The fastest and easiest way to give Ukraine’s forces access to some of the vast US military surplus is for the supportive nations to cut a deal with Trump.
Working in unison, European states have the power and the wealth to save Ukrainian lives, to restore the country and thereby to ensure peace in Europe. Done sensibly, through realistic dealing with the Trump administration, this can reduce the massive long-term outlays that will be needed to drastically expand continental defense.
Donald J. Trump’s book titles “Think like a champion”, “Think big”, “How to get rich” and “Trump – the art of the deal” should give a decent hint who Europe faces. This is not a person that gives anything away for free. This is a decision point — there is little point trying to convince President Trump about the benefits of providing free resources for the long-term security of the free world. Instead, we must switch to the mechanics of the souk, of the market.
Take one example. In 2000, the US Government bought 1,602 Bradley M2 infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) for $5.66bn, that is $3.5m a unit. Now, 25 years later there have been some improvements, but also over two decades of wear and tear on these tracked vehicles. So what is fair market value?
So, let’s say you buy a pickup truck with 100, 000 miles on the odometer. A 2014 Chevrolet Silverado 1500 LT costs around $12,000—$13,000 with 100,000 miles on the odometer. That is a third of the price in 2014.
So instead of 20 more meeting in Ramstein asking the Americans to give M2 Bradleys for free, as the Europeans give their vehicles for free for the defense of Ukraine, give Trump a deal he can’t resist. Buy 1,000 US of the stored Bradleys for a third of the original price for about $1.77bn with free delivery to Eastern Poland thrown in. Cash.
What’s the alternative? If we ignore the moral and human obligation to help Ukraine and only look at the finances behind the deal, it is good for both the Trump administration and European NATO. Run the numbers. Sweden has a GDP of around $600bn. Every percent of GDP is $6bn.
Sweden, like every European nation, now faces much increased defense costs. Take the price of doubling defense spending to 4% of GDP for 20 years. That would represent an additional burden of $240bn in today’s values.
These are resources that could otherwise be used to improve welfare or societal investments with positive returns in the future.
So purchasing 1,000 Bradley in a deal that may total $2.5bn when spare parts and ammunition are included, would mean Sweden alone could finance this key equipment for Ukraine. Even if it threw in equipment worth 10 times this sum, i.e., about $25bn, this would still only represent 10% of the long-term cost of 20 years of elevated defense costs.
From Ukraine’s point of view, its army has embraced the Bradley, widely regarded as the world’s best IFV. It has received 300 so far; another 1,000 would make a significant impact on the battlefield.
Trump has indicated he is willing to consider a lend-lease arrangement for Ukraine, and Europeans can guarantee payment, but the turn around and negotiations will take too long. Give Trump an offer he will accept, after some haggling, and buy in cash.
It is faster, it costs the same, and the resources arrive in a critical juncture when Ukraine needs them. It would also meet the policy demand made on February 12 by US Defense Secretary Pete Hesgeth that European allies “provide the overwhelming share of future lethal and nonlethal aid to Ukraine.”
Several of Trump’s national security advisors have flagged that they are now considering deactivating army units, and prioritizing the air force and navy, which would increase US surplus army stock. If Europeans buy, at fair market value for used and worn hardware, or missiles and ammunition nearing the end of its shelf life, it makes sense for the US and Ukraine.
Okay, Mr. President, you’re the master of the deal, so let’s do it.
Jan Kallberg, Ph.D., LL.M., is a non-resident Senior Fellow with the Transatlantic Defense and Security program at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA), a Fellow at the Army Cyber Institute at West Point, and a George Washington University faculty member. Follow him at cyberdefense.com and @Cyberdefensecom.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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