After 35 years of independence, and waves of reform following the 2013 Euromaidan uprising, Ukrainian society still demonstrates a striking asymmetry: overwhelming confidence in the institutions responsible for defending the state, and deep suspicion of those responsible for governing it.
This divide has become even more visible since Russia’s full-scale invasion. While the war has strengthened public trust in the armed forces and other security institutions, it has done little to repair the chronic credibility crisis affecting the courts, political parties, and large parts of the state bureaucracy.
Surveys consistently show Ukrainian’s have faith in their Armed Forces. Polling by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) in December showed 94% of Ukrainians trust the country’s defense forces.
The numbers surged after Russia attacked in February 2022, jumping from 72% in late 2021 to 96% a year later, reflecting the army’s success in preventing the collapse of the state and defending Ukrainian sovereignty.
Other institutions directly involved in national defense also enjoy high public confidence. According to a survey by the Razumkov Centre in December, 86% of Ukrainians trust the State Emergency Service, 72% trust the National Guard, and more than 70% trust the country’s military intelligence and border guards.
Volunteer organizations, which have played a crucial role in supporting the war effort, also rank among Ukraine’s most trusted actors.
But outside the security sector, trust drops sharply. Surveys repeatedly show Ukrainians are deeply skeptical of political institutions and the judicial system.
Only 15% trust the courts, while 62% say they do not, according to KIIS data. Prosecutors fare even worse, with just 12% expressing trust and 64% distrust. The National Police get slightly higher ratings but still have a negative balance: 35% trust them, while 46% do not.
The broader institutional picture is even more troubling. The Razumkov Centre reports that 76% of Ukrainians do not trust the parliament, 75% distrust the state bureaucracy, and 73% distrust the government.
This skepticism is not limited to individual institutions and reflects broader doubts about the ability of the political system to function effectively. Surveys indicate that 74% of respondents do not believe Ukrainian politicians can ensure political stability, while 83% doubt corruption can be meaningfully reduced.
Ukraine has undertaken extensive institutional reforms over the past decade, particularly in response to the requirements for integration into the European Union. Anti-corruption institutions such as the National Anti-Corruption Bureau and the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office were created with the support of Western partners, while judicial reform has remained one of the central pillars of Kyiv’s agenda.
Yet the impact of these reforms on public trust has been limited. Although roughly half of Ukrainians say they trust the Anti-Corruption Bureau, a significant share still expresses skepticism toward the broader system. Concerns about the independence of anti-corruption institutions have periodically fueled public debate, including protests last summer after controversial legislation targeting these bodies.
The European Commission’s enlargement report in November noted “limited progress” in Ukraine’s anti-corruption efforts and warned of growing pressure on anti-corruption institutions and civil society organizations. Legislative initiatives that could restrict transparency or weaken institutional independence have further complicated the issue. Debates over restoring public asset declarations for officials and ensuring the independence of key anti-corruption bodies have illustrated the political sensitivity of these reforms.
Meanwhile, persistent scandals continue to undermine confidence. An investigation by the National Anti-Corruption Bureau in 2025, for example, uncovered illegal payments related to Ukraine’s state nuclear energy company.
According to investigators, intermediaries demanded kickbacks of 10%–15% from contractors in exchange for avoiding payment delays or losing supplier status, reinforcing public perceptions that informal networks and political influence still shape key sectors of the economy.
The full-scale war initially produced a “rally-round-the-flag” effect that boosted trust across many institutions, but the effect has weakened over time. While trust levels remain higher than before the war in some sectors, many political institutions have returned to pre-war patterns of low credibility.
The high levels of trust for those responsible for national defense mean there’s likely to be an increased political role for people associated with the armed forces in the future. Ukraine has already seen prominent military figures, including Andriy Biletsky and Denys Prokopenko, become influential public voices, and veterans will enjoy strong public legitimacy in future elections.
Political parties can be expected to capitalize on the military’s popularity by promoting “military faces” within existing structures, but they may try to do so without transforming the underlying culture.
Whether Ukraine develops a genuine veteran-based political elite — or just symbolic military branding in traditional political organizations — could affect the capacity of institutional reforms to restore trust in civilian governance.
The country’s military enjoys extraordinary legitimacy because it has demonstrated effectiveness in the most critical national task: survival. Civilian institutions, by contrast, continue to struggle with long-standing problems of corruption, political influence, and weak accountability.
Closing this trust gap will be one of the central challenges of Ukraine’s post-war transformation. Without meaningful improvements in governance, restoring the credibility of democratic institutions will be a Sisyphean task.
Kateryna Odarchenko is a political consultant, a partner of the SIC Group Ukraine, and president of the PolitA Institute for Democracy and Development. A specialist practicing in the field of political communication and projects, she has practical experience in the implementation of all-Ukrainian political campaigns and party-building projects.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
Ukraine 2036
How Today’s Investments Will Shape Tomorrow’s Security
CEPA Forum 2025
Explore CEPA’s flagship event.
