It was called the Clean Network initiative. The US jawboned European Union governments, and partners including Japan, India, and Australia, to remove Huawei and other Chinese vendors from their 5G networks, while laying the groundwork for similar restrictions in future 6G systems.
But most governments across Latin America, the Middle East, sub-Saharan Africa, and Southeast Asia have not followed suit. Outside of North America, Huawei holds about 40% and ZTE about 14% of the telecom equipment market.
Even in allied Europe, key countries such as Germany have resisted tearing out Chinese equipment, angry over US pressure and fearful of the cost. A new report from GSMA, a global trade body representing the telecom industry, estimates that the EU’s plan to rid its telecoms network of Chinese suppliers will cost up to €40 billion, four times more than initially estimated.
This does not mean that Chinese vendors control every network, or that the main non-Chinese telecom vendors (Sweden’s Ericsson, Finland’s Nokia, South Korea’s Samsung, and Japan’s Fujitsu and Rakuten) have been driven out of developing markets. It does mean, however, that Washington’s central strategic objective — excluding Huawei and other Chinese players like ZTE from next-generation communications infrastructure — has largely failed.
While the 5G battle looks lost, the global telco war remains far from over. The focus should shift toward 6G and its offshoots: cloud infrastructure, artificial intelligence, and cybersecurity. 5G focused on the security risks associated with Chinese mobile network equipment. 6G, by contrast, will integrate AI directly into network operations, edge computing, sensing systems, satellites, autonomous platforms, and industrial infrastructure. Next generation networks will form a core layer of the AI technology stack rather than serving as a downstream utility.
Unlike the 5G contest, the US and the EU enter the 6G race from a strong position. The US retains major advantages in chip design, AI, cloud infrastructure, and software. Its central challenge will be not only to restrict Chinese vendors at home or encourage allies to limit “high-risk” suppliers, but to build economically viable and technologically competitive alternatives. The Trump administration launched a global partnership this month with more than 20 allies to promote secure (read: non-Chinese) 6G wireless networks.
Despite the West’s technological advances, China’s advantages will be difficult to reverse. Beijing enters the 6G development cycle with structural strengths that extend beyond 5G radio technology. These include state-enabled financing, large-scale deployment experience, manufacturing depth, and long-standing commercial relationships across emerging markets. Throughout the Global South (and much of the developed North), Huawei and its Chinese cousins remain among the most affordable and fastest-to-deploy options.
Chinese state-owned commercial banks, specialized sovereign funds, and multilateral development banks have provided roughly $2.2 trillion in overseas loans and grants since 2000, many of which are associated with telco rollouts. This financial architecture helps explain why Chinese telecommunications vendors remain commercially attractive even when security concerns are understood. Huawei and ZTE are difficult to displace not simply because of their installed base or technical capabilities, but because governments and operators must weigh affordability, financing, rollout speed, maintenance, and end-to-end integration alongside trust and security.
Reversing China’s position will require more than export controls or vendor bans. It will require credible economic alternatives.
Unfortunately, US industrial coordination remains fragmented between the Federal Communications Commission, the Department of Commerce, the Department of Defense, and the Department of State. US telecommunications financing mechanisms are not structured for sustained geopolitical competition, either. Tools such as the US International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) and the Export-Import Bank of the United States (EXIM) often remain too slow, risk-averse, and inflexible for high-risk, high-stakes strategic infrastructure investments.
Transatlantic alignment will be key. US and European development finance and export credit institutions should jointly support complete 6G packages rather than isolated equipment purchases. These packages could combine radio and core equipment, fiber connections, cloud infrastructure, cybersecurity services, workforce development, and long-term maintenance. The DFC already invests in networks, data centers, and fiber-optic infrastructure, while the EU’s Global Gateway acknowledges a substantial financing gap for secure digital connectivity. Coordinating these instruments would create large financing pools, distribute project risk, reduce duplicated reviews, and make trusted infrastructure more affordable.
In addition, if Washington and Brussels coordinate their positions in the International Telecommunication Union, the 3GPP standards body, they can promote open interfaces, secure-by-design architecture, interoperable components, and internationally harmonized spectrum. If they present competing positions, they will fragment the Western market and make China’s unified offering more attractive.
The December 2025 US memorandum on “Winning the 6G Race” identifies international standards, globally harmonized spectrum, and a coalition of foreign and industry partners as prerequisites for US leadership. Europe should form the core of that coalition.
Through the end of this decade, telecommunications policy is likely to become integrated into national industrial and security strategies. The US government looks set to broaden its definition of critical communications infrastructure to include cloud computing, undersea cable landing stations, and satellite networks. Washington wants to ensure that every layer of digital infrastructure — from hardware to routing software — meets trusted vendor standards.
China won the 5G battle by combining technology with cheap financing and rapid deployment. The US and Europe will win the 6G contest only if they can offer a more technologically advanced, compelling, and affordable alternative.
Alexis Serfaty is a Managing Director at DGA-Albright Stonebridge Group, where he helps the world’s leading companies and investors understand how political and regulatory trends are influencing the development and deployment of digital networks, artificial intelligence, semiconductors, global technology supply chains, and cross-border data flows. Mr. Serfaty most recently served as the Director of Eurasia Group’s Geo-Technology Practice and previously served as a policy advisor to the Assistant Secretary of Transportation for International Affairs.
Bandwidth is CEPA’s online journal dedicated to advancing transatlantic cooperation on tech policy. All opinions expressed on Bandwidth are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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