The prospect of reduced US naval and military support for Europe has raised alarm bells across the continent. In particular, European NATO now needs to think whether it alone can deter or defeat Russia.
Fears of Russia’s ability to act against sea lines of communication, geographically isolated parts of the continent, and the Russian navy’s combat experience as forged in war with Ukraine mean that the risks are real.
But there is a danger too that they will overcome rational thought and rely too much on historical views of Russia that may no longer be valid.
European navies have been modernized in recent years, and in many cases have raised their readiness relative to past decades of the post-Cold War era. By contrast, the Russian navy has performed quite poorly in the Ukraine war and has been forced to rely on a shrinking group of smaller and less capable vessels than previously.
History also suggests that Russian’s poor strategic geography can be manipulated by well-directed maritime forces to deter aggression.
There are drawbacks for both the US and Europe in a parting of the ways. Russia maintains a formidable submarine arm, and Europeans would be in difficulty if they had to face these vessels without US support. From the US viewpoint, on the other hand, a Europe-only focus by European navies would make these vessels and capabilities unavailable to support the US in an Indo-Pacific conflict, where it is now outnumbered by China.
Does Russia’s navy present a similar threat to the Soviet navy of the Cold War?
Putin’s navy has significant niche capabilities, notably its submarine arm, mentioned above, but is otherwise a pale shadow of its Soviet-era greatness. In 1985, Russian fielded over 380 submarines of all types; today it possesses fewer than 65 such vessels, and these are geographically scattered.
Its Black Sea Fleet has demonstrated poor readiness and tactical skill, especially as evidenced by its arguable defeat in the Black Sea littoral by land-based Ukrainian drone and missile forces. Russia’s wider fleet also has challenges. Its single aircraft carrier has been out of service for over five years, and many of its larger, Soviet-era warships remain under refit or are inoperable. Russian nuclear submarines remain a threat and have appeared in the Atlantic region much more often in recent years.
That said, Russian submarine numbers are not enough to threaten Atlantic sea lines of communication. Even during the Cold War, the Soviet navy did not have a significant mission to attack NATO resupply convoys. Today’s Russian navy is more poorly equipped to accomplish this mission and does not even address it in its most recent strategy document as a significant effort. Recent Russian maritime strategy is focused on defense of the Russian homeland with limited maritime capacity in its “near abroad”. It does not include interdicting North Atlantic sea lines.
What about European naval capacity?
European naval forces have reduced in numbers, much like those of the United States and Russia, since the end of the Cold War, but the collective number and strategic mobility of these units exceeds that of the geographically isolated Russian fleets in the High North, Baltic, and Black seas.
New maritime technology is also guaranteed a role. The Royal Navy, for example, is funding a $500m-plus program named Project Cabot, to use unmanned rotary wing and undersea vehicles to fill the gaps left by a shortage of high-end manned vessels. Uncrewed units can be far cheaper and so more numerous.
Russia’s nuclear submarines remain a critical threat. The Northern Fleet is Russia’s most capable formation with five cruise missile and eight nuclear-attack submarines among its ranks. The combined naval forces of other Atlantic and Arctic European nations boast 10 nuclear attack submarines (all of them French and British.) The Europeans are short on both nuclear and conventional submarines as compared to the Russians in the critical Barents/Norwegian Sea area, and would need the support of US nuclear submarines to counter those of Russia in war.
Past wars suggest a European strategy to counter Russia.
Russia’s geography has always made it vulnerable to sea-based action. During the 1853-1855 Crimean War, British and French expeditionary combat operations sealed of critical Russian ports in not only the Black Sea, but also the Baltic, depriving Russia of critical imports and denying its ability to export key commodities like wheat and timber.
The inability to move wheat out of the Black Sea in World War I helped to precipitate the collapse of Imperial Russia. The end of the Cold War made these traditional Russian challenges worse in the Baltic and the Black Sea by reducing the amount of coastline and port facilities and bases available for Russian use. A blockade of Russian imports and exports, notably oil and wheat, or the threat to do so, could be useful in deterring Russian aggression. The Russians know this weakness and it is noted in their 2022 Maritime strategy.
The way ahead?
No doubt Europe would be challenged in mustering the coordinated force necessary to repel Russian aggression, but its naval forces are highly professional, and well-coordinated through NATO training. They can succeed in deterring and if necessary, defeating Russian naval forces.
Lack of US nuclear submarine support is the one critical naval shortfall that could affect the ability deter Russian aggression. European NATO would need to fix this to deter and ultimately defeat Russia.
Dr. Steven Wills currently serves as a navalist for the Center for Maritime Strategy at the Navy League of the US. He is an expert in US Navy strategy and policy. Wills had a 20-year career as an active-duty US Navy officer at sea and on shore-based assignments to the Defense Intelligence Agency and NATO.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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