Like a frog on a bicycle, the sight of European leaders locked in emergency conclave to agree on enormous additional sums for defense is dreamlike. And yet here we are — within days, the hitherto security-blasé continent is likely to have agreed well over $1 trillion in new funding.
The sums involved are staggering. Taken together, they amount to at least eight times the $130bn or so in US and European military aid to Ukraine since Russia’s all-out invasion three years ago.
The mood was encapsulated by the Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen on March 6. “Spend, spend, spend on defense and deterrence — that is the most important message,” she said
European defense firm valuations are soaring, old Brexit divisions are healing in plain sight, and debt-laden European states are suddenly finding new sources of money. Europe, often described as the old continent, slow and set in its ways, is moving at a blistering pace. The loss of faith in US military support and the realization that Putin’s imperial appetite is far from satisfied have proved powerful motivators.
The European Union (EU) emergency summit in Brussels on March 6 discussed the creation of €150bn ($162bn) in defense loans and up to a further €650bn over four years from easing EU national debt rules on arms spending. The meeting followed the March 5 announcement by Germany’s two biggest parties that they planned to largely remove lending rules for defense outlays. If agreed by the Bundestag, this would allow perhaps an extra $500bn or so in defense spending over the coming years.
“In view of the threats to our freedom and peace on our continent, the rule for our defense now has to be ‘whatever it takes,’” said Germany’s probable next chancellor, Friedrich Merz. The same day, the French President told his nation that the naivete of the post-1989 years was over: “I want to believe that the United States will stand by us. But we have to be ready if that is not the case. Given the Russian threat . . . European states must be able to defend themselves.”
The UK’s statements on defense spending have been notably less ambitious. The government has raided the overseas aid budget to provide another £6bn ($7bn) annually by 2027 and says its £28bn national wealth fund will now be allowed to invest in defense projects. These fall short of anything close to the European effort.
Even so, Prime Minister Keir Starmer is taking a leading role in talks with the US and Europe and has said the security situation creates a “generational challenge.” More UK funding is expected, probably from welfare cuts and extra borrowing, or a proposed Rearmament Bank, dubbed the “Bomb Bank.”
Will the European public accept a mix of higher borrowing and social expenditure reductions?
It’s hard to be sure, but there are intriguing signs that ultranationalist politicians are uneasy about events and how to respond. The favorite for the next French presidential vote, Marine Le Pen, who in 2014 accepted about $10m in funding from a Kremlin-linked bank, was notably cautious when asked about the Trump administration’s decision to halt arms supplies to Ukraine. She described it as brutal and argued the Kyiv government should have been given more time to react.
Meanwhile, the hard-right Reform UK leader Nigel Farage squirmed in the House of Commons as Starmer accused him of “fawning” to Putin. He is no doubt aware his voters dislike the Russian leader and have recently turned against President Trump.
Reform UK backers’ support for the president has transformed from +38 to -8 in the two weeks to March 5 as his Ukraine policy has emerged. Some 69% of British voters want Ukraine to defeat its invader, 80% have an unfavorable view of Trump, while 79% see Putin as a threat to peace.
Europeans remain very largely pro-NATO even as they question the US commitment. Germans say they would support more spending even if it meant other budget cuts (by 62%-32%) and 62% of British voters would back cuts or additional borrowing.
Whether the current urgency among European governments and voters, or their backing for Ukraine, will survive the inevitable cries of pain as the defense burden rises is another matter.
But for now, Europe looks more united and purposeful than it has for many years.
Francis Harris is Managing Editor at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA) and oversees Europe’s Edge. He was a foreign correspondent with the Daily Telegraph and served in Prague, London, New York, and Washington.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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