In January, Donald Trump will return to power with the aim of delivering on his pledge to Make America Great Again. To the President and many in his orbit, that requires both projecting strength and withdrawing from foreign entanglements of all kinds.
The President’s successful campaign capitalized on public exhaustion with global conflict, a diminishing trust in post-war institutions and the rules-based international order, and a desire across much of US society to put domestic concerns ahead of those abroad.
Trump’s cabinet nominations have sent mixed signals. Nominated for Secretary of State, Senator Marco Rubio holds the generally hawkish views that were formerly mainstream within the Republican Party. Conversely, Tulsi Gabbard, nominated for Director of National Intelligence, has been outspoken in her criticism of interventionism and has repeated Kremlin talking points on Ukraine.
The tensions in Trump’s nascent foreign policy were already on display in his campaign, during which he declared his intention to “prevent World War III [and] restore peace in Europe and in the Middle East.” How might the incoming administration satisfy its apparently competing desires to both disengage and stop global conflict?
It could honor its ideological commitments by reducing engagement with multilateral organizations and initiatives without abandoning the compacts that underpin global security and trade.
For example, Trump could once again reduce US contributions to United Nations programs, such as the World Food Programme (WFP) or the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR.) These organizations, and the vulnerable populations they serve, would be under-resourced, but the President would be able to provide tangible evidence of foreign policy realignment without creating a power vacuum in the global arena. Whether that hostility extends once more to the World Health Organization (WHO), a clearing house for medical research is harder to say — it has been the target of enormous criticism by right-wing Americans in recent years.
Much of Trump’s hostility towards allies comes from the idea that the US is subsidizing foreign countries’ security and getting nothing in return. This has raised questions about his commitment to NATO’s Article 5, which guarantees the aid of allies if there’s an attack. The only time it has been invoked was after the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the US.
With a defense manufacturing sector that is struggling to produce sufficient weaponry and ammunition to defend the country during a protracted conflict, the US needs the combined might of its allies both as a deterrent and as an aid to its defense.
The Pentagon’s 2023 National Defense Industrial Strategy identifies these vulnerabilities and provides recommendations to build resilience into the defense industrial base. Until that advice is fully implemented, the US would be more vulnerable outside NATO than within.
Alliances also allow the new administration to keep its friends close and enemies closer, and membership in NATO gives the US outsized influence in European affairs.
The strategic drift of Turkey away from the US’s orbit has been limited, for example, by its membership in the alliance. Despite increased cooperation with Russia, particularly in Syria, Ankara has been unable to formally ally with Moscow because of NATO’s constraints. If Trump wishes to remake the world order in his image, abandoning American commitments to Europe would significantly limit the scope of what he can achieve.
The President’s desire to prevent global conflict also requires the establishment of a credible deterrent that halts the advance of adversaries in their proxy wars against the West. The Biden administration’s risk aversion emboldened the West’s enemies, including Vladimir Putin, who benefited when Washington stopped Ukraine from using US-supplied missiles on targets in Russia, a decision only recently reversed.
In the Middle East, American inaction has also led to Iran and its proxies attacking US positions at least 180 times since October 2023, with three fatalities and many more injuries. Only when the credible threat of retaliation exceeds the benefits of continued action will America’s adversaries withdraw, and the Trump administration has an opportunity to reestablish this deterrence. The obvious testing ground for this would be Yemen, where Iran and Russia have aided Houthi success in choking global shipping. The US and allied response has been inadequate and this should not be allowed to continue.
Even so, retaliation should be done with restraint. It is here that the incoming President can honor his commitment to avoid “forever wars” by showing that America is not afraid to punish its adversaries but does not seek to conquer them.
Full disengagement, an abandonment of alliances, and the resulting projection of weakness may lead to the unthinkable — a new direct, global conflict between great powers. If the President abandons NATO, and Russia marches west across the European continent, the US will not be left unscathed (think of the $4 trillion of US investment in Europe, just for a start.)
Global markets and trade routes would destabilize, causing inflation and shortages across the domestic economy. Eventually, the new authoritarian axis would directly threaten an economically weakened America, which would need to spend massive sums and risk hundreds of thousands of lives to defend against an imminent threat.
With that in mind, continued support for Ukraine and US allies worldwide looks like a bargain. The President-elect, who says he knows a deal when he sees one, needs to be clear-eyed about the reality abroad and find the balance between withdrawal and deterrence.
Rob McGillis is a writer and consultant focused on the intersection of geopolitics, national security, and technology. Previously, he managed strategic policy initiatives at Google and holds an MA in International Political Economy from Johns Hopkins SAIS.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
US Bases in Europe
Military experts explain why US bases in Europe matter.
