Since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine began, Russian aircraft have entered European airspace on dozens of occasions. The range of aircraft types indicates that these are not accidents or the work of a single unit. Instead, in many cases, they are likely the product of a centralized command structure.
A new dataset compiled by CEPA’s Transatlantic Defense and Security program using open-source research and information from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data institution, analysis shows that Russia’s signature Shahed/Geran drones, along with combat aircraft, support aircraft, and missiles, have been linked to more than 70 unique airspace violations in NATO and Moldova since February 2022.
Some of these incursions by manned and unmanned aircraft are confirmed to be Russian, while others are suspected of being Russian in origin. As the drone campaign has widened to include Denmark, Belgium, Germany, and other countries, it is evident that Europe’s airspace is highly vulnerable to Russian incursions.
This strategy has a sizable upside for Russia. For one, uncontested flyovers provide Russian pilots with valuable flight experience. It also provides helpful lessons for Russian military planners on how best to engage with NATO air defenses. Reconnaissance allows Russian generals to observe NATO bases, map weaknesses, and follow arms shipments to Ukraine.
It also creates ambiguity. If the Russian military ever decides to engage in a more expansive offensive operation against a NATO ally, it could potentially mask some of its initial attacks as non-offensive air incursions. In that case, Russian activity in a true offensive form would look much like previous attempts to prod NATO’s defensive bubble, when the new intention may in fact be far more serious. As a result, alliance member states would have difficulty assessing what is happening, causing a slower response.
Finally, these incursions require little effort from Russia, but drains European states of time, energy, and bandwidth, as was the case when Russian drones violated Poland’s airspace in September. Russia’s strategy forces European states to react, rather than being able to take proactive action.
The response of European and NATO leaders to Russian activities has been mixed. Germany has shown little appetite to shoot down manned aircraft, with the defense minister calling for restraint. On the other end of the spectrum, Poland has stated that it is committed to downing any aircraft that violates its airspace. Estonia also invoked Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, requesting strategic assistance from the NATO alliance, and in October, an unmanned drone was shot down over an Estonian military base housing US troops. And in the middle, Sweden’s posture is reflective of a strategic ambiguity mantra — making clear it has the military means to respond but stopping short of an official shoot-down policy.
Yet, if these incursions go unchallenged and become the new normal, Europe will be forfeiting control over its airspace, a significant retreat on national sovereignty. The long-term implication would be that NATO cannot or will not defend its airspace from an adversary on its doorstep. As CEPA Fellows Arnis Cimermanis and Gordon B. “Skip” Davis, Jr. have highlighted, the “violations test NATO’s Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) capabilities and decision-making, and may encourage the Kremlin to believe it would meet little or no resistance if they continue.”
To effectively combat Russian air incursions, NATO member states need to agree on new policies, ranging from public statements to preparing for the use of lethal force. Consistent and unified diplomatic language is key to deterring Russia. The policy recommendations provided below are intended to counter the threat of unmanned and manned systems. However, in the case of manned systems, NATO member states will need to take additional steps to prepare for the secondary consequences of any Russian military casualties.
Thus far, NATO has failed to do so, and the result has been less-than-convincing alliance threats to use force.
As a baseline policy recommendation, all NATO heads of state should issue public statements declaring that they reserve the right to shoot down foreign aircraft, manned or unmanned, entering their airspace if initial communications fail to elicit a response. Policymakers should be transparent in how they discuss this issue and clearly articulate that debris from downed systems may crash in populated areas, creating an increased risk for their own people. But they should make it plain that the risks from enemy systems flying unhindered into NATO territory have still more dangerous implications.
As a follow-on recommendation, member states should refine their standard operating procedures to preauthorize fighter jets to shoot down Russian aircraft, manned or unmanned, that violate their airspace. Delays in weapons authorization hinder NATO fighters from taking decisive action to stop an imminent threat. NATO fighters would be given the authority to use their weaponry to take action if other methods had failed. Refining these standard operating procedures should be announced publicly or conveyed behind closed doors to Russian counterparts, without fully detailing the list of procedures entailed. This tactic is intended to both increase the speed of its operations and deter Russian activity.
Europe should also invest in a more layered defense. Scrambling fighters during each incursion is expensive, and so are the air-to-air missiles they carry. NATO should therefore strive to defeat the threat without utilizing direct airpower.
Cheaper alternatives like the new varieties of interceptor drones being manufactured by Ukraine and ground-to-air anti-aircraft guns provide a helpful alternative. A single system will never be able to do the job alone; a layered approach with other alternatives is needed. In a recent article featured in Europe’s Edge, David Brookfield argued that guns remain a cheap and effective alternative to larger surface-to-air munitions.
This should be accompanied by a set of follow-on public statements that publicize its new capabilities via public broadcasting and an intensive social media campaign. The goal of this initiative would be to effectively signal Europe’s capability to shoot down encroaching aircraft from the ground, not necessarily to develop a full-scale air denial strategy.
A caveat to this approach is that developing additional lethal force capabilities will take time, enabling Russia to increase the number and frequency of its air incursions. Consequently, Europe cannot neglect its air-to-air capabilities. As it stands, the Baltic states lack air-to-air combat aircraft and must rely on the alliance to intervene whenever Russia violates their airspace. As Europe continues to invest in sixth-generation fighters, it should position some of its older aircraft in the Baltics. In the long term, NATO can shorten its response times by increasing the number of combat aircraft in Northern Europe.
A component of this layered defense requires being able to effectively detect aircraft flying in European airspace. It remains a constant challenge to identify where aircraft are and where they’re going. As a result, this is an area that requires continuous and sustained investment. Perhaps most notably, there is a requirement for mobile detection systems that can be easily moved around, depending on the need.
It is also important to develop a better understanding of the scale, depth, and types of Russian air incursions, both among the public and expert communities. In private, elected officials and trusted partners should be shown recovered components of downed adversary air systems. In public, NATO member states should post videos to social media and other online spaces of NATO assets downing unmanned Russian aircraft.
Depending on the context, NATO members should also display recovered pieces from manned and unmanned aircraft in public settings such as museums and government buildings.
These policy recommendations are not intended to map a one-size-fits-all approach for air incursions. Instead, they are meant to help NATO allies grapple with the varying types and nature of the systems being flown into European countries. A more unified approach, regardless of member states’ varying capabilities, effectively prepares NATO to face Russian air incursions.
Whatever actions NATO decides to take, they need to be immediate and address every element of the Russian threat. The consequences of taking little to no action will only make the situation worse.
Chris Hoeft is an intern with the Transatlantic Defense and Security program at the Center for the European Policy Analysis (CEPA). Before joining CEPA, Chris worked as an open-source researcher and Team Lead at the Berkeley Human Rights Center, where he investigated political violence against protesters in Iran. Chris also previously interned at the Institute for the Study of War, where he worked on their Geospatial portfolio. Chris’s research interests include the intersection of defense technology and human security issues. Chris graduated with a Bachelor of Arts degree in Political Science from the University of California, Berkeley in 2023, and is currently pursuing a Master of Arts in Security Studies at Georgetown University.
Noah Greene is a Senior Program Officer with the Transatlantic Defense and Security program at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA). Prior to joining CEPA, Greene was a research assistant for the Artificial Intelligence Safety and Stability Project at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS). In this role, Greene worked with four programs, along with the executive vice president and director of studies, to coordinate research activities across multiple lines of effort. His research agenda included investigating the military applications of AI in the United States, Europe, Russia, and China, along with European decision-making on AI more broadly. Greene currently serves as a fellow for the Blackburn Institute at the University of Alabama. He also serves as a junior associate fellow for the NATO Defense College.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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