Forget the “Brussels Effect,” when European rules beam global standards, Britain wants to promote a “Brit Effect,” spreading its ideas about tech regulation. From climate policy to AI and gene editing, the UK’s ability to move first compels larger players in Brussels, Washington, and even Beijing to respond.
Leadership won’t be easy. Although British ideas long shaped the world, raw economic and military power backed its global standing. That’s no longer the case. After Brexit, London is squeezed between Trump’s anti-regulation tsunami and the European Union’s pro-regulation proclivities. Britain’s influence can be decisive when it leads with an innovation-driven agenda. When it attempts to impose restrictive policies on tech players, it lacks the market power to enforce compliance.
Prime Minister Keir Starmer confronted the challenge during his recent visit to the White House. President Donald Trump suggested the US and UK could strike a trade deal “with advanced technology at its core.” But the US president criticized British demands on tech companies to break encryption and to remove offending or illegal content, comparing them to Chinese surveillance.
Despite its limited power, Britain aims to settle into a new niche: the think tank of the West, generating ambitious policy ideas that others implement. Often it succeeds. Take climate policy. The 2008 Climate Change Act and the 2019 net zero commitment set global precedents, shaping international carbon markets.
This intellectual influence is no accident. The UK has long had structural advantages, making it an effective policy incubator. Its civil service values scientific input, and its universities are world-class. Cross-party consensus allows Britain to act as a laboratory for policies that others later adopt, unlike the US and EU, where institutional fragmentation and competing agendas slow decision-making.
Another good example is gene editing. In his first speech as Prime Minister in 2019, Boris Johnson linked Brexit to the UK’s ability to liberalize genetic technology regulation. The 2023 Genetic Technology (Precision Breeding) Act removed barriers. British scientists are now using gene editing to produce virus-resistant sugar beet and disease-resistant wheat, reducing the need for pesticides and improving sustainability.
Although the UK’s stance on gene editing sparked EU concerns over trade and food standards, Brussels is quietly following Britain’s lead. In 2023, the European Commission proposed loosening restrictions on gene-edited crops. The European Parliament backed the move. While final approval is still pending, the shift recognizes that rigid regulations slow innovation.
Artificial intelligence represents yet another example. In 2023, the UK pulled off a diplomatic coup by hosting the world’s first AI Safety Summit. It followed up with creating the world’s first AI Safety Institute (now the AI Security Institute). The move inspired Brussels and Washington to establish similar AI safety institutes to study emerging technology risks.
Despite Britain’s ability to set the agenda, get the big players to pay attention, and carve out a seat at the table, its ultimate influence remains mixed. The Stern Review reshaped the economic case for climate policy and gave Britain long-term influence. With AI, the picture looks different. The EU was first to regulate, with its AI Act coming into force last year. The US is ahead in innovation. There seems to be no real place for the UK.
Green finance represents another failed effort. Post-Brexit, the UK envisioned itself as a pro-business alternative to Brussels, creating flexible sustainable finance standards. Yet shaping green finance standards requires economic heft. The EU’s stringent rules shaped the flow of $240 billion in EU investments, while the market, not regulations, drove US green finance.
Britain’s small market struggles most when its security agenda conflicts with Silicon Valley’s. To Trump’s ire, the UK recently ordered Apple to allow access to encrypted iCloud backup data. Apple refused, calling the demand for back doors an affront to privacy, and has stopped offering iCloud’s highest security controls in the UK.
When Britain tightens regulation in ways that companies see as unworkable, they not only push back. They walk away. The country’s antitrust authority has been forced to acknowledge the limits of Britain’s regulatory reach. After blocking high-profile global mergers, only to see companies restructure deals around it, the trustbusters recently signaled a shift: scrutinizing fewer deals to avoid deterring investment and innovation.
Although Britain can still shape global debates, its ideas succeed only when they persuade rather than prescribe. From climate policies to AI and gene editing, its regulatory agility has set global debates in motion. But it lacks the economic heft to impose its will.
Clara Riedenstein is a Project Assistant for the Tech Policy Program at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA). She received her BA from Oxford University, where she is now a graduate student in the Department of Politics and International Relations. Her academic research focuses on Internet governance, content moderation, and the moral status of AI.
Maurice Hirt is a PhD candidate at the University of Oxford, researching the political economy of fiscal and industrial policy. His work examines the interaction between fiscal incentives, regulation, and private capital in facilitating economic transitions. He holds an MPhil from Oxford and a BSc from the London School of Economics.
Bandwidth is CEPA’s online journal dedicated to advancing transatlantic cooperation on tech policy. All opinions expressed on Bandwidth are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
