Whether or not you agree with Canada’s Prime Minister Mark Carney that the old world order is rupturing, there’s no question it’s under huge strain. With the Trump administration making clear through statements and policy papers that Europe is very largely on its own, the continent’s bigger powers are facing deeply uncomfortable choices.
That’s especially true for Italy, where a populist, right-wing Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni has sought to be a bridge to Donald Trump, with whom she enjoys good relations, while maintaining the country’s key interests in Europe.
So when Trump made threats including additional tariffs because European countries rejected his demands for Greenland, Meloni called for restraint among European allies. While President Macron and Chancellor Merz were adamant about the need to show strength in response, including sending troops to Greenland, Meloni and her Defense Minister Crosetto chose not to participate.
Riccardo Leoni, an independent Italian defense expert, explains: “Meloni has set her foreign policy on two tracks: reinforcing Italy’s role in Europe and taking advantage of her ties with Donald Trump to position Rome as Washington’s interlocutor in the EU. Yet in light of tensions within NATO and a growing possibility of the US retreating from Europe, this balance is proving extremely difficult to maintain”
Russia’s shadow war against north-eastern Europe notably stepped up last year, bringing urgent responses from the most-threatened NATO states but barely any support from Washington. That, the US threats over Greenland, and the possibility of an enforced, Russia-friendly peace on Ukraine have clarified thinking in Northern Europe.
France and Germany speak ever more plainly of a European-only defensive alliance able to resist Russia and China and, if need be, stand up to the US. The UK, another of the continents’ five major military and security powers, argues — like Italy — that the transatlantic alliance remains critical, but has been planning with Berlin and Paris behind the scenes. The issue not yet decided is whether this would be an outgrowth of the European Union — tricky given UK and Norwegian involvement, but also because the bloc’s systems are sluggish and open to veto by adamant single powers.
So, what about Italy and why does it matter?
The country is critical in deciding what post-US European defense might look like. The balance of any likely new alliance is very much tilted towards Northern Europe. Apart from France, the UK, and Germany, it would probably include at least 12 other Nordic, Baltic and Benelux states (see this CEPA article, If NATO Dies, Long Live NEATO).
But such a grouping’s only Southern European presence in that case would be France. Spain is a long-standing defense laggard, while Greece and Turkey are more focused on one another than on Russia. Italy’s presence would greatly expand the footprint and regional presence of a defensive military pact. As the fifth-biggest defense spender among major European NATO states — and the EU’s third-largest economy — it clearly matters a great deal.
With over 100 US bases, 12,000 American military personnel, and large stores of equipment in Italy, the country acts as a logistics center and a key part of NATO’s deterrence for all of Europe. If the Trump administration chose to bring its troops and equipment home, there would be initial shock, but Italy would be likely to join other European countries to build a post-US structure defense pact. The alternatives, after all, are not appealing.
Indeed, it could align with Italy’s long-term goal of becoming the continent’s leader in the Mediterranean.
But the country has an even higher debt-to-GDP ratio — at 136% — than even France and the UK, which also have significant problems servicing their loans. Italy also suffers low economic growth. The idea of spending very large additional sums on defense would be politically difficult and unpopular.
That’s not to say Italy’s government has ignored what is happening on the continent. Despite headwinds from pro-Russian forces in parliament and the country, Meloni’s Italy has been a staunch supporter of Ukraine, sending 12 aid packages worth over €3bn ($3.6bn).
Italy’s military is now growing after a long period of low spending and was estimated finally to have reached NATO’s old target 2% of GDP target last year. Rising funding is anticipated, and will go toward programs including the new amphibious carrier Trieste and its F-35B aircraft. Italian defense industries are already benefiting; there are now partnerships between Leonardo and Rheinmetall to produce next-generation Panther tanks, and Fincantieri is exporting frigates, while industry modernization is steadily progressing. A powerful and secure Europe will need capable industries backing it.
A key signal of Italian defense strength and seriousness of purpose is the multi-billion dollar Global Combat Air Program (GCAP) with the UK and Japan to produce a sixth-generation multi-role stealth fighter
In 2022, the Italian Ministry of Defense announced its commitment to the defense of the “wider Mediterranean” (Mediterraneo allargato), underscoring the important role Italy holds in protecting the sea from grey zone threats, including undersea cable cutting. Crosetto’s recently released working paper calls for a civil-military unit of 5,000 people to combat hybrid warfare threats, critical given Sicily’s important role as a route for undersea cables prone to sabotage.
The combination of recognizing grey zone threats paired with modernized equipment makes Italy a leader in Mediterranean defense and essential to any broad-based defense of European territory.
In a recent press conference, Meloni and German Chancellor Frederich Merz agreed to boost defense cooperation and to work jointly to cutting down on EU defense export vetoes and bureaucracy. The pair reiterated that the EU must evolve to meet the demands of the future, become faster at decision making, and leaner in rules.
Stronger ties to European countries are not the only avenues Meloni continues to take to prepare for a retreating US presence. Apart from the GCAP (see above) and other hard defense projects, Italy’s Mattei Plan in Africa seeks to deepen engagement on the south side of the Mediterranean.
The remarkable stability of Meloni’s government, unseen since the 2000s, makes the country a serious player without which Europe would be more vulnerable.
An EU-based military alliance would be more likely to win public support in Italy, where 69% supported an EU army in a recent poll (Northern Europe tends to be more skeptical on this issue).
Leoni said: “The choice at hand is either strengthening defense cooperation within the EU or the creation of a new military alliance, although the latter is less probable.”
The EU’s current defense-related work is critical, he said. “The EU has laid the groundwork for cooperation, and more importantly, vital financing. Without such funding, the Italian budget would not be able to support increased military funding, leaving it less impactful in an ad-hoc military alliance.”
Any new European defense arrangement will be extremely difficult to agree. But given it now seems far likelier that the US is pulling back, Italy would likely wish to join and should not be counted out.
Niccolò Comini is an independent researcher. He writes about Italian politics and foreign policy, and has been published on CEPA’s Europe’s Edge, Foreign Policy, and The National Interest.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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