Though their landscape is picturesque, the Baltic states are not built for defense. Lakes and swamps provide some benefit, but there are no mountains, jungles, or Rhine-sized rivers to stop an invader. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania can be Holland, but not Switzerland.
Hence, the Baltic states want to build the “Baltic Defense Line” to stave off a Russian attack. Announced in January 2024, the idea is that by working together, three small nations can overcome their numerical and geographical weaknesses versus their giant and aggressive neighbor.
Estonia plans to build 600 bunkers along its 300-km (186-mile) border with Russia. Latvia is emplacing dragon’s teeth. Lithuania announced a plan last month to build a multi-layer border defense system stretching up to 50 km from the border. Directly on the border would be the first layer — 5km in depth — comprising a wide anti-tank ditch, backed up by dragon’s teeth, then minefields, then strongpoints and trenches, followed by a second line of trenches. The second layer would include trenches as well as bridges wired for demolition, with a third layer studded by trees ready to be felled into obstacles, and yet more trenches and wired bridges.
“Fixed fortifications are a monument to the stupidity of man,” declared the ever-aggressive Gen. George Patton. But in reality, they are a sensible and cost-effective idea, especially for weaker nations. They increase the survivability and lethality of friendly troops, impede enemy mobility and logistics, and allow the defender to economize on manpower and resources. As the early days of the Ukraine war showed, it doesn’t take much to derail and disrupt Russian armored columns. For the Baltic states not to build fixed defenses would be negligent, if not criminal.
However, fortifications can also be an albatross. The most infamous example is the Maginot Line, which has become a meme for how static defenses can become a trap. Yet in theory, the concept was good. Maginot defenses were a force multiplier that allowed the French to garrison the southern part of their line with second-line troops while concentrating higher-quality mechanized forces to stop a German offensive in the open terrain to the north.
The problem was that the Germans attacked in the center and quickly penetrated through the lightly defended Ardennes Forest. While the sclerotic French high command failed to counterattack or shift reserves to block the German thrust, the panzers fanned out north and south to split the Allied line in half and encircle each wing. In other words, the fault lay not with the forts, but with the lack of mobile reserves and agile commanders.
It’s not that the Baltic Defense Line is Maginot 2.0. But fortifications do take on a life of their own, gaining a prestige value that compromises their tactical benefits. After the 1967 Six-Day War, Israel built the Bar-Lev Line, a chain of fortified posts along the Suez Canal. When Egypt launched a surprise attack across the canal in October 1973, the thinly manned fortifications barely impeded the Egyptian crossing, the defenders were isolated and mopped up, and outnumbered Israeli armored reserves were decimated as they counterattacked in a doomed relief attempt.
All of which means that the Baltic Defense Line will be useful for limited missions: slowing a Russian offensive, repelling minor Russian raids, and providing a small degree of deterrence against Russian aggression. But the backbone of the defense will be the reserves — presumably backed by airpower — that will block the Russian spearheads and eventually eject them from Baltic soil.
The question is whether NATO is prepared to implement this plan. The Baltic state militaries are small: Estonia has less than 8,000 active-duty personnel, backed by 230,000 lightly armed reservists better suited for defense than counterattack. The bulk of the counterattack force will have to come from the larger NATO powers such as the US, Germany, France, and the UK.
Currently, NATO has four battlegroups in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland, with a total strength of a few thousand troops. They are being stiffened by a German armored brigade that will be permanently stationed in Lithuania. But if Russia were to mount a Baltic offensive on the scale of its Ukraine campaign, those NATO forces would be nothing more than a tripwire.
Ultimately, the issue will become how long it will take NATO to mobilize a fully equipped and amply supplied army to succor the Baltic states, especially if an isolationist US does not join the coalition. At this point, it is questionable whether a purely European army could be assembled in sufficient time and in sufficient strength.
An even darker possibility is that Europe will be short on weapons and personnel — and uncertain of public support for going to war with Russia. If so, there will be an economic and psychological temptation to rely on the Baltic Defense Line to deter or stop a Russian assault.
The French hoped that fortifications would save them from the Germans. NATO cannot afford to make the same mistake.
Michael Peck is a defense writer whose work has appeared in Business Insider, Forbes, Defense News, Foreign Policy magazine, and other publications. He holds an MA in political science from Rutgers University. Follow him on Twitter and LinkedIn.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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