A wave of illiberalism is flowing across the South Caucasus. With a distracted West and a determined Russia, there are few incentives for ruling elites to continue along the liberal democratic path and many rewards in taking a different route.
Reasons vary from internal politics to wider regional and global trends that have placed democratization on the backfoot, and authoritarianism with opportunities unseen since the late 20th century.
Georgia’s ruling party, Georgian Dream has been in power for the past 12 years and has become increasingly illiberal and now, authoritarian. This is especially so since the October parliamentary elections where the party claimed victory, the opposition refused to concede what it said was a rigged vote, and a wave of repression including violence against protesters began. Repressive laws are being rolled out on a weekly basis; it seems the ruling party feels it has the wind behind its back.
The new US administration has not only frozen aid to pro-democracy groups in countries like Georgia but has also, through the billionaire Elon Musk, suggested that USAID is “a criminal organization.” This has been seized on by illiberal governments that are now asking Washington to provide payment details so they can investigate.
The outlook for Georgia’s opposition and its vibrant civil society in Georgia is increasingly bleak. Mistakes have been made, primarily in failing to form an effective response to the government well before 2024 elections and failing to make itself a promising alternative, while civil society failed to build a narrative beyond mere explanations that Georgian Dream is a pro-Russian party.
Both failed to reach a wider spectrum of the population, namely those living beyond Tbilisi and who are conservative in belief and more supportive of the ruling party.
This in no way exonerates the ruling party’s push for increasing power. Measures employed range from outright physical pressure, to political moves to limit the room for maneuver of the opposition forces as well as the NGO sector. Everything suggests that Georgia has shifted from an imperfect democratic/liberal state to a country bent on expansive sovereignization, a code name for state capture and prolongation of one party rule.
In Azerbaijan the situation with democratization and rule of law has always been much worse than in Georgia. But recently the remnants of the independent media began to be targeted, with arrests of free journalists critical of the government and largely supported through Western grants.
By February 5, Azerbaijan had jailed 21 journalists in the past 18 months. The annual Committee to Protect Journalists report ranked Azerbaijan eighth in the list of countries which jailed most journalists after China, and others such as Russia.
Civil society is virtually non-existent, while political opponents are either jailed or pushed to the margins. This has allowed the Azerbaijani president Ilham Aliyev, 63, to further solidify his already highly personalized rule with no successor marked out and likely anyway to be chosen from the ruler’s own family.
Aliyev’s regime has also pushed against the West in other ways. It has consistently argued against non-regional (i.e., Western) involvement in the South Caucasus, pushed for membership in non-Western organizations such as BRICS and the China-led Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and weaponized its importance to the European Union (EU) as a gas producer following the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
And then there is Armenia. In many respects, the country appears to fare better than Georgia and Azerbaijan. There are signals that Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and his party might cling to power in elections scheduled for next year. As in Georgia, the opposition is discredited but Pashinyan’s popularity is not that widespread. In fact it has been diminishing and the only factor which allows him to stay in office is the lack of political alternatives.
But holding onto power will likely require more than just a general antipathy toward opposition parties that are mostly corrupt and pro-Russian. Already there are signs that the ruling party will not easily share power with others. For instance, in Armenia’s small cities and rural centers, opposition figures are being pushed aside and replaced by hardline loyalists. The premier is also able to pressure judges and other appointees to resign, as was the case a few months ago.
The situation with NGOs is much better in Armenia than elsewhere in the region but much will depend on how much criticism they aim at the ruling party. If the government believes they have gone too far, there may be a hardening of attitudes in Yerevan. Moreover, given what has happened in Georgia and Azerbaijan, it is far from impossible that the region’s authoritarian momentum will engulf Armenia too. One look at Armenia’s geographical position, bordered as it is by authoritarian states, makes the point.
This failure of democracy in the South Caucasus seems to be a longer-term development and is further compounded by unfavorable international situation. Free and fair elections are very clearly at risk, if not already corrupted, and fundamental freedoms like association and speech are being curtailed.
Whether it is Trump’s return with his often nationalist rhetoric or the high probability of nationalists coming to power in EU countries, illiberalism is gaining momentum globally.
This means that the authoritarian trend in the South Caucasus is both a corollary of global processes but also a result of exclusively local circumstance. Russia might not only win militarily in Ukraine but also ideologically – one party rule could become a defining feature of political life across the South Caucasus.
Francis Harris is the Managing Editor at Center for European Policy Analysis and co-authored this article with analysts in Georgia, whose identities are being withheld for security reasons.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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