino-Russian partnership that many thought only a few years back would not be possible is a new geopolitical reality.
In short, we may be entering a period in which the US will be confronted by two adversaries determined to upend the global order built by Washington and its democratic allies in Europe and Asia.
The key variable is just how strong and enduring this Sino-Soviet partnership will be in great power competition, and how it shapes the power distribution in the Atlantic and the Pacific, as well as alignments across an increasingly developed developing world.
As the Kremlin pushes to remake Europe’s great power relationships at a continental level, Beijing is pursuing a far more ambitious project aimed at changing the foundations of the global order, ending once and for all the era of worldwide Western dominion.
The two states are allies not because they share any particular cultural or ideological affinity; rather, they have come together on account of the old adage that the “enemy of my enemy is my friend.” Their partnership is largely practical — anchored in hard power principles bereft of ideological pretense or posturing. In this realpolitik alignment, both parties believe they have more to gain from continuing to work together than they risk losing.
Their economic relationship deepened after the West imposed sanctions on Russia in the wake of its 2022 all-out invasion of Ukraine. Initially, trade between Russia and China collapsed, but it recovered quickly, reaching new heights by the end of that year —trade turnover totaled $190bn in 2022, beating the previous record of $147bn set in 2021.
By December 2023, Sino-Russian trade had crashed through the $200bn barrier to reach $240.1bn overall — a 26.3% increase over the previous year, and exceeding the annual targets set by the two governments.
The boom has largely served Chinese interests, with Russia increasingly in a subordinate position, exporting raw materials to China while China sends finished goods, especially cars, to Russia — the latter at the expense of Russia’s indigenous auto industry. China’s IT sector has also expanded into Russia, with Chinese firms recruiting cyber specialists from Russia and buying up Russian AI startups.
Russia’s growing dependence on China has serious implications for Moscow’s economic future, but more importantly, it poses a security threat to the US and its allies in Asia. I am not talking about the risks posed by increased military cooperation, though the Chinese and Russian navies have conducted a number of joint exercises and patrols in the Sea of Japan, the Taiwan Strait, and even the South China Sea.
Rather, as Moscow becomes increasingly dependent on Beijing, the latter will be able to demand access to key areas of military technology that the Russians have developed since the end of the Cold War, leveraging their post-Soviet designs and benefiting from access to mainly European technology.
This is particularly true of Russian development in hypersonics and nuclear propulsion technology, areas where it has worked steadily to close the gap with the West and where China continues to lag.
It should therefore be of serious concern to the US and its allies that the Russian and Chinese militaries have set up a series of consultations and, on the margins of the December 2023 meeting between Xi Jinping and Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin, pledged to improve their level of strategic coordination. This spirit of cooperation was on display during a recent visit to Beijing by Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov who, in addition to appearing with his Chinese counterpart, was also received by President Xi — a break in protocol likely intended to underscore the new closeness of the two countries’ “no limits” partnership.
The Sino-Russia alignment is quintessentially about great power synergy when it comes to interests and relative strength. It is fair to say that without China’s economic support, Russia would not have been able to brave the economic sanctions imposed on it by the West in the wake of Putin’s all-out invasion of Ukraine.
By backing Russia, China has taken considerable risks, including the possibility that the West, and the US in particular, may become more hostile in its economic relations with Beijing if Sino-Russian cooperation deepens. (On May 1, Washington imposed sanctions on 20 companies based in China and Hong Kong.)
And yet Beijing appears to have concluded that what Russia has to offer China in military technology outweighs the economic penalties.
Should China, “the world’s factory,” find a way to access and absorb the latest military technology from Russia, the global military balance could tilt decisively. For the US this is the greatest dilemma facing its military planners and political decision-makers alike: are we about to witness in the military domain China’s ability to leapfrog technological and manufacturing development much as it did in the civilian sector?
If so, the threat posed by the People’s Liberation Army Navy to the United States Navy in a future confrontation over Taiwan would grow exponentially, requiring both new planning on the Pentagon’s part and a significantly expanded investment in the size of the US military.
Tracking and correctly assessing the extent to which the Russian and Chinese military establishments become intertwined should be among our top priorities, especially as the United States’ ability to secure our allies in Asia remains paramount.
But remember that the Sino-Russian alliance is not without its problems.
One factor that could strain relations is Russia’s policy of engagement with North Korea, helping the Pyongyang regime to break out of international isolation and building closer ties between the two countries in exchange for supplies of munitions. Beijing is unlikely to accept Russian encroachment into what used to be China’s exclusive relationship with a country on its doorstep.
Notwithstanding the current close cooperation between Beijing and Moscow, the relationship may prove to be more fragile than assumed.
Despite the fact that China has repeatedly called for a negotiated settlement in Ukraine, America’s continued support for Kyiv — and hence Russia’s inability to secure its gains in short order — is actually in Beijing’s interest.
The termination of US aid would work against China since the implosion of Ukraine would halt — or at least slow – Moscow’s slide toward vassal-like dependency on Beijing. On the other hand, an expansion of the war into European NATO territory would pull the United States deeper into the theater, reducing Washington’s ability to respond to a crisis in Asia and bringing China closer to achieving its regional hegemony in the Indo-Pacific.
It must therefore be obvious that Ukraine is extremely important to China and that a continuing conflict is very much in its interests. Equally, US policy on Ukraine and its consequences will heavily influence how the Sino-Russian relationship unfolds (with the outcome of the presidential election in November a key variable.)
The US has to be aware of how high the stakes are both in Ukraine and in the developing Sino-Russian axis. These will shape the future security environment in Europe and Asia, and their relative strength will influence regional power balances across the globe.
The two great powers, should they continue to work in tandem, will be well positioned to dominate Eurasia, forcing the United States to revisit its historical strategic dilemma, i.e., whether America can remain secure in its hemispheric homeland and free to pursue its economic and security interests worldwide if Russia and China control the Eurasian landmass and strike out beyond regional hegemony to control the world’s oceans.
Chels Michta is a Non-resident Fellow with the Democratic Resilience Program at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA). Chels is a former CEPA Title VIII Fellow and is currently a military intelligence officer serving in the US Army.
The opinions expressed here are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Army, the US Department of Defense, or the US government.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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