The 40 days between December 2 and January 12 accounted for 10% of all Russian attacks on ports and ships that have been launched since the full-scale invasion in 2022. The onslaught demonstrates that the Kremlin remains determined to destroy Ukraine’s vital export infrastructure and sales. The attacks show no sign of letting up.
The Black Sea grain corridor remains operational but under sustained pressure, both from security threats and structural constraints.
Agricultural products are Ukraine’s most important export. In 2021, the last year before the full-scale invasion, they totaled $27.8bn, accounting for 41% of the country’s overall exports. In 2023, Ukraine exported agricultural products (including grains) worth $22bn, rising to $41.7bn for commodities in 2024, a category dominated by agri-food.
Russia has used missiles, drones, and naval mines to attack Ukrainian ports and commercial shipping. Rather than imposing a formal blockade, like the failed version it attempted from February to July 2022, it has pursued a strategy of persistent disruption, forcing Kyiv to devote scarce resources to coastal air defense and port protection.
Lacking a conventional navy capable of matching Russia, Ukraine has focused on asymmetric means to attack Russian naval vessels and installations. Uncrewed surface vessels, underwater drones, and long-range precision strikes have hit a wide range of targets (see here and here).
These operations have forced Russia to disperse forces, reinforce port defenses, and reconsider basing patterns. Beyond their material impact, Ukrainian maritime strikes carry strategic and psychological weight, challenging assumptions about Russian naval dominance.
After Russia’s unilateral withdrawal from the UN‑brokered Black Sea Grain Initiative in July 2023, Kyiv established its own maritime export corridor through ports such as Odesa, Chornomorsk, and Pivdennyi.
This has allowed the continued shipment of agricultural exports, but the risks are high, and it remains strategically vulnerable. At the height of the 2022 blockade, Ukraine also utilized its ports on the Danube to organize a river route as an alternative, although the capacity for goods transit was much lower due to the smaller size of the river vessels. The Danube route remains operational, and Russia attacks ports there, but it remains secondary to the main maritime route.
In April 2024, Ukraine exported approximately 6.6m tons of grain and oilseeds, the highest monthly figure since the start of Russia’s full‑scale invasion, with about 5.2m tons shipped via its Black Sea ports.
Yet volumes have been volatile: in April 2025, for instance, exports via the corridor reportedly declined by around 45% year‑on‑year, illustrating its sensitivity to security and market conditions.
Despite such fluctuations, it has been a story of remarkable success in the face of tremendous adversity.
Yet the latest Russian onslaught adds ever more pressure on Kyiv’s resources.
Missile and drone strikes on port infrastructure and the threat to commercial vessels directly affect the security of exports and push up insurance costs, testing the willingness of shipping companies to operate in the region. So far, operators have not been withdrawing from transporting goods, but the risks are real. The underwriting and insurance of the Black Sea grain trade has transitioned to a mixture of private, specialized insurance markets and a state-supported Ukrainian facility, which includes such giants as Lloyd’s of London.
The grain corridor’s continued functioning reflects Ukraine’s adaptability, yet its sustainability is dependent on a viable level of security, the cost tolerance of global shipping markets, and Ukraine’s agricultural output.
The corridor is a critical economic and geopolitical asset whose disruption would have immediate consequences for Ukraine and global food security.
Ukraine’s role as a major breadbasket means disruptions to its grain trade —specifically wheat, corn, and sunflower oil — have severe impacts on global food security, causing price surges and supply shortages, particularly in Africa and the Middle East.
The Black Sea has entered a phase of protracted contestation, in which ongoing military activity coexists with emerging informal constraints for civilian shipping and third-party actors.
This is likely to continue even after the fighting stops. How this is managed — especially with regard to civilian shipping and third-party interests — will be critical in determining whether the region moves toward a fragile equilibrium or even greater instability.
Dr. Volodymyr Dubovyk is a Non-resident Senior Fellow at CEPA. He has been working at the Odesa I. Mechnikov National University since 1992, as an Associate Professor at the Department of International Relations since 1996, and has acted as a Director of the Center for International Studies since 1999.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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