For many outside observers, momentum in war is measured by red and blue arrows moving across screens, or towns changing hands, where advances are counted in kilometers. Yet from Ukraine, where front line movement is more often measured in meters, it means something different.
Even on the morning after a Russian attack, many of my neighbors and friends in Odesa do not ask whether the front has shifted. Instead, they check their phones to see whether Ukrainian drones have struck an airfield in Crimea, a refinery inside Russia, or a military factory hundreds of kilometers from the battlefield. On July 6, for example, they will have read about attacks on the faraway Russian refinery in Omsk. On July 7, in Moscow and Belgorod.
In a war that has become one of attrition, the ability to impose costs on Russia far from the front has become an important sign of progress and irrefutable evidence — for both Ukrainians and Russians — of successful asymmetric warfare against a stronger enemy.
This difference in perception is often missed abroad. Western discussions frequently focus on territorial gains and losses, treating momentum as something visible on maps.
For Ukrainians, momentum can mean forcing Russia to move aircraft farther from the front, compelling Moscow to spend extra resources protecting domestic infrastructure, or demonstrating that ever more Russian territory is within reach of Ukraine’s weapons. It also means the occupying forces cannot relax in the lands they have temporarily and illegally taken from Ukraine.
One of the principal sources of this momentum has been Ukraine’s ability to innovate, which has been a necessity and a massive source of national pride. The widespread use of drones for reconnaissance, strike missions, and naval operations has allowed Kyiv’s forces to compensate for disadvantages in manpower and conventional military equipment.
Ukrainian engineers, military units, and private companies have developed increasingly sophisticated unmanned systems capable of reaching targets deep behind Russian lines. Some were bankrolled by cash donations from members of the public, who dug into their own pockets to fund their country’s defense.
The attacks have complicated Moscow’s logistics and increased the cost of sustaining military operations, particularly in Crimea and along critical supply routes. They have also shown ordinary Russians, as they sit in endless lines for gas, that their leaders have misled them about progress in the war.
Military assistance from Western partners has also enabled Ukraine to continue its resistance. Political debates in allied countries have sometimes created uncertainty, but Kyiv, through relentless and effective diplomacy, has succeeded in maintaining a broad coalition of support.
For Ukrainians living through the war, this support is not an abstract geopolitical issue, but a vital fact of everyday life. Decisions made in Washington, Berlin, or London can affect air defense, electricity supplies, and the safety of entire cities.
Ukraine has suffered devastating losses, but Russia faces mounting pressures of its own, with sanctions, technological restrictions, labor shortages, and the costs of prolonged war weighing on its economy. Long-range strikes against oil facilities and military infrastructure are intended not simply to destroy targets but to make Moscow’s war increasingly expensive.
None of this means Ukraine is clearly winning, and Ukrainians are fully aware of that. The front remains difficult and often static; Russia retains substantial advantages in population, industrial capacity, and available manpower, and its forces are continuing offensive operations across several sectors.
Yet momentum does not depend entirely on territorial advances. If Ukraine can continue to innovate, maintain international support, and force Moscow to devote more resources to defending its own territory, it can gradually improve its strategic position.
For many of us in Ukraine, this is perhaps the most important shift of the past two years. Victory is no longer just imagined as a rapid liberation of occupied territory — though that remains a strong wish and a stated priority. Increasingly, it means denying Russia the ability to dictate the course of the war.
Momentum is visible in Russia’s growing need to defend itself, Ukraine’s ability to strike back, and the continuing refusal of Ukraine’s people to accept that time automatically favors Moscow.
This is a vital notion for Ukrainians, but it should also be a moment of reckoning for their international partners. The time to build on this momentum, increase pressure on Moscow, and elevate assistance to Kyiv is now.
Dr. Volodymyr Dubovyk is a Non-resident Senior Fellow at CEPA. He has been working at the Odesa I. Mechnikov National University since 1992, as an Associate Professor at the Department of International Relations since 1996, and has acted as the Director of the Center for International Studies since 1999.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
