In normal times, the Strait of Hormuz, a 24-mile-wide maritime passage framing the Persian Gulf, helps keep the global economy a well-oiled machine. Without it, past and present show, panic ensues.
Despite significant losses, Iran’s resurgent theocratic regime continues to exert command over this critical maritime corridor. And while views on Operation Epic Fury diverge across the United States, Europe, and beyond, there remains broad agreement on one point: the world’s vital shipping lanes cannot be left vulnerable to those willing to exploit them for coercive advantage.
As nations begin to coalesce around a possible approach, recent history provides valuable perspective and some reason for substantial caution.
Just over two years ago, in response to a growing campaign of Houthi drone and missile attacks targeting commercial shipping passing or heading for the narrow Bab el-Mandeb passage into the Red Sea, the United States led the establishment of Operation Prosperity Guardian (OPG) – about a dozen European and other regional partners unified toward a common mission of protecting merchant vessels under threat. In practice, however, there is a wide variation in participants’ commitment – from the tightly integrated, such as the United Kingdom, to those like France operating under national missions in parallel, to others, including Australia, offering personnel for staff roles.
Today, as multiple nations again signal their intent “to contribute to appropriate efforts to ensure safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz,” it is worth reflecting on what from the OPG model can be replicated.
Overall, OPG could be considered a relative success; by tactical measures, it was effective. Coalition forces intercepted dozens of drones and missiles and enabled hundreds of commercial vessels to continue transiting the Red Sea.
Yet these accomplishments masked a complicated strategic reality. Shipping volumes still dropped significantly during the worst disruption, insurance risk premiums surged, and a steady stream of successful Houthi strikes — while rarely catastrophic, with great credit due to the expertise of the militaries involved — sustained doubts about the viability of the Red Sea route and proved the adversary remained undeterred.
Upon close inspection of the OPG playbook, four critical considerations emerge for a mission to protect shipping amidst Epic Fury: two structural challenges — brutal geography and partner hesitancy — that make the earlier model difficult to imitate and two features — adaptation speed and software-driven uncrewed systems — that could prove applicable, even decisive.
First, the map. Unlike the wider operating space and more flexible routing options available around the Bab el-Mandeb, Hormuz compresses traffic into a narrow transit corridor. It has fewer alternative routes, limited maneuverability, high traffic density, and far greater exposure to shore-based threats. The relative absence of large-scale sea mining during Protective Guardian also stands in contrast to the Persian Gulf, where mines have historically proven to be an efficient, scalable threat that can disrupt shipping regardless of naval escorts.
Second, the coalition. Protective Guardian benefited from a level of multinational participation that, while uneven, was still able to distribute operational burden and lend political legitimacy. Even then, contributions varied widely, with key allies choosing different command structures or limited roles. With the escalation risk of any operation to reopen the Hormuz passage, that coalition is likely to remain thinner, more fragmented, and more politically constrained as nations hesitate to commit high-value assets into a more dangerous and economically consequential theater.
That is the case if the fighting continues, the very high-risk scenario, or if a ceasefire holds, a lower-risk but still perilous situation. Indeed, on March 20, France, Germany, and Italy said that while they may engage in operations after a ceasefire, they would not take action before that.
Any operation can learn useful lessons from Protective Guardian. There were two that offer glimpses of a radically innovative future with the potential to transform the escort and protect mission.
The first is the speed of adaptation. OPG demonstrated that modern maritime defense is no longer defined solely by platforms, but by the ability to rapidly integrate sensor data, iterate tactics, and adjust in near real time to evolving threats. This shift from platform-centric to network-centric operations allowed coalition forces to respond effectively to complex drone and missile attacks. In a Hormuz scenario, where threats are likely more diverse and coordinated, this ability to learn and adapt quickly will likely matter more than the number of ships deployed.
The second is the early glimpse of a different cost and risk model as Protective Guardian exposed the unsustainable economics of using high-end interceptors against low-cost threats, while also highlighting the growing role of unmanned and attritable systems and the software that unites them.
Distributed networks of sensors, electronic warfare capabilities, and uncrewed platforms offer the potential to scale defenses, reduce the burden on individual escorts, and lower risk to service personnel. Just as importantly, they may enable broader participation: a nation unwilling to deploy a frigate into harm’s way may still contribute data, autonomous systems, or integration capabilities into a shared network.
Back to the present. The coming days and weeks will reveal new complexities related to any operation in the Strait of Hormuz, and it is evident that the lessons from Protective Guardian provide more caution than confidence. Indeed, the future of maritime security will demand something different: distributed networks, faster adaptation, and swarms of attritable unmanned systems that shift risk away from high-value platforms and the precious lives that crew them.
For the nations now stepping forward, the lesson is not to repeat Protective Guardian, but to build on it toward what comes next.
Jason Israel is the Auterion Senior Fellow for the Defense Technology Initiative at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA). He has twice served the White House National Security Council, most recently as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Defense Policy & Strategy. He is a Captain in the US Navy Reserve.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
Ukraine 2036
How Today’s Investments Will Shape Tomorrow’s Security
CEPA Forum 2025
Explore CEPA’s flagship event.
