The group, named after the Crimean Tatar word for “fire,” has developed its methods since it was created in the months after the full-scale invasion, becoming more sophisticated and planning in ever increasing detail. Moscow, in turn, has stepped up its hunt for Atesh agents.
“In 2022, there was more enthusiasm, a lot of people, driven by emotion, supported us and tried to help in any way they could,” said Dzhokhar, 30, who helps coordinate Atesh’s covert operations. “The emotions have subsided, and many people who were willing to take risks have left the occupied territories. Now it’s more pragmatic, more systematic, more methodical.”
To illustrate his point, he describes a project called Bunt (Riot), which was launched in 2024 and provides a private information channel for Russian military personnel. It gives advice on how to avoid assault operations, delay or cancel deployment through sabotage, and buy time to escape, including by pouring raw eggs into engines.
After the resource was launched, soldiers in occupied parts of Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, and Donetsk contacted Atesh. “They used our methods, learned, and made their equipment break down,” Dzhokhar said. “They didn’t go anywhere.”
The 126th Separate Coastal Defense Brigade of the Russian Black Sea Fleet is a good example of the group’s achievements, he said. The brigade, which is deployed on the Kherson front and has been assaulting islands in the Dnipro River delta, has had repeated issues with its equipment.
“A lot of their jet skis were breaking down, and rubber boats were damaged, their engines as well,” he said. “The problem became so widespread that a commission from the Russian Dnipro grouping of forces was sent to investigate.”
Atesh agents have also gathered information to guide strikes on energy infrastructure and other facilities linked to Russia’s defense-industrial complex, causing fuel shortages and disruption to logistics.
Dzhokhar cited damage to oil facilities in Luhansk, Crimea, and at the Port of Kavkaz, as well as the Kazan Gunpowder Plant, as examples of the group’s successful reconnaissance work.
He also highlighted attacks on the Baltimore military airfield, in Voronezh, which houses SU-34 bombers and an operations and training center for drones.
“Our agent worked there, and we were able to track a number of the drone operators,” Dzhokhar said. “After that, we managed to pass the information to the Donetsk front.”
One of Atesh’s most significant achievements has been its ability to recruit and work with Russian soldiers who want to undermine Moscow’s war effort from the inside.
“On the Zaporizhzhia front, an active serviceman got in touch and passed along the plans for an attack on a village,” Dzhokhar said. “This helped the Ukrainian Defense Forces identify the real direction of the attack, not the fake one meant to mislead our defenders, and they were able to repel the assault.”
Atesh operatives have also sabotaged the communications networks that coordinate Russian military activity and the railway system supplying Russian troops. “We have dozens, even hundreds, of such stories,” Dzhokhar said. “This has a systemic, large-scale character, and it absolutely hinders Russia’s operations.”
In response, Russian forces are adapting and hunting down operatives from Atesh, which Moscow officially designated as a terrorist organization in 2024. Dzhokhar says they are pursued not only by the FSB, but also by the GRU and units of the National Guard.
“On Telegram, there are several fake Atesh accounts that replicate our daily work,” he said. “They were created so people would make a mistake and write to a fake account instead of the real Atesh. They are then sent on some ‘assignment’ and immediately detained.”
One such case involved a teenager in Crimea who was detained and accused of preparing terrorist attacks and a mass school shooting, something Dzhokhar says the real Atesh would never do.
“Even some of our agents wrote to us expressing their dissatisfaction, and we had to explain that it’s not true, we were being set up,” Dzhokhar said. “We have moral boundaries. We are not terrorists.”
He said a growing number of people are joining the movement from occupied parts of Donetsk and Luhansk, which have been under Russian control for 12 years. Dzhokhar attributes this to the economic situation and local authorities failing to deliver on their promises.
In Luhansk, people go months without receiving their salaries or are substituted by Russians, while in Donetsk, local residents bombed out of their homes have been denied promised new housing, he said.
“People are being cheated,” Dzhokhar said. “They feel offended and want a way to fight the injustice.”
Russians are also continuing to contact Atesh in steady numbers every month.
“Some want to earn money, others want to leave Russia or the combat zone and help in some way,” Dzhokhar said. “They are disillusioned or were deceived into going to the front.”
As many as 2,000 agents and informants are helping Atesh, and the group has significantly strengthened security arrangements for its agents to counter Moscow’s ubiquitous surveillance cameras and growing experience.
This means more meticulous cyber hygiene, for example, with separate devices, VPNs, regularly changed equipment, deletion of correspondence, and secure methods of communication that do not attract attention, he said.
It is difficult to calculate how much Atesh has managed to divert Russian resources from the front, but there are hints of the group’s impact from the Russian side.
“In some Russian regions, classified FSB reports rank Atesh almost on a par with Ukraine’s military intelligence (HUR),” Dzhokhar said. “They take us very seriously.”
Elina Beketova is a Non-resident Fellow with the Democratic Resilience program at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA). She is the author of Behind the Lines, a database and article series focused on Ukraine’s temporarily occupied territories. Elina began her career as a journalist in Crimea and later worked as a journalist, editor, and TV anchor for news stations in Kharkiv and Kyiv.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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