US policymakers warn of “countries of concern,” blacklist Chinese firms, and debate restrictions on artificial intelligence exports. Yet a far larger — and quieter — development is unfolding in plain sight: an unprecedented influx of foreign capital.
Since 2025, the US has welcomed a staggering $10.5 trillion in investment commitments spanning semiconductor manufacturing, energy infrastructure and cloud computing. While some of these commitments may not materialize, the investments are celebrated as evidence of renewed American industrial vitality, even though their sheer scale should prompt scrutiny. Close attention is warranted to the source of the capital and its potential security risks.
Foreign government investors account for 51% of the pledge investment at $5.3 trillion. The United Arab Emirates and Qatar alone have promised $1.4 trillion and $1.2 trillion respectively, followed by Japan with roughly $1 trillion, Saudi Arabia with $600 billion, and India approaching $500 billion. By comparison, cumulative private European investment pledges into American tech total roughly $802.8 billion.
Chinese foreign direct investment — despite fiery political rhetoric — totals just $1.4 billion and is concentrated in manufacturing. Nearly all Chinese investment in the US can be traced to Smithfield Foods, the US’s largest pork processor, acquired for $4.7 billion by WH Group in 2013. Interestingly, the White House does not list Smithfield Foods as foreign-owned. Shenghe Resources, a Chinese rare earth company, owns almost 8% of MP Materials, which is the owner of the only American rare earth mining and processing site, the Mountain Pass mine in California. MP Materials has committed $1.3 billion in investment.
American policymakers have long understood the national security dangers of foreign investment. In the aftermath of the 1973 oil embargo and fears surrounding OPEC “petrodollar” acquisitions, President Gerald Ford established the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS). Its deliberately ambiguous mandate allowed federal agencies to investigate foreign acquisitions that might threaten national security, particularly those involving state-owned enterprises.
Half a century later, Washington has actively solicited and welcomed massive inflows from sovereign wealth funds and government-backed entities. Gulf states, possessing some of the world’s largest pools of deployable capital, have emerged as undeniable partners. Their investments are not purely commercial. Sovereign funds seek long-term exposure to foundational technologies — AI, advanced energy, and semiconductors — that will define future economic power.
AI sits at the intersection of civilian industry and national defense. The ongoing Iran war has already integrated the use of frontier models into intelligence analysis, logistics, and targeting. This shift exposes a new dimension of tech ownership risk, not simply who finances American innovation, but who governs the private firms that mediate military capability.
Anthropic’s conflict with the Department of War illustrates this emerging dilemma. Negotiations fell through around whether the AI firm would permit unrestricted military use of their systems for “all lawful purposes,” including mass surveillance and operational planning. The Pentagon blacklisted Anthropic as a “supply chain risk” after it declined to remove certain safety limits governing autonomous systems or mass surveillance. Anthropic responded by suing the US government.
The conflict marks a structural turning point: national security increasingly depends not only on federally owned infrastructure, but on privately governed algorithms financed through global capital markets. The firms shaping military AI are embedded with sovereign wealth funds, multinational venture capital, and cross-border institutional ownership.
Corporate nationality offers only partial reassurance. US-registered companies frequently possess globally dispersed ownership structures, opaque shareholder networks, and institutional investors whose ultimate beneficiaries remain difficult to trace — including sovereign wealth funds or state-aligned capital operating indirectly through financial intermediaries. Private equity firms invest tens of billions through a variety of investment vehicles but are not required to disclose the identities of their investors.
The money pouring into American technology can maintain parallel ties to China. Modern capital moves through subsidiaries, private equity structures, holding companies, and cross-border investment funds designed precisely to obscure ultimate ownership.
Even where foreign ownership is approved, companies may be legally barred from sharing controlled technologies with overseas investors. The result is a distinction between financial participation and technological participation: capital may cross borders, but not knowledge.
The US is effectively outsourcing portions of military technological development to venture-backed firms whose capitalization depends on global investors—even as policymakers frame technological competition in increasingly national terms. Corporate governance could be influenced by transnational capital rather than government oversight. The danger is no longer limited to supply chains or manufacturing capacity. It extends to strategic military capabilities.
The US remains the world’s richest economy and home to its most valuable tech firms. Its embrace of massive foreign investment reflects less financial necessity than political choice.
Elly Rostoum is a Senior Resident Fellow with the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA).
Bandwidth is CEPA’s online journal dedicated to advancing transatlantic cooperation on tech policy. All opinions expressed on Bandwidth are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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