If you want one example of Armenia’s problems in shaking itself free of Russia’s influence, look at its rail system. Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has repeatedly called for Russia to show flexibility and potentially transfer the concession to a third country acceptable to both sides. On 24 August, he again urged Russia to sell its concession rights to a mutually acceptable third party.
Russia has not answered, and it is unlikely to accept the idea. It has been running an escalating campaign to make life hard for Pashinyan, who was reelected in June. Putin makes no secret of this; indeed, he seems to delight in the (considerable) influence he can bring to bear.
That was clear at the September 1 meeting between the Russian and Armenian leaders at Bishkek, on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit. The reason is Armenia’s pursuit of closer ties with the European Union.
Putin sees this as a threat, as he once did with Ukraine. The EU’s anti-corruption, free trade, liberal democratic ethos is the antithesis of Russia’s approach.
He has concluded that the best way to pressure Armenia is to demand that it hold a referendum on joining the EU or staying within the Russian-run Eurasian Economic Union. Since the former will take many years, while the latter already exists and accounts for a significant part of Armenian trade, a vote would cause significant confusion and possibly internal dissent.
Pashinyan is playing for time, arguing that Armenia has not reached the point at which it must make a definitive choice. He suggested that a clear decision would come only when an actual alternative had been created. Armenia’s parliament supports EU membership and the government also backs it, but the process is at an early stage.
Arguments over the vote are far from the only point of dispute. Armenia’s new 2026-2031 government program illustrates the rift. In it, Russia is no longer explicitly described as Armenia’s ally but merely a partner with whom Yerevan will strive to expand relations. This signals a major shift from an alliance-based relationship toward a more transactional and pragmatic relationship where Russia is increasingly seen as one of many partners in Armenia’s sprawling web of strategic partnerships.
The Armenian prime minister went further at an August 27 press conference, questioning Russia’s value as a strategic partner. He specifically cited Russia’s failure to provide the security assistance Yerevan expected during the 2022 fighting with Azerbaijan and the broader Armenian perception that the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) failed to fulfil its commitments.
Officially, Russia and Armenia remain allies. They are bound by the bilateral allied treaty from the 1990s, and both are still members of CSTO. The Russian leader, during the Bishkek meeting, emphasized that Moscow still supports “friendly, mutually beneficial relations with Armenia based on the principles of strategic partnership and allied relations.”
Yet, the core of the problem remains the same. Armenia wants to have more freedom in foreign policy and may be willing to suffer a major rupture in its relations with Russia to achieve this. Increasingly, it seems that Armenia’s policy is more than just a diplomatic stratagem to gain attention from Moscow, and that it is seeking to diversify its security and foreign policy. That resembles a major shift from the Russian-dominated sphere toward the West, with significant links also developed with India, Iran, Turkey and others.
Whether this was conceived from the very beginning is hard to say, but Yerevan, by pushing against the CSTO and now the EAEU, is pursuing something more than just a multi-vector foreign policy.
Armenia even raised a sensitive topic of Russian troops stationed in Gyumri. Pashinyan argued following the meeting with Putin that: “We do not consider the presence of a Russian military base in Armenia a vital necessity. There have been no discussions about the base; we have never raised the issue. If Russia decides to withdraw the base, we will not object. If it decides to stay, we are ready to discuss it.”
Russia still has significant levers to influence Armenia’s behavior, but those tools are increasingly economic rather than military (as was the case with Ukraine, Moldova or Georgia). The lack of a common physical border complicates things for Moscow.
Its support for the Armenian opposition was mostly ineffective. Samvel Karapetyan, an Armenian-Russian billionaire, presently under arrest, founded the Strong Armenia, which lost in June 6 parliamentary elections.
So, Armenia is different from other countries which have experienced pressure from Russia. Not that the country is immune to Moscow’s projection of power. Much will depend on how fast and effectively the normalization pursued by Yerevan with Azerbaijan and Turkey develops.
If that allows greater economic development, the impact of economic tensions with Russia could be greatly reduced even if some segments of the economy reliant on Russian trade suffer.
The EU is helping. It has approved measures to support Armenia’s economy by removing tariffs on nearly 80% of Armenian exports to the EU. This could redirect 99% of Armenian agricultural products and a similar proportion of beverages and alcoholic products from Russian to European markets.
Armenia’s direction of travel is clear, for now at least.
Emil Avdaliani is a research fellow at the Turan Research Center and a professor of international relations at the European University in Tbilisi, Georgia. His research focuses on the history of silk roads and the interests of great powers in the Middle East and the Caucasus.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
