Life has not been easy for Georgians for much of their post-1991 independence. The challenges they are facing now, however, are the most dangerous and troubling in the country’s recent history.
Georgia’s government has picked a fight with its own people. By seeking to change course away from Euro-Atlantic integration, including its aspirations for membership in the European Union (EU) and NATO, the ruling party is flying in the face of broad support from the vast majority of Georgians, an outlook that has only become stronger over the past 20 years. Polls now show 86% support for EU membership and 79% for NATO. Both goals are enshrined in Georgia’s revised constitution of 2018.
On May 14, the Georgian parliament passed the so-called non-governmental organization (NGO) law, known to opponents as the Russian law for its open imitation of oppressive Kremlin legislation. Georgia’s distinguished Western-oriented president, Salome Zourabichvili, has promised to veto the bill, but the government says it has enough votes to override this.
The government has stated that it intends to use the law immediately to curtail the activities of many of Georgia’s NGOs. It has sent riot police to the streets to violently suppress peaceful protests. Those demonstrating include large numbers of young Georgians, who fear their hopes for a European future are vanishing.
This comes only a few weeks after the leader of Georgia’s ruling party, the billionaire former Prime Minister Bidzina Ivanishvili, gave a deeply troubling Putinesque speech to his party’s youth wing, denouncing the US, NATO, and the EU as the “global party of war”, and blaming the West for pushing Georgia into war with Russia in 2008.
I know Ivanishvili fairly well. As Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Europe, from 2011-2015, I met with him on multiple occasions in Tbilisi to discuss his decision to challenge the then-ruling United National Movement of Mikheil Saakashvili.
The US and the EU insisted that UNM turn over power to Georgian Dream when it became clear that UNM had lost the 2012 elections. Ivanishvili put together a coalition that included several Western-oriented parties.
I and other US officials, including our ambassador in Tbilisi, worked to avoid a post-election crisis and to convey to Ivanishvili our hope that Georgia would continue on its path to democracy, which was clearly linked to progress in its Euro-Atlantic aspirations.
Georgia’s signing of an EU association treaty in 2014, in the wake of Russia’s first invasion of Ukraine, was a high point for hopes for Georgia’s future in Europe. The treaty included visa-free travel to the Schengen zone and extensive trade privileges, as well as university scholarships for Georgian students in the EU.
Ivanishvili’s obsession with (the now-imprisoned) former President Saakashvili, whom he viewed as the West’s pet project (not entirely wrongly, given the support provided to Saakashvili and UNM by the George W. Bush administration, including a visit by President Bush to Tbilisi), began to dominate his outlook. The grudge match resulted in Saakashvili’s conviction and imprisonment in 2021.
There are many questions about Ivanishvili’s past and his true intentions. He made a fortune in the Russia of Yeltsin and Putin and then was allowed by Putin to expatriate his wealth when he decided to return to Georgia.
An early supporter of Saakashvili, both financially and politically, he later broke with him in the feud that continues to this day. An avowed supporter of Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations, he refused to support sanctions on Russia in 2014 and again in 2022. And now, with the NGO law and his aggressive, anti-Western rhetoric, he is publicly aligning himself and Georgia with Moscow.
It is fair to say that the US and our European allies have taken our eyes off the ball in the South Caucasus, downgrading our role in peace negotiations in the region and taking no significant action when Azerbaijan overran Nagorno-Karabakh last year and effectively forced its 100,000-strong Armenian population to flee, ending a presence that had endured since the Second Century BC.
More recently, the US and EU have not imposed any significant consequences for Georgia’s refusal to sanction Russia and its lack of support for Ukraine. The contrast between Moldova and the pro-Western government of President Maia Sandu, which is in an equally if not more precarious position, could not be starker.
High-level US attention to Georgia has been minimal in recent years. The only American officials to comment publicly on concerns about Georgia’s current course have been our ambassador in Tbilisi and, on May 11, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan.
Given US preoccupation with the Russia-Ukraine war and the Israel/Gaza conflict, among many other crises across the globe, Ivanishvili may well have concluded that we do not have the bandwidth to challenge him in any serious way.
Our respect for Georgian democracy, which will be tested by the critically important parliamentary elections in October, should remain a foundation for our policy. The United States and EU now need to communicate, loudly, publicly, and at the highest levels, that Georgia stands to lose its Transatlantic future if it continues down its current path.
The bipartisan move by the House Foreign Affairs Committee to consider imposing sanctions on Georgia is a good first step. But let us be honest — the West has been muted and is failing to speak with a clear and strong voice.
US Assistant Secretary of State James O’Brien told the Georgian authorities on May 14 that the continuing campaign of anti-US and anti-European rhetoric could result in aid cuts. This is unlikely to have surprised or worried Georgian Dream. And the EU’s extraordinary silence on May 14 following the bill’s passage — reportedly once again due to Hungarian objections— will simply cheer Georgia’s pro-Russian elements. (A Commission statement was finally issued on May 15.)
We are our European partners can shrug off Ivanishvili’s insults and slanderous accusations, but we need to tell the Georgian people the truth: that they stand to lose 32 years of painful struggle and effort, and with it their hopes for the future.
Ambassador Eric Rubin is a Non-resident Senior Fellow with the Democratic Resilience Program at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA). He was elected to serve as the President of the American Foreign Service Association (AFSA) after his recent posting as US Ambassador to Bulgaria (2016-2019). Joining the Foreign Service in 1985 after graduating from Yale, he has served in numerous posts around the world, including Russia and Ukraine.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
