The thrilling chase of a Russian-owned shadow fleet tanker that began in the Caribbean and continued across the high seas, only to end in an audacious US heliborne assault in the North Atlantic, resulted in a very public defeat for Vladimir Putin. At the very least, the Russian leader discovered the impotence of his bullying when aimed at Washington.
The seizure of a shadow fleet vessel on January 7 reads like a Tom Clancy novel and has provided considerable fodder to journalists, shipping analysts, retired naval officers and politicians.
But there is more to it than mere drama, eye-catching though it was.
The pursuit of an obscure and elderly vessel — then called Bella 1 and flying the flag of Guyana — began as a US operation against shadow fleet ships transporting sanctioned Venezuelan and Iranian oil. In December, the rusting vessel stopped transmitting its location and began changing course near Venezuela. The US Coast Guard demanded that the vessel prepare to be boarded. The ship ignored the challenge and sailed on, with the USCG in pursuit.
About three weeks later, the vessel reappeared on tracking systems under the name Marinera, now sailing under a Russian flag. Marinera also showed up in the Russian Maritime Register of Shipping as an oil tanker registered in Sochi, a Russian port on the Black Sea. Soon afterwards, Russian spokespeople began to make threats that the US should not interfere with the ship’s passage. The Kremlin made a formal request to the State Department that the pursuit should end.
That was Putin’s big mistake.
The attempt to escalate was a gamble, and it failed. From that moment on, the Marinera became the symbol of a confrontation between two powers ruled by two strongmen. The Kremlin attempted to raise the stakes again, claiming that “our vessel” would be escorted by a Russian Navy submarine (Donald Trump said on January 8 that Russian vessels had “moved away pretty fast” as the US closed in on the ship).
Trump took absolutely no notice of the Russian threats. He ordered his forces to seize the tanker in a large-scale operation that also involved British aircraft and ships and used British bases.
Russia’s response looked very much like a bully whose bluff has been called. Putin said nothing at all and instead hid behind statements from two Russian ministries. The transport and foreign affairs ministries condemned an “illegal act”, provoking mirth among those pointing out Russia’s systematic disdain for international law.
Russian media, acting as always on Kremlin instructions, belittled the story, focusing on the fact that most of the crew were Ukrainian, not Russian, and that the transfer of the flag was, strictly speaking, not conducted according to the rules. Suddenly, the Marinera was not a proper Russian vessel.
Putin’s regime has clearly not benefited from this extraordinary showdown, but the seriousness of the damage is unclear.
The Marinera was not the first tanker affiliated with Russia to be taken into Western custody since the start of the full-scale war in Ukraine. Several other vessels suspected of being part of Russia’s shadow fleet have been raided or detained by Western powers over the past two years.
In April, Estonian authorities detained the tanker Kiwala, sailing under a Djibouti flag. In October, French special forces boarded the same vessel — by then renamed Boracay and reflagged in Benin. The tanker was already under UK and EU sanctions for its shadow fleet role. At the time of the French operation, it was bound for India, carrying Russian oil loaded at the port of Primorsk.
In late December, Swedish authorities briefly detained the Russian freighter Adler, which had departed from St. Petersburg and anchored in Swedish waters near Höganäs in southwestern Sweden after engine failure. The Adler was listed under EU and US sanctions and was suspected of involvement in weapons transport, including to North Korea. The vessel was released after a customs inspection.
The previous year, Finland seized the Russian oil tanker Eagle S, which was carrying 35,000 tons of petrol loaded in Russian ports. Finnish authorities suspected the vessel of involvement in damage to undersea cables. That case was later dismissed by a Finnish court.
So what has changed? The truth is that throughout 2025, all sides involved have been raising the stakes in this game around the shadow fleet. Bear in mind that the fleet (whose size is unknown but may number several hundred vessels) provides the lifeblood to fund Russia’s war on Ukraine.
When Finland detained Eagle S in December 2024, the shadow fleet was primarily accused of helping Russia evade sanctions and suspected of playing a role in damaging undersea infrastructure in Europe. By this January, however, ships associated with the shadow fleet were widely suspected of involvement in sabotage operations across Europe, including alleged drone launches against Denmark, Germany, and several other European countries.
It became clear that those old tankers were no longer simply designed to keep the Russian economy afloat, but could be used in active offensive operations conducted by Russia’s intelligence agencies across Europe. That probably explains why British forces joined the pursuit of the rusty Marinera.
Russia’s interest in these ships became crystal clear last summer when the Russian Navy began protecting them. In June, the corvette Boikiy was spotted escorting two sanctioned tankers through the English Channel — the Selva (also known as Nostos or Naxos), sanctioned by the UK, and the Sierra, sanctioned by both the UK and the EU.
That development significantly escalated the stakes in the cat-and-mouse game — from that point on, it was no longer only about avoiding sanctions or assisting sabotage operations, but about the risk of a direct military confrontation between the Russian navy and its Western counterparts.
Putin lost this time, there are few reasons for huge optimism.
First, Putin’s propaganda machine remains formidable. Prigozhin’s mutiny offers a clear lesson: in a tightly controlled system, a dictator can absorb public humiliation without immediate damage to the regime, even amid grumbling from military hardliners.
Second, the widespread assumption that the Russian navy will always stand back when confronted is a dangerous belief. It’s almost certain there will be more boardings of Russian vessels by NATO member states (UK sources told Inews that there will be more robust action against the vessels, and the US took control of another shadow fleet ship on January 9) and at some point, Russian forces will be nearby. There is room for some unintended and extremely dangerous confrontations.
Irina Borogan and Andrei Soldatov are Non-resident Senior Fellows with the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA). They are Russian investigative journalists and co-founders of Agentura.ru, a watchdog of Russian secret service activities. Their book ’Our Dear Friends in Moscow, The Inside Story of a Broken Generation’ was published in June.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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