“It ain’t about how hard you hit. It’s about how hard you can get hit and keep moving forward.” That line from the movie Rocky has become the unlikely motto of Polish President-elect Karol Nawrocki’s campaign, and now, his presidency.
Vilified by the media, dogged by scandal, and written off by elites, the conservative historian held his ground, rallied a bloc of nationalist voters, and won the June 1 vote. What comes next will be obstruction, as Nawrocki is likely to turn the Polish presidency into a tool to weaken Donald Tusk’s government. The government, in turn, is unpopular and has been weakened by the outcome.
Nawrocki was backed by the right-wing Law and Justice party (PiS), and won the presidency by the slimmest of margins, taking 50.89% of the vote to the mayor of Warsaw Rafał Trzaskowski’s 49.11%. It was also supported by members of the Trump administration, including Homeland Security Secretary Kristi Noem, who told Polish voters to back him at a May 28 conference.
The 42-year-old victor, who worked at Poland’s Institute of National Remembrance and admits his past involvement in “masculine combat” between battling football fans, was the choice of nationalist conservative Law and Justice party (PiS) leader Jarosław Kaczyński. He also owed his victory to overwhelming support from voters who had backed far-right candidates Sławomir Mentzen and Grzegorz Braun in the first round.
His win relied on a mobilization of the right, driven by defiance and deep political polarization.
Trzaskowski spent much of the campaign staying silent while all the attention was on his opponent explaining the various affairs and scandals. That, it turned out, was an error.
Trzaskowski made a deliberate shift to the center-right in its early stages, hoping to appeal to conservative and undecided voters. But the shift felt improvised. His attempts to distance himself from a liberal, urban identity lacked authenticity. The electorate sensed the contradiction.
A candidate like Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski, who naturally speaks the language of conservative patriotism and has deeper roots on the moderate right but who lost the primary vote, might have been better suited to the moment.
Instead, Trzaskowski’s campaign focused on persuasion, hoping to attract floating voters in the center. But in a deeply polarized contest, there was no real center-left to win. Voters had already chosen sides. The decisive contest was not for the middle ground but for mobilization. In that contest, Nawrocki never tried to convert, only to consolidate.
The campaign is being described by many as the dirtiest and most poisonous ever in the country’s post-communist democratic era. Karol Nawrocki denied accusations of ties to gangsters, organizing prostitutes at a hotel on the Baltic coast, and acquiring a flat from a vulnerable senior in murky circumstances. The media went after him daily. His opponents called him unfit, unserious, and unelectable.
Nawrocki absorbed it all and positioned himself as the target of elite persecution, and used the backlash to strengthen his appeal.
A decisive factor in Nawrocki’s victory was the overwhelming support he received from voters who had backed anti-establishment candidates in the first round. Sławomir Mentzen, the far-right libertarian leader of Confederation, received 14.8% of the vote, while Grzegorz Braun, running on a hardline nationalist platform, scored just over 6%. In the runoff, over 88% of Mentzen’s voters and more than 92% of Braun’s shifted to Nawrocki.
Though Poland’s presidency is often seen as symbolic, its powers are substantial. The president can veto legislation, nominate key officials, appoint ambassadors, and use the office as a powerful national platform.
Outgoing president Andrzej Duda signed most of the bills sent to him. Nawrocki, by contrast, is expected to wield the veto far more aggressively.
Nawrocki does not see himself as a referee between branches of power but as a defender of the “real Poland” against what he calls liberal overreach.
Tusk’s coalition is held together more by shared opposition to PiS than by ideological unity. The agrarian-centrist Polish People’s Party (PSL) is uncomfortable with progressive reforms on abortion, green energy, and secularism.
Meanwhile, the left feels increasingly marginalized. Key campaign promises on housing, labor rights, and church finances have been shelved or diluted. Tusk’s centralized leadership is facing internal strain.
Nawrocki’s strategy does not require inventing conflict. He simply needs to amplify the cracks that already exist. “The right’s goal is to harden its flank and wait for the government to unravel,” said political scientist Rafał Chwedoruk. The presidency offers the perfect vantage point to apply that pressure.
Throughout his campaign, Nawrocki signaled that he had no intention of governing above politics. His slogan “Now Rocky” was more than a nod to his own boxing past, it was a promise of confrontation.
He repeatedly vowed to block what he called “leftist ideology” and to stand firm against “Brussels centralism.”
In his own words, he promised to be a “barrier” to the current government’s agenda. There were no appeals to unity or shared purpose. Nawrocki positioned himself not as a statesman, but as a president with a mission to stop, not to govern.
He takes office in August, and the first moves could come fast. The government may test him with symbolic legislation on abortion or public media reform. Early vetoes will set the tone.
Tusk, seeking to project control, might push for a vote of confidence in the Sejm. But repeated blocks and stalled bills could turn that show of strength into a sign of instability.
Speculation about snap elections will grow. Nawrocki doesn’t need to topple the government outright. He just needs to keep it bogged down, bleeding momentum. In a fragile coalition, time and friction do the rest.
Stuart Dowell is a Warsaw-based journalist covering Polish politics, culture, and history. His writing has been featured in both Polish and UK media.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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