The continent of Africa will become ever more important in the 21st century. Home to some of the fastest-growing populations and economies in the world, a plethora of critical minerals, yet caught in between spheres of influence and extremism, it is too often forgotten or regarded as too difficult to engage with.
The US administration has made clear that Africa is not a priority. The 2025 National Security Strategy (NSS) contained a mere three paragraphs on the continent. As it mostly (but not exclusively) focuses elsewhere, Russia and China continue to extend their influence and invest, albeit in sometimes destructive ways — such as illegal Chinese mining in Zambia, releasing harmful chemicals, and Russian troops raping and torturing civilians in Mali. The resulting instability threatens the global order, but also presents the European Union (EU) with an opportunity.
West Africa, in particular, is under increasing pressure. Military coups in Burkina Faso, Niger, and Mali have left the region in shock at a time when jihadist attacks are on the rise. The recently installed military regimes have thrown out French and US forces, who were critical partners in counterterrorism, and swapped them for Russia’s proxy forces: the Africa Corps
Unsurprisingly, given their predilection for extreme violence, the Russian guns for hire have not proven as effective as advertised. They have struggled to secure ore deposits, and have faced deadly raids by rebels, and even targeted strikes linked to Ukrainian special forces. Nonetheless, paired with Chinese economic investment and trade, Western-backed institutions are on the defensive.
The increasing presence of Russia and China puts African sovereignty at risk, but also continues to tip the scales in favor of Russia and China with critical raw materials (CRM) and rare earth elements (REE).
There is a countervailing force. The Economic Community of Western African States (ECOWAS) is standing up to democratic backsliding, albeit by itself. ECOWAS is a regional bloc of 15 West African Nations, with a strong track record of efforts to foster peace, economic stability, and democracy.
In 2017, ECOWAS intervened decisively in The Gambia after longtime ruler Yahya Jammeh refused to concede electoral defeat, using coordinated diplomatic pressure and the credible threat of force to ensure a peaceful transfer of power. Earlier, during the civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone in the 1990s, ECOWAS deployed its ECOMOG peacekeeping forces to stabilize both states, laying the groundwork for post-conflict elections and the restoration of constitutional governance.
The group is currently under strain — internally divided, stretched by repeated coups, and facing growing skepticism. But that is precisely why sustained European backing matters now. Paired with the fact that the United States, a main partner of West Africa, is busy elsewhere, West African countries need alternative Western support to combat terrorism, as well as Russian and Chinese influence. This presents a solid opportunity for the EU.
This does not mean that the EU should seek to entirely replace the United States (and in many ways it cannot). But the goal of the partnership should not be increasing aid, but rather increasing security and technology partnerships. Both parties would gain.
It’s important to remember the problems of Europe’s past military interventions. French counter-insurgency operations Serval and Barkhane lasted nearly a decade, failing to contain the spread of violence and chaos, costing lives, and ultimately ruining France’s relations with Mali. Italian involvement in UNOSOM II in the 1990s highlights an earlier example of lives lost for failed missions, and speaks to the EU’s lack of appetite for military interventions abroad.
But while joint military engagement in Africa may be a difficult sell to European voters, the logic is straightforward: a safer and more prosperous West Africa means reduced irregular migration and fewer extremist safe havens on Europe’s southern flank. Addressing the drivers of migration would also undercut the political momentum of Europe’s populist parties, which have capitalized on insecurity to weaken European cohesion.
Middle ground can be found. The EU can work to support stronger civil-military relations on the ground between armed forces and their citizenry in the Sahel, disarming resentment towards state actors that fuels jihadist recruitment and support. Fostering trust and building relationships can help stabilize fragile regions and allow for economic growth, further dispelling the draw of rebel groups to impoverished citizens.
If ECOWAS continues to weaken as a credible political and security force, the resulting vacuum will not remain empty — Russia and China have already shown they are prepared to fill it. That shift would directly undermine European interests by accelerating irregular migration, increasing terrorist safe havens on Europe’s southern flank, and tightening authoritarian control over critical raw materials and energy corridors vital to European industry. Supporting ECOWAS, therefore, is not an act of idealism but a strategic investment in Europe’s own security, economic resilience, and geopolitical relevance.
From a technological standpoint, an EU partnership should include an expansion of Italy’s Mattei Plan. By providing investment opportunities for mining programs and rare earth excavation, this would strike a contrast to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which uses opaque financing for political leverage from partner states. Instead, an expanded Mattei Plan should focus on building partnerships that strengthen African mining and refining capabilities while securing Europe’s own energy and industrial needs. Such a development of the EU’s Global Gateway program will serve as a legitimate alternative to China’s often-abusive BRI (critics say it’s little better than a debt-collection agency), and offer an avenue to cut off illegal mining that puts rural populations at risk.
Increasing ties to ECOWAS would allow the European Union to demonstrate its strength as a bloc and give it more credibility worldwide. It is routinely pushed aside by China, Russia, and the United States. Now, it has a chance to demonstrate its capacity as a global actor and solidify its place on the global stage.
Niccolò Comini is an independent researcher. He writes about Italian politics and foreign policy, and has been published on CEPA’s Europe’s Edge, Foreign Policy, and The National Interest.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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