“In the village of Urzuf, the first tourists have opened the swimming season,” reports a Russian TV reporter from the Azov Sea coast in occupied Donetsk. “There is even a new ride called the Pendulum, and today we are the first to test it. It was recently brought from China, installed by Chinese specialists.”
Moscow is very keen for the world to see its occupation of parts of Ukraine as settled and normalized, and the presence of foreign companies is one of the ways it hopes to do so. But there is a world of difference between Chinese companies selling equipment to Russians in Ukraine and long-term investment.
Karansky Quarry, near the settlement of Myrne, also in occupied Donetsk, had been inactive for 14 years before the full-scale invasion, but in 2022, people linked to Beijing arrived to relaunch operations, according to an investigation by Realna Gazeta.
By May 2023, the quarry employed 243 workers and was producing approximately 250 tons of commercial fractional crushed stone per day.
Amma Construction Machinery Co., Ltd. and Zhongxin Heavy Industry Machinery Co., Ltd., both registered in China’s Henan province, supplied equipment and industrial support to reboot the facility. A concrete production plant and a crushing facility were constructed in 2024 as part of a joint project with Chinese companies at the site, Realna Gazeta said.
A report by the Eastern Human Rights Group, together with the Institute for Strategic Studies and Security, identified at least 17 Chinese companies linked to the occupied territories, ranging from early-stage discussions to supplying equipment for mining and infrastructure projects.
Mining appears to be the leading edge of Chinese commercial engagement. In 2023, representatives from Nedra group, a mineral company based in occupied Donetsk, toured mining equipment manufacturers across China before reportedly taking delivery of industrial machinery from Henan Liming Heavy Industry Science & Technology.
The next year, engineering giant WISDRI was approached over the modernization of metallurgical plants in occupied Donetsk as Moscow continued to court Chinese firms.
It is unclear how much influence China has from selling equipment for use in the occupied territories, or if it plans long-term operations there. Some are skeptical and see the Kremlin’s disinformation machine at work as it seeks to use arms sales and short-term business relationships to build on the validation given to Putin by his visits with Chinese President Xi Jinping.
“Every Ukrainian drone contains 50 to 70% Chinese components, does that mean China supports Ukraine?” asked Kostyantyn Batozsky, founder of Ukraine’s Azov Development Agency. “China sells equipment to Russia openly, but it also sells to Ukraine. It sells to everyone.”
Batozsky warned of other, longer-term risks, noting that China is interested in a Russian victory in Ukraine because it would weaken the West. China’s strategic interests in the region are tied to logistics and trade routes connected to the Belt and Road Initiative, he said.
“The only thing that really interests Beijing is ports and transport corridors, though the Azov ports are shallow and not very suitable for them,” he said. “But China will never officially operate in territories that are dangerous and whose legal status is uncertain.”
He warned that the appearance of Chinese workers on Russian TV may be “provocations” by the Kremlin, and Ukraine and its allies should be careful not to fall for its tricks. Russia uses claims of Chinese involvement to legitimize its occupation and strengthen its negotiating position, he said.
“They also want to show the Americans, especially during the current negotiations, that ‘look, the Chinese are already coming in. They are entering the region. You could have been here instead.’ That is the dangerous part,” he said. “The Russians would be delighted if we started publicly debunking all of this, because that would shift the conversation to a different level – one where we implicitly acknowledge their de facto control over these territories.”
Compared to the Donetsk region, Chinese interest in occupied Luhansk appears much more cautious. The occupation authorities have attempted to attract Chinese investors since 2024, but nothing has come of it.
“Chinese investors have been brought there, but so far we do not see any major Chinese project actually launched,” said Ukrainian journalist Andrii Dikhtiarenko, one of the co-authors of the Realna Gazeta investigation.
There’s a similar pattern in occupied Kherson and Zaporizhzhia, where cooperation remains largely declarative. The Russian-appointed governor of occupied Zaporizhzhia claimed in December 2025 that he was working with the UAE, China, Belarus, and Kyrgyzstan, while his counterpart in Kherson wrote that his region had used an economic forum in Crimea to strengthen cooperation with China.
Sources in Kherson say there is no firm evidence of any Chinese business activity.
What is more certain is that around 6,000 mobile base stations have been deployed across occupied southern and eastern Ukraine using Chinese equipment, and telecommunications networks in the occupied south rely on Huawei servers. This has created a closed digital environment integrated with Chinese surveillance technologies, the Eastern Human Rights Group said.
There is also evidence of “yuanization,” and some 79 bank branches in the occupied territories are officially selling the Chinese currency, the group said. It is now the second most used currency, and businesses are employing covert methods, such as Alipay and WeChat apps, to circumvent international compliance.
Even though China has not officially recognized the illegal annexation of Crimea, Moscow’s puppet “republics” in eastern Ukraine, or the occupation of parts of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson, it has gradually infiltrated the information and cultural space of the territories.
Chinese bloggers and journalists have gained access to occupied areas and produced content for Chinese audiences that echoes Russian narratives. During the fight for Mariupol, for example, Phoenix TV correspondent Lu Yuguang reported alongside Russian forces, broadcasting their version of events to millions of viewers.
Russia also uses Chinese bloggers and performers for its propaganda. The Chinese singer Wang Fang performed “Katyusha,” a Soviet-Era song, at the ruins of the theater in Mariupol, where Russian forces killed more than 600 sheltering civilians in the early months of the full-scale war.
Chinese language centers and private schools are also opening in occupied regions, including a language study center at a university in occupied Luhansk with dedicated facilities and teaching staff, indicating it is intended to be more than a temporary initiative.
Yurii Poita, head of the Asia-Pacific section at Ukraine’s Center for Army, Conversion and Disarmament Studies, says Kyiv has a range of channels to communicate with Beijing, including diplomatic, business, and intelligence connections, and should use them to respond.
“Chinese involvement strengthens Russia’s position in the occupied territories, helps sustain economic activity, supports industrial development, facilitates the exploitation of natural resources, and contributes to infrastructure that can also serve military purposes,” he said.
“Ukraine should present evidence of such activities and press China to reduce or end its involvement.”
Elina Beketova is a Non-resident Fellow with the Democratic Resilience program at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA). She is the author of Behind the Lines, a database and article series focused on Ukraine’s temporarily occupied territories.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
