How can the US and other democracies safely use drones, including those made in China or using Chinese components? Commercial and civilian drone use has expanded in recent years and will undoubtedly continue to grow as tech evolves. Drones use the airspace in ways that challenge existing regulations and raise concerns about supply chain security, since many drone components and over 85% of drones operating in the US are of Chinese origin.
The Federal Communications Commission’s ban on all foreign-made drones failed to address the root of the supply chain issue: Chinese firm DJI still dominates the global market. Of the almost 840,000 drones registered with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DJI made more than two-thirds. Public safety agencies such as police and fire departments currently operate approximately 25,000 DJI drones. The expense of replacing these is beyond the budget of most agencies. Chinese companies also dominate production of the microelectronics used in drones and other products, with a more than 70% market share. Even Ukraine’s drone makers depend on Chinese components. Bans don’t work because it is impossible to achieve “full self-sufficiency.”
Instead, the issue at hand is how to manage and secure an airspace populated by Chinese-made drones. The immediate solution is not a ban or a requirement to buy only western-made drones. This may be a good long-term goal, but it will take time and investment to replace China.
DJI and China are only one part of a larger problem. Chinese suppliers are deeply embedded in American consumer goods from dishwashers to cars and trucks, and many are connected to the internet — thus vulnerable to cyber-espionage or disruption. The cost to the US of replacing Chinese products in all goods, not just drones, is estimated at roughly $14 trillion over 25 years.
So, how can we ensure security in a world populated by connected Chinese devices?
The Trump Administration has taken valuable steps to manage drones in US airspace. A June 2025 Executive Order created an interagency task force to secure US airspace from drone incursions by foreign actors, drug cartels, and unauthorized operators near critical infrastructure, military installations, and mass gatherings. The EO requires the FAA to provide automated, real-time access to identifying information linked to drone ID signals, restricts drone flights over sensitive facilities, and streamlines federal grant programs to let state and local agencies acquire advanced counter-drone and drone detection technologies. This is good progress, but there is more to do.
CEPA’s Solving the Drone Dilemma series explores the problem and suggests practical policy solutions.
The series explores several key themes centered on the challenges and necessities of supply chain security and regulating drones:
- The US and Europe’s heavy reliance on Chinese drone components creates data exfiltration risks and exposes western firms to retaliatory export bans.
- Blanket bans on Chinese technology are counterproductive, stifle innovation, and fail to address DJI and other Chinese companies’ existing market saturation.
The series urges greater cooperation with Ukraine and emphasizes international collaboration and industrial investment, urging Western nations and NATO allies to diversify supply chains, leverage wartime innovations from Ukraine, and provide long-term government contracts to build a resilient manufacturing base. There is a strong focus on airspace safety and modernization, advocating for a shift away from inefficient, temporary “no-fly” bans toward centralized drone traffic control systems, standardized tracking protocols (such as Remote IDs), and unified regulatory frameworks inspired by international models to safely unlock commercial potential.
A reliance on Chinese drone technology is both risky and unavoidable. The options are to accept risk, ban the products, or find a way to manage risk. All three options can work, depending on the level of risk and the cost of alternatives. The risks of connectivity vary by device. We may accept the risk of using Chinese white goods (like washing machines) and require alternative approaches for others, such as cars or drones.
Taking advantage of digital connectivity is one solution that could become a useful precedent for consumer devices. An architecture to reduce risk could use cloud-based data intermediaries. DJI drones, for example, would not communicate directly with China, but to a US-based intermediary. For drones, this could build on existing FAA drone databases and law enforcement’s recently authorized, automated, real-time access to Remote ID signals. A few telecom companies are already developing drone protection systems that take advantage of 5G connectivity.
A new drone management structure would combine mandatory identification, data intermediaries, and permissions or geofencing (a virtual boundary around a specific geographic location) for sensitive areas. Unauthorized drones could be quickly identified and acted upon under 2026 “Safer Skies” authorities. Drones transmit digital identifiers that can be used to avoid the kind of disruption around airports seen in the US and Europe. The risk to data and services in sensitive use cases, such as for law enforcement or commercial applications like deliveries or imaging, can be managed by data monitoring.
Elements of a near-term response already exist. Many digital technologies are already connected to the cloud for updates and servicing. The spread of 5G and 6G networks will accelerate this. The interconnected economy could provide risk management in new ways that take advantage of advances in telecommunications, cloud services, and artificial intelligence tools. Think of it as a spam filter on steroids.
The concept of data intermediaries could be extended to include other consumer technologies to reduce risk from Chinese supply chains without entailing unacceptable costs, since in the near term, creating an alternative supply chain will be an expensive and lengthy process.
Ultimately, securing Western airspace and consumer markets does not require an all-or-nothing choice between bans and vulnerability. Building independent Western supply chains is an important long-term goal, but the immediate situation requires new tools for risk management rather than reactive bans. Using digital connectivity, cloud-based data intermediaries, ubiquitous networks, and automated oversight can allow the US and other market economy allies to safely use Chinese-manufactured technology and commercial services. Beginning with drones, a network-centric approach provides a scalable blueprint to safeguard airspace and critical infrastructure today while laying the regulatory and technological foundation to secure an increasingly interconnected global economy.
Bandwidth is CEPA’s online journal dedicated to advancing transatlantic cooperation on tech policy. All opinions expressed on Bandwidth are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
Tech 2030
A Roadmap for Europe-US Tech Cooperation
