Europe’s strategic horizon is shifting eastward. Russia’s war against Ukraine, instability in the Red Sea, tensions around the Strait of Hormuz, transatlantic trade and political friction, and the fragmentation of global supply chains have forced policymakers to rethink the geography of economic security.
The Mediterranean, the Gulf, and the Indian Ocean increasingly belong to the same strategic conversation. Energy flows, maritime security, industrial resilience, and trade flows now connect Europe to the Indo-Pacific. So too does a growing recognition that the US and China now represent a global G2, and that the giants are likely to adopt policies requiring middle-power alternatives.
India occupies a growing place in this evolving picture. The conclusion of the EU-India Free Trade Agreement in January, after negotiations that began in 2009, reflects a convergence that extends beyond trade. Europe is seeking trusted partners capable of supporting supply-chain diversification and industrial resilience. India is looking for deeper access to markets, technology, investment, and advanced industrial ecosystems.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s recent European tour illustrated this. His visits to the Netherlands, Sweden, Norway, and Italy reflected a desire to combine engagement with European institutions, regional economic frameworks, and bilateral partnerships with key European states. The broader message was clear: Europe has become increasingly important for India’s external strategy.
The Rome summit nevertheless stood apart from the other stops on the tour. The decision by Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni and Modi to elevate bilateral relations to what is termed a special strategic partnership formalized a relationship that has expanded rapidly over the past three years. Defense industrial cooperation, critical minerals, maritime transport, ports, innovation, and advanced manufacturing now sit at the center of the bilateral agenda.
Yet the summit’s broader significance emerged elsewhere. In a joint op-ed published simultaneously in Italy and India, Meloni and Modi described what they called the Indo-Mediterranean, describing it as an interconnected geostrategic space linking the Mediterranean to the Indo-Pacific through the Gulf and the Red Sea. They argued that the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean can no longer be considered separate spheres. That formulation matters because it gives political expression to a strategic reality that has become increasingly difficult to ignore.
The crises of recent years have exposed the links between Europe, the Middle East, East Africa, and the Indian Ocean. The Houthis’ attacks on merchant vessels in the Red Sea affect European trade. The Iran war in the Gulf influences energy markets across Eurasia. Decisions taken in the Indo-Pacific reverberate across maritime routes connecting Asian production centers to European consumers. Geography has not changed. The strategic perception of geography has.
Italy occupies a distinctive position within this emerging framework. Bilaterally, it offers India advanced manufacturing capabilities, a sophisticated defense industrial base, and growing opportunities for integration into European value chains. Regionally, its Mediterranean location places it at the intersection of the maritime routes connecting Europe to the Gulf and the Indian Ocean. At the European level, Italy provides access to one of the European Union’s largest industrial economies and one of its most active foreign policy agendas.
This helps explain why the Italy-India relationship has acquired a significance that exceeds the bilateral dimension. The India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) provides the most visible example. Initially presented as a connectivity initiative, the corridor has gradually acquired a broader strategic function. The debate surrounding IMEC increasingly revolves around resilience, redundancy, and the diversification of routes connecting Europe and Asia.
The logic is straightforward. With war and disruption on the rise, governments and businesses are searching for alternatives capable of reducing exposure to disorder.
Recent developments suggest that this thinking is beginning to influence European diplomacy. At this week’s informal EU foreign ministers’ meeting in Cyprus, discussions included maritime security, the Middle East, Ukraine, and Europe’s future security strategy alongside counterparts from India and Saudi Arabia. The presence of both countries reflected a broader recognition that Europe’s security environment increasingly extends beyond its traditional geographic perimeter.
Both sides have a clear interest in deepening ties. India recognizes China’s growing assertiveness, a Russia whose strategic alignment with Beijing continues to deepen, and an American foreign policy that is increasingly transactional. Europe is confronting many of the same issues, from growing concerns about China’s economic and technological influence to uncertainty surrounding long-term American commitments and the consequences of Russia’s revisionism. The alignment is therefore more than temporary.
Recent events capture that transformation. While Modi was in Europe discussing connectivity, industrial cooperation, and the Indo-Mediterranean, Vladimir Putin was in Beijing reaffirming Russia’s partnership with Xi Jinping. Days later, Indian and Saudi representatives joined European foreign ministers in Cyprus.
These are distinct diplomatic moments and together point toward the emergence of a new strategic geography. The Indo-Mediterranean concept can become a construct to anchor both Europe and India, and provide some insurance against the unpredictability of less cooperative nations.
Emanuele Rossi is senior analyst at Decode39 and Formiche’s diplomatic editor
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
