Over the past year, this author reviewed court records, indictments, and investigative reports to build what is probably the first open-source database of major known cryptocurrency money-laundering schemes.
It includes 164 cases spanning roughly two decades and shows roughly $350bn in illicit flows have moved through crypto-linked laundering schemes.
The findings are alarming, and the figures are conservative; many more are likely to remain hidden. The true figure is almost certainly far higher.
The trend is also worsening. The number of identified cases in the database has been rising at a compound annual growth rate of 16.5%. Crypto-enabled financial crime is no longer a niche problem of scams and shadow exchanges. It is becoming a major enabler of state-backed aggression, organized crime, and sanctions evasion.
The most troubling pattern is not just the scale of the flows, but who is behind them.
North Korea receives an estimated one-third of its government revenue through cryptocurrency schemes. Most governments have a cyber defense division; North Korea has a cyber-attack division through the Lazarus Group. They have carried out 30% of the cryptocurrency hacks in my database and have stolen $4.1bn from these schemes. This goes directly to funding their military and nuclear programs.
Iran relies on partner networks to launder billions in funds through cryptocurrency, including some firms registered within the UK. In the last quarter of 2025, according to estimates by Chainalysis, 50% of all cryptocurrency transactions within Iran were carried out by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). At the same time, Iranian-linked ransomware and cyber operations continue to target Western systems and critical infrastructure.
Russia not only allows but encourages criminal activity. Half of all the illicit cryptocurrency exchanges in my database are based in Russia. Four out of the five major ransomware groups have been located in Russia. Russia has gone so far as to set up its own stablecoin, A7A5, for sanctions evasion. In its first year alone, it is estimated to have processed close to $100bn in cumulative volume.
Yet enforcement remains weak. In my database, 79% of cases have resulted in no convictions, and only 27% of funds have been seized.
We need to do more to protect victims and stop hostile actors and regimes.
At a UK House of Commons event last week, I made three key recommendations to the British government. These are also relevant for the EU.
The Russian-backed A7A5 is one of the most pressing issues facing Western society. It is sanctioned in the EU, UK, and the US, but it continues to function. Not only does it function, but it also thrives.
How? Its value lies in A7A5’s convertibility by criminals into cash. This happens through exchanges, including EU- and US-sanctioned exchange Grinex. These exchanges, as well as the issuer of the stablecoin, Old Vector LLC, are registered in Kyrgyzstan.
Kyrgyzstan has been wholly uncooperative in shutting down these schemes from operating and has shrugged off international pressure. The EU and UK should therefore sanction key members of the Kyrgyzstan government who are allowing this sanctions evasion to continue, specifically the head of the central bank, the general prosecutor, and the main financial regulator.
It is outrageous that Russia can skirt sanctions and fund its war of aggression through A7A5 with the support of Kyrgyzstan.
The EU also needs to overcome resistance from Hungary. Its 20th sanctions package was supposed to have sanctioned key cryptocurrency exchanges like Meer, which allow A7A5 to transact, but failed to do so because of Viktor Orbán’s government. The Meer exchange operator, CJSC TengriCoin, has been sanctioned by the UK. The EU must take more decisive and timely actions towards Kyrgyzstan entities that facilitate A7A5-aided sanctions evasion.
The second key policy recommendation is the creation of a cryptocurrency whistleblower reward scheme to take down large scams that target thousands of victims across Europe and the UK. This is not a novel idea; it has been done very successfully in the US for security law violations and tax evasion.
Crypto crime is notoriously hard to identify from the outside; investigators often lack the internal evidence needed to move quickly. A reward program would incentivise insiders to come forward with actionable intelligence. This will shift the balance of power toward law enforcement, away from criminals.
Thirdly, Western governments need much stronger international coordination. Cryptocurrency is inherently cross-border. Funds move through multiple wallets, exchanges, and jurisdictions in seconds. No single country can dismantle major laundering networks alone. Financial intelligence units and law enforcement agencies need faster information-sharing, joint investigations, and more coordinated designations to effectively take down criminals.
At present, there is an inequality in the arms race between the criminals and authorities, and as a result, criminals are running circles around the authorities. Unless lawmakers and regulators act with greater urgency, hostile regimes and criminal groups will continue to exploit this gap, at enormous cost to European security.
Alexander Browder is the founder of launderingdatabase.org and author of “Confronting the Illicit Finance Hydra in Crypto Markets: Protecting Retail Investors and Disrupting Hostile Government Exploitation” published by the Henry Jackson Society. On March 3, he presented his findings and policy recommendations at the UK House of Commons in a cross-party parliamentary event chaired by Phil Brickell MP, with Tom Tugendhat MP and Chris Coghlan MP.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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