The speed at which a task force involving Bulgaria and Romania, soon to be joined by Turkey, set to work demining vital cargo routes in the Black Sea demonstrated how bonds between NATO allies have been reinvigorated since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
And that spirit of cooperation offers an opening for the US, as a new State Department strategy finally gives the Black Sea the attention it demands. It outlines plans to increase regional security, multilateral cooperation, and strategic cohesion at a time when the inland sea is increasingly vital to the region.
Assistant Secretary of State James O’Brien emphasized in a congressional hearing in October that the Black Sea’s fate is intrinsically linked to that of Ukraine and Europe.
Russia’s blockade of grain exports, mining of sea lanes, and targeting of civilian port facilities has destabilized both regional and global markets and threatens the security of NATO allies and partners.
Increasing and ensuring freedom of navigation, and restoring Ukraine’s ability to access commercial shipping lanes will boost the Ukrainian economy at a vital point in the war, O’Brien said. Estimates suggest Ukraine could reap up to $20bn in GDP and $5-6bn in tax revenue from increased access. Increasing flows of shipping to and from Ukrainian ports in defiance of the Russian blockade offer some limited benefits, but not enough.
Washington’s renewed interest in the region was spurred by the downing of a US surveillance drone in March 2023, prompting members of the Senate and House Foreign Relations committees to propose a bipartisan bill stressing the importance of the region and the need to establish a strategy.
Russian belligerence was underlined in September when intercepted recordings showed an attempt to shoot down a UK surveillance plane carrying around 30 crew members in international airspace in 2022 was an intentional act (happily, one missile failed and another missed.)
The Black Sea Security Act of 2023 was incorporated into the National Defense Authorization Act for 2024, which is currently having House and Senate differences resolved.
In a sign that policymakers are in lockstep on the issue, the strategy set out by the Department of State aligns closely with policy aims set out by Congress. The key tenets include:
- Deeper diplomatic and political cooperation between the US and Black Sea littoral states. This includes supporting current NATO members and aspirant countries, notably Georgia and Ukraine.
- Improved energy resilience. While the Kremlin’s attempt to blackmail European countries into inaction due to their gas dependence may have failed, there are still opportunities to expand renewable energy sources and establish gas lines that bypass Russia. This would also help mitigate unwanted influence from China, which has a growing interest in the region.
- Enhanced security cooperation, including increased foreign military financing, aerial surveillance, and joint training exercises. NATO has already increased its military presence in Romania and Bulgaria and continued development of the region’s defensive deterrence is needed to respond proactively to threats.
Ukraine’s drone warfare expertise also presents a valuable opportunity to diminish Russia’s strategic capabilities. Forced to retreat from Sevastopol by a long series of successful Ukrainian attacks — the navy says 15 Russian naval vessels have been destroyed and 12 damaged — Moscow’s Black Sea Fleet no longer rules the waves as it once did.
In the same way that the full-scale invasion of Ukraine rallied Europe against Moscow’s aggression, Russia’s mining of sea lanes has fostered deeper cooperation, as seen in the October demining agreement between Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey, which was followed by further discussions in November. Experts including the former US ambassador to NATO, Kurt Volker, have also suggested the dispatch of unmanned alliance systems to the region.
In addition, the Black Sea region provides an opportunity for NATO and the European Union (EU) to deepen relations with the Caucuses and, potentially, Central Asia. As Russia’s influence on its southern border wanes, and China extends its presence across Eurasia, the West can offer a middle path between the two authoritarian states.
There remain major obstacles to attempts to strengthen NATO’s position and implement a more proactive strategy in the region.
Turkey, for example, restricted transit to the Black Sea via the Bosporus under the 1936 Montreux Convention shortly after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. While this cut off the Russian Black Sea Fleet from outside resupply, it also meant NATO ships without home ports were not allowed to enter.
As with any strategy, implementation is key. Its success will depend on the willingness of the US to maintain sustained efforts to increase its diplomatic, political, and security ties in the region. Failure risks squandering a crucial opportunity for NATO to minimize Russian aggression.
William Mockapetris is an Intern with the Transatlantic Defense and Security Program at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA). He is also an M.A. candidate in Security Policy Studies at the George Washington University.
Ivanna Kuz is a Senior Program Officer with the Transatlantic Defense and Security Program at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA) where she works on Ukraine, Black Sea security, NATO, and the future of European security. Prior to joining CEPA, Ivanna worked at the NATO Headquarters and the US Senate.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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