Russia’s recent missile and drone strikes and follow-on attacks against Ukraine represent a cruel exercise in signaling.
Following a brief ceasefire, Russia revealed that it can breach Ukraine’s aerial defenses. By deploying an unparalleled barrage, Putin arguably sent a veiled warning to Europe that their cities and factories are not beyond reach if they continue supporting Kyiv. Finally, as Trump and Xi toasted their summit in Beijing, Putin sought to remind both leaders that he does not want to be seen as a junior counterpart.
The West’s strategy of sanctioning Russia and assisting Ukraine is predicated on the notion that Russia will eventually reach a point in its war at which the costs of advancing any further are simply too painful. The Kremlin’s confidence rests on its calculus of the West’s strategic limitations and the apparent fragility of the rules-based order. The scale of as-yet unpunished Russian war crimes in Ukraine attests to this.
Russia reckons it can outlast its foes. From the Kremlin’s vantage, the war amounts to a social media spectacle for most Westerners. Commitments to realizing increases in NATO members’ future defense spending, a €90bn ($100bn-plus) loan to Ukraine, some European countries instituting compulsory military service, and a 20th round of sanctions illustrate a highly commendable awakening.
But this will not deter Russia from continuing its war. US talks over the past year have not yielded any major successes either. Russia’s stalling and bizarre demands, paired with its targeted attacks on US companies in Ukraine, indicate that Putin reasons his position is very secure.
Yet the Kremlin’s strategic fallacy rests on Russia viewing Ukraine as a Western proxy, rather than a skilled and determined state capable of fighting to a stalemate. The estimate of Russian casualties since its full-scale invasion (up to 325,000 dead by December 2025) is staggering, and Ukraine is hitting Russian oil refineries. Russia’s loss of unauthorized access to Starlink further vexes its military. Ukraine has also responded to Russia’s brutal attacks by deploying nearly 600 drones.
Meanwhile, “Russia’s rate of advance is plummeting” and “Ukrainian forces are out-innovating Russian forces in both military technologies and in applying these new technologies in effective operational concepts,” the Institute for the Study of War said on May 25.
In an age now defined by the breakage of the rules-based order, Ukraine is one of its remaining champions. Its execution of numerous “Saratoga” moments, such as the 2022 counter-offensive to retake Kharkiv and Kherson; the Kursk incursion; Operation Spider’s Web; and grit through a most brutal winter, underscores the resilience of a free nation defended by free men and women.
Ukraine boasts arguably the “strongest” military in Europe and is a party to the ICC and NPT, as well as an ardent supporter of the UN Charter. Even as Ukraine fights an existential war defined by extreme social hardships and economic challenges, Kyiv is aiding certain Gulf states with their own defenses. Ukraine is also enhancing cooperation with European defense companies, which could set the stage for Kyiv to more robustly integrate its high-tech advancements into Europe’s future security. Ukrainian drone factories are opening across democratic Europe.
Yet the West’s favored compellence strategy, while well-intentioned, essentially forces Ukraine to keep bleeding, while the proverbial wolf draws closer to the sled. A recent wargame revealed that NATO appears unprepared to repel a rapid Russian incursion into its territory.
Absent a credible deterrent — something which requires popular acquiescence, at least — the West thus awaits a future in which Russia, a terrorist state already menacing Europe with its shadow war activities, holds sway over the continent’s prosperity. It is in this sense that the war’s eventual outcome matters so much, for Ukraine serves as both a shield and ballast of the rules-based order. Western states cannot let Russia outwit them by chipping away at Ukraine.
True, Russia lacks the capacity to subjugate Ukraine, in part due to the latter’s advancements in drones. But such thinking masks the inherent difficulties for Ukraine in terms of maintaining a mobilized force, rotating troops, caring for the wounded and displaced, repairing infrastructure, and shielding its supply routes. Russia’s recent attacks and strikes on Kyiv should therefore spark a discussion about how to stop Putin, both now and in the future.
The West should not cling to the illusion that Putin’s dictatorship wobbles behind an opaque curtain. That may or may not be true, but it cannot be relied on. Rather, upon settling their security burden-sharing discrepancies, Western states could invite Kyiv into some form of alliance and physically take part in defending its controlled territory. Building a credible deterrent takes time, and allying with an embattled middle power means preparing for war. By escalating, the West may freeze the war in place, if it credibly avows the rules-based order is not a relic.
And there is now no question that the battle-hardened Ukrainian forces of perhaps 1 million personnel are key to defending the West against Russia. The Kremlin will be far more wary of embarking on a future war that would engage Kyiv’s formidable military system.
A coordinated and sequenced Western escalation has the potential to stop Russia’s imperialism dead in its tracks. Facing a credible deterrent, Putin would have to reason that his illegal war aims in Ukraine are simply unachievable. As long as Russia deters the West from intervening any further, the war will not cease. The West has to strip Putin of this trump card.
Ukraine should not officially cede anything to Russia. A freeze in place would give Kyiv a decisive security guarantee over its controlled territory, the chance to break free from the wolf, and the opportunity to fully align with the West. Ukraine will then no longer just serve as a shield, but Europe’s sword in any future confrontation.
Charles Sullivan is the author of Motherland: Soviet Nostalgia in the Russian Federation (Palgrave Macmillan, 2022) and Leaders of the Nation: Kazakhstan during the Twilight of the Nazarbayev Era and the Russo-Ukrainian War (Palgrave Macmillan, 2025).
The opinions expressed here are the author’s own.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
